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I. INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided twenty-four insurance related
appeals between the Survey Period-June 2003 through May 2004.1 Those
cases originated in nine federal district courts. Again, the overwhelming
majority of appeals concerned the interpretation and enforcement of insurance
contracts.2 Barring one case of first impression, most involved very familiar
procedural and substantive conflicts.3 This year, federal preemption questions

1. The Fifth Circuit delivered twenty-four decisions. The cases are as follows: Pedcor
Managementv. NationsPersonnelof Texas, 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003); Shocklee v. Massachusetts
Mutual Life InsuranceCo., 369 F.3d 437 (5th Cit. Apr. 2004); In re Biloxi CasinoBelle, Inc., 368 F.3d
491 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004); In re MonumentalLife InsuranceCo., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cit. Apr. 2004); Adams
v. Unione MediterraneaDi Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004); NorthfieldInsuranceCo. v. Loving
Home Care Co., 363 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004); New OrleansAssets, L.L.C. v. Woodward, 363 F.3d
372 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004); Hamburgerv. State Farm MutualAutomobile InsuranceCo., 361 F.3d 875 (5th
Cir. Mar. 2004); Mayo v. HartfordLife Insurance,Inc., 354 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004); Valmont
Energy Steel, Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 359 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. Feb. 2004); Brown v.
Protective Life Insurance Co., 353 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003); Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355
F.3d 853 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003); American InternationalSpecialty Lines Insurance Co. v. CanalIndemnity
Co. 352 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003); Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan (Arana l), 352 F.3d 973 (5th Cir.
Dec. 2003); Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. Sept. 20 03); Genesis Insurance Co. v.
Wausau InsuranceCos., 343 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003); Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. HaspelKansasInvestment, 342 F.3d416 (5thCir. Aug. 2003); Medical CareAmerica, Inc. v. National Union Fire
InsuranceCo., 341 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003); Ross v. CitiFinancial,Inc., 344 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. Aug.
2003); Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan (Arana 1), 338 F.3d 433 (5th Cit. July 2003); American States
InsuranceCo. v. Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, 335 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. July 2003); Sport Supply
Group, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 335 F.3d 453 (5th Cit. July 2003); American Indemnity Lloyds v.
Travelers Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 335 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. June 2003); Trinity Universal
InsuranceCo. v. Stevens ForestryService, Inc., 335 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. June 2003); ACS Construction Co.
v. CGU, 332 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. June 2003).
2. See discussion infra Parts Il-VI.
3. See discussion infra Parts Il-VI.
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and conflicts over subject matter jurisdiction appeared in several cases.' But
surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit also decided six class-action or classcertification cases, and the court decided two conflicts involving allegedly
widespread racial and ethnic discrimination in the sale and marketing of
various insurance contracts.
More particularly, among the procedural questions, litigants petitioned
the Fifth Circuit to resolve the following: (1) whether a federal district court's
in personam jurisdiction, venue, and liability-apportionment rulings were
proper;6 (2) whether under federal law "complete diversity" of citizenship
requires a court to consider the citizenship of every underwriter's subscribing
to a Lloyd's of London insurance contract when the lead underwriter only
sues on its own behalf; 7 (3) whether the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) preempts a state declaratory-judgment proceeding to
determine whether an employer's equitable-subrogation claims are
meritorious;' (4) whether an insured has standing to commence a punitive,
class-action suit against credit-life insurers under the Federal Civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute;9 (5) whether insured
African-Americans sufficiently satisfied the "class definition" requirements
to commence a class-action, racial-discrimination suit against industrial-life
insurers under the Civil Rights Act of 1866; l° (6) whether the McCarranFerguson Act preempts non-Caucasians from citing the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 in commencing a class-action suit
against an insurer who allegedly used discriminatory credit scoring to sell
more expensive property insurance contracts to non-Caucasians; 1 and
(7) whether a district court properly certified a large class of self-funded
ERISA health plans for an arbitration hearing. 2
Among the recurring substantive questions, appellants asked the Fifth
Circuit to decide the following: (1) whether a corporate employer, a selfproclaimed beneficiary, has an insurable interest under a corporate-owned life
insurance contract;" (2) whether insurers were liable for a "bad-faith"' 4

4.

See discussion infra Parts II.C-F, II.A, V.C.

5.

See discussion infra Parts I1.B, I.C, IV, V.C.2.

6. See discussion infra Part H.E.
7. See discussion infra Part H.F.
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.C. See also Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation
of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to
Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-FergusonAct1941-1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399, 411-13 (1994) (discussing the development of the McCarranFerguson Act, the allocation of state and federal power under the Act, and the meaning of "business of
insurance" as that phrase appears in the Act).
12. See discussion infra Part IH.C.
13. See discussion infra Part II.C.
14. See discussion infra Part IL.A-B. See also Willy E. Rice, JudicialBias, the InsuranceIndustry
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refusal to pay first-party coverage and indemnification claims; 15 (3) whether

insurers were liable for a bad-faith refusal to defend against third-party

claims; 6 and (4) whether an insurer was liable for arguably breaching a
statutory duty to reimburse a commercial property owner for damages
associated with their first-party claims. 7 More striking, the overwhelming

majority of the appeals involved substantive questions about whether insurers
have a duty to pay, settle, defend, and indemnify insureds in underlying third-

party personal injury suits or whether the insurers need only indemnify the
insureds. 8 Additionally, within this category, the Fifth Circuit agreed to
decide five, four, and three conflicts involving third-party injuries to
persons, 9 property,' and businesses, respectively. 21
To repeat, the Fifth Circuit's twenty-four opinions covered a fairly broad
range of procedural and substantive questions. Therefore, Parts I through IV
present a more thorough review of relevant facts and questions appearing in
each decision. To obtain even greater insight into and appreciation of the
appellate court's deliberations, the author conducted a content analysis of the

and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme Courts' Bad-Faith,Breach-ofContract, Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U.
L. REv. 325, 337-40 (1992) (outlining the origin of the bad faith doctrine and discussing the continuing
judicial conflicts surrounding the application of the doctrine and the standard of proof that one must satisfy
to prevail under the doctrine).
15. See, e.g., DeLeon v. Lloyd's London, Certain Underwriters, 259 F.3d 344,354 (5th Cir. 2001)
(observing and reporting the following:
Article 21.55 [of the Texas Insurance Code] requires the prompt payment or resolution of
claims according to a defined timetable. This timetable is only triggered by the filing of a
"claim," defined as "a first party claim made by an insured or a policyholder under an
insurance policy or contract or by a beneficiary named in the policy or contract that must be
paid by the insurer directly to the insured or beneficiary."
(citations omitted)).
16. See discussion infraPart V.A.2; see also General Star Indem. Co. v. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., 173
F.3d 946, 949-50 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing and reporting the following:
Texas law recognizes only one tort duty in the context of third party claims against an insured,
that being the duty owed by a primary insurer to its insured, as set forth... in the landmark
case of G.A. Stowers FurnitureCo. v. American Indemnity Co. [ 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved)]. In Stowers, the Texas Commission of Appeals held that an
insurer which, under the terms of its policy, assumes control of a claim, becomes the agent of
the insured and is held to the degree of care and diligence that an "ordinarily prudent person
would exercise in the management of his own business." Although Stowers focused
specifically on an insurer's obligation to settle within the limits of its policy, the duty owed by
an insurer to its insured has since been broadly interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court to
include the full range of obligations arising out of an agency relationship. A breach of the
Stowers duty ... gives rise to a cause of action in negligence against that insurer ....
(citations omitted)).
17. See discussion infra Part IlIB.
18. See discussion infra Parts I-VI.
19. See discussion infra Part V.A.
20. See discussion infra Part V.B.
21. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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decisions, generated some percentages, and performed a limited empirical
analysis of the findings.
Part V presents several tables that illustrate the types of legal questions,
legal theories, plaintiffs, defendants, first- and third-party victims, and
insurance contracts associated with the controversies.22 Part V also highlights
and compares the dispositions of the cases within each of the nine federal
district courts and in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.23
HI.

FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS: STATE COMMON-LAW CLAIMS
& DECISIONS

A. Automobile Insurance: Whether Under Texas's Law an Insurer
Acts in "BadFaith" and Breaches the Implied Covenant of
Good Faithand FairDealing by Refusing to Pay Uninsured
Motorists Benefits Before a Jury Clearly Determines the Proximate
Cause of the Insured'sInjuries
The facts in Hamburger v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.24 are quite simple. State Farm insured Perry Hamburger under an
automobile policy. 25 Among several clauses, the insurance contract contained
two clauses that are pertinent: a personal-injury protection (PIP) provision and
an uninsured or underinsured motorist (UIM) provision.26 Under the PIP
clause, an insured motorist receives "reasonable and necessary" medical and
rehabilitative services where an accident proximately causes the insured's
bodily injury.27 On the other hand, the UIM provision required the insurer to

pay those damages that its insured was legally entitled to recover from the
third-party owner or operator of another vehicle.28 But there was a proviso:
The third party must be uninsured or underinsured,2" and the third-party's
behavior must proximately cause the accident and the insured's injuries.3"

22.
23.
24.

See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part V.
Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004).

25.

Id. at 878.

26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 878 n.1.

The PIP provision provides benefits because of bodily injury, resulting from a motor vehicle
accident, sustained by a covered person. The benefits consist of reasonable and necessary
medical and funeral expenses, loss of income, and reasonable expenses incurred for obtaining
services that a covered person normally would have performed.
Id.
28. Id. at 878 n.2.
29. See id. at 880. "Hamburger's UIM coverage requires State Farm to 'pay damages which a
covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle
because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person."' Id.
30. Id. "Texas courts construe the phrase 'legally entitled to recover' in UIM provisions to mean
that 'the insured must establish the uninsured motorist's fault and the extent of the resulting damages

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:871

During the policy period, another motorist collided with Hamburger's
automobile. 3' Hamburger suffered a herniated disc in his neck, which
required surgery; he strongly asserted that the third-party operator of the other
vehicle caused the accident and his injuries, which exceeded $50,000.32 To
settle Hamburger's complaints, the third-party driver's insurer-Old
American Insurance Company-paid the $25,000 policy limit.33 Shortly
thereafter, Hamburger filed a claim with his insurer, State Farm, for the
additional $25,000-plus damages.34 State Farm limited Hamburger's payment
to $10,000 under the PIP provision, and refused the UIM provision payment.3
Nearly two years after the accident, Hamburger filed a suit against State
Farm in a Texas state court.36 The complaint alleged that State Farm
(1) breached the contract when the company failed to pay "extra-contractual
damages" as required under the UIM clause and (2) acted in bad faith, a
violation under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)37 and under Article
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.38 State Farm removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas based on
diversity jurisdiction.39 Hamburger asked for a trial by jury.'
Because Hamburger had no expert witness to confirm that the accident
caused the herniated disc, the trial court did not allow the jury to consider
whether the insurer had to compensate Hamburger for his medical expenses
or for the pain and suffering related to the herniated disc." Instead, the trial
court granted State Farm's motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding
that the accident did not cause Hamburger's injuries.42 On the other hand, the

before becoming entitled to recover [UIM benefits]."' Id. (quoting Wellisch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,
75 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied)).
31. Id. at 878.

32.

Id. at 878-79.

33. Id. at 878.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 2003).
38. TEX. INS. CODEANN. § 21.21(4)(l0)(ii)(Vemon 2003); Hamburger,361 F.3d at 879 (asserting
that State Farm "failed to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of

a claim with respect to which the insurer's liability had become reasonably clear').
39. Hamburger,361 F.3d at 878.
40. See id. at 878-79.
41. Id. at 879.
Hamburger designated his expert witnesses on April 30, 2002, almost three months after the
trial court's deadline, without submitting expert reports. On May 23, 2002, State Farm filed

a motion to exclude Hamburger's expert witnesses for failure to timely designate the experts
and produce expert reports. On June 12, 2002, the trial court granted State Farm's motion to
exclude Hamburger's expert witnesses, and on August 23, 2002, the trial court denied

Hamburger's motion to reconsider. Hamburger appeals the court decision to bar Dr. Lynn
Fitzgerald's expert testimony that the accident caused Hamburger's herniated disc.
Id.

42.

Id. "As an alternative ground for granting judgment as a matter of law that Hamburger was

not entitled to recover medical expenses, the trial court found that Hamburger had presented no evidence
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judge allowed the jury to decide whether Hamburger should receive

compensation for past and future pain and suffering for injuries not associated

with the herniated disc. 3
The jury awarded and the trial court entered a final judgment of $50,000

against State Farm for Hamburger's pain and suffering, which was not related
to his herniated disc." Shortly thereafter, State Farm sought to offset State
Farm's prior $10,000 PIP payment and Old American's $25,000 payment by
moving to amend or alter the final judgment. 5 The trial court granted the

motion and entered an amended final judgment of $15,000 against State
Farm.46 Hamburger appealed the offsets to the jury verdict in the trial court's

amended final judgment. 7

The issues before the Fifth Circuit were neither complicated nor novel.
At the outset, the appellate court addressed whether the district court's
summary judgment in favor of State Farm vis-A-vis the UIM extra-contractual
claim or damages was erroneous. 8 Citing the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Universe Life Insurance Co. v. Giles,49 the Fifth Circuit observed,
In order to impose liability on State Farm for [violating] the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, the DTPA, and Article 21.21, Hamburger [had] to
show that State Farm knew or should have known that it was reasonably
clear that Hamburger's UIM claim was covered, but failed to attempt in good
faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement.'
After reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals found a "bona fide
dispute" between Hamburger and State Farm regarding the UIM claim, rather
5
than evidence of State Farm's engaging in bad-faith conduct. Therefore, the

that his medical expenses were reasonable." Id.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id. "Hamburger [argued] that summary judgment on the extra-contractual claims was
improper because (1) material facts were in dispute which precluded summary judgment, and (2)
Hamburger was not afforded a full opportunity to conduct discovery." Id.
49. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48,55 (Tex. 1997) (explaining the standard for
an insurer's violation of its duty of good faith and fair dealing).
50. Hamburger,361 F.3d at 880.
51. Id.at881.
[Iun
seeking payment of UIM benefits, Hamburger submitted to State Farm medical bills
totaling $18,960.90, and claimed additional damages for pain and suffering as to which he
apparently submitted no additional information. State Farm responded: "The medical
information that was submitted to us concerning Perry Hamburger does not appear to warrant
an underinsured claim. This is based on Old American Insurance Company paying their policy
limit of $25,000.00 and State Farm paying the policy limit under Personal Injury Protection of
$10,000.00. We feel that $35,000.00 is adequate compensation for Mr. Hamburger's claim."
This letter reflects a bona fide dispute about State Farm's liability for UIM benefits.

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
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Fifth Circuit found that the district court properly granted the motion for

summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 2
Concerning the district court's decision to bar the testimony of

Hamburger's expert witness, the court of appeals found no abuse of judicial

discretion. 3 Quite simply, the Fifth Circuit correctly observed that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to timely identify his
expert. 54 Hamburger failed to comply with that requirement. 5 In addition,
the court of appeals found that the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that State
Farm may offset both its $10,000 PIP payment and Old American's $25,000

settlement award from the jury's $50,000 judgment in favor of Hamburger.

6

But the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's fourth
ruling:57 The accident did not cause Hamburger's herniated disc as a matter
of law.' 8 To reach that conclusion, the appellate court cited both federal and

Id.
52. Id.
Although Hamburger contends that "such an outlandishly low evaluation, on its face, shows
that State Farm's denial of Mr. Hamburger's claim was merely a pretext" we disagree. Even
if State Farm assumed during its evaluation that the accident caused all of Hamburger's claims,
itcannot constitute bad faithper se for State Farm at that time to view $16,039.10, which is the
difference between the medical bills and the insurance benefits already paid, as sufficient
compensation for Hamburger's subjective pain and suffering. Therefore, the trial court
properly granted summary judgment for State Farm on Hamburger's extra-contractual claims.
Id.
53. Id. at 882.
54. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A) states that "a party shall disclose to other parties
the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703,
or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." [Also,] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)
provides that "this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party
regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and
signed by the witness."
Id. (quoting FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(B)).
55. Id. "Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring Dr. Fitzgerald as an expert
witness because Hamburger failed to timely identify her as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(A)." Id.
56. Id.
State Farm contends that the joint pretrial order entered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(e) controls the subsequent course of the action. In the joint pre-trial order signed by
Hamburger and State Farm, Hamburger agreed that "Defendant is entitled to offset any
payments made pursuant to the underlying liability policy" and that "Defendant is entitled to
offset any payments made under Plaintiff's PIP coverage unless Plaintiff's damages exceed the
combined limits of his PIP and UIM coverage" ...
We will not reverse the trial court's
exercise of its discretion based on Hamburger's unspoken assumption. Hamburger should not
have been surprised by the possibility that if he did not prove that his medical expenses were
reasonable and necessary, the jury would not be permitted to consider an award of medical
expenses.
Id.
57. Id. at 886.
58. Id. at 879. "Because Hamburger had no expert testimony that the accident caused
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Texas's law.59 Citing its recent ruling in Mathis v. Exxon Corp., the Fifth
Circuit noted that a judgment as a matter of law is appropriate under federal
law where "'a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the party on that
issue.'""
And citing the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Morgan v.
CompugraphicCorp., the court of appeals observed,
Under [Texas's] law, "[f]ay testimony is adequate to prove causation in those
cases in which general experience and common sense will enable a layman
to determine, with reasonable probability, the causal relationship between the
event and the condition. . . . Generally, lay testimony establishing a
sequence of events which provides a strong, logically traceable connection
between the event and the condition is sufficient proof of causation."'"
In light of those principles, the Fifth Circuit declared that Hamburger was not
required to establish a factual causation issue with expert testimony.62
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment that Hamburger
could not recover, as a matter of law, pain and suffering damages for the
herniated disc.63
B. Whole Life Insurance: Whether Under Louisiana'sLaw an
InsurerBreaches a "Vanishing Premiums" Whole-Life
Insurance Contractand an Implied Covenant of Good
Faithand FairDealing by Failingto "Vanish" Class
Action Members' Premium Payments After Seven Years
Although the facts and the type of insurance contract in Shocklee v.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. differ from those appearing in
Hamburger,the substantive questions in both cases are remarkably similar.'
But the Fifth Circuit's analysis and interpretation of Louisiana's law in
Shocklee are highly superficial, and the appellate court's holding is, at best,
suspect.

Hamburger's herniated disc, the trial court granted State Farm's motion for judgment as a matter of law

that the accident did not cause Hamburger's injuries." Id.
59.
60.

Id. at 884.
Id. (quoting Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448,453 (5th Cir. 2002)).

61. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 733
(Tex. 1984)). "Therefore, in determining whether lay testimony is sufficient to prove causation, Texas
courts look at the nature of the lay testimony and the nature of the injury." Id.

62.

Id. at 886.

63.
64.

Id.
See Shocklee v. Mass. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 437,438-39 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004).
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During the mid-1980s, a Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company
(MassMutual) agent persuaded Sanford and Marilyn Shocklee to purchase a
$25,000 whole-life insurance policy.6' When marketing that product, the
agent gave the Shocklees a dividend-payment schedule. 66 The schedule
indicated that insureds like the Shocklees could use their accumulated
dividends to pay the policy premiums after seven years. 6 7 Of course, there
were two conditions: MassMutual's then-current dividend rates had to
continue and the dividends had to be reinvested. 68 But more important, the
soliciting 7agent,
the schedule, the conditional binder or receipt, 69 and the
"contract" ° disclosed where and how MassMutual would reinvest those
dividends.7
However, there were other disclosures.72 One stated that the policy
premiums would be payable for life, and another stated that the "forecast
73
dividend payments were 'neither guarantees nor estimates for the future."
Still, the Shocklees purchased the insurance and received a conditionalbinding receipt immediately.74 The Shocklees received a copy of the actual
policy, which gave them ten days to review the policy and cancel it at will.75
And they began making annual payments without canceling the policy.76
For seven years, the Shocklees paid the scheduled premiums.77
Presumably, MassMutual reinvested the policy dividends and sent annual
reports to the Shocklees indicating the amount and history of the
reinvestments.7 8 In the early 1990s and during the eighth anniversary of the

65.
66.

Id.
Id. at439.

67.

See id.

68.

M.

69. Other names for this document include the following: a "binding receipt," a "temporary
binder," and a "temporary receipt." "A binder' is used to bind insurance temporarily pending the issuance
of the policy. No binder shall be valid beyond the issuance of the policy as to which it was given." See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:631 (West 2004); Spain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 827, 833 (La. 1976)
(embracing the view that insurers must issue a conditional receipt before delivery of the policy, and the
receipt is not incorporated in the insurance contract).
70. Shocklee, 369 F.3d at 440.
In a recent case, the Eighth Circuit examined similar "vanishing premiums" insurance policies
under Louisiana law. The policies at issue in [that case] are identical in all material respects
to the policy at issue here.... The MassMutual policy provides that "[t]he policy and the
application constitute the entire contract" and that the insurance company's "agents cannot alter
or modify any of the terms of the policy ...[nor] waive any of its provisions."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 346 F.3d 830,837
(8th Cir. 2003)).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

76.

Id.

77.
78.

Id.
See id.
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policy, MassMutual sent another premium bill to the Shocklees. 9 The
Shocklees were shocked; but to be sure, they still made at least one additional
premium payment."0
In early 2000, the Shocklees filed a class-action lawsuit in the District
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.8 The complaint alleged that
MassMutual breached the life-insurance contract by not vanishing their
premium payments after seven years.82 The insured complainant also accused
the insurer of breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.83
However, the record does not indicate whether the latter claim "sounded" in
contract, tort, or under both sets of legal principles.84
Initially, the district court denied MassMutual's motion for summary
judgment, finding that the whole-life insurance contract was ambiguous about
"the source of the premium payments. 85 However, after discovery, the
district court considered the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment;
and, relying in part on statements in the Shocklees' depositions, the district
court awarded summary judgment in favor of MassMutual.s 6 The Shocklees
appealed, arguing that the MassMutual contract was ambiguous.87
Curiously, the Fifth Circuit cited a host of settled contract principles in
Louisiana. 8 But only two are relevant for this discussion. 9 First, under
Louisiana's law, "[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and explicit and
lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in
search of the parties' intent."' And second, Louisiana's law "does not allow
the parties to create an ambiguity where none exists and does not authorize
courts to create new contractual obligations where the language of the written
document clearly expresses the intent of the parties.""t

79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Cf Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed in every contract under California law sounding
in both tort and contract), and Lewis v. Marshall Bros. Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 876 So. 2d 142, 145 (La.
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that "[a]lthough a claim of redhibition may sound in both contract and tort, a
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in the petition to establish that damages occurred in a particular
location so that venue might be proper in that parish in which the damage occurred." (citation omitted)).
See also Shocklee, 369 F.3d at 439-40 (reporting that the "parties agree that Louisiana law governs this
action").

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
Sanco La.,

Shocklee, 369 F.3d at 439 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 440.
See id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2046 (West 1987).
Omntiech Int'l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1326 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Kennedy v.
Inc., 573 So. 2d 505, 507 (La. Ct. App. 1990), writ denied, 578 So. 2d 138 (La. 1991)).
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But these principles cause the writer to ask: What language and which
contract did the Fifth Circuit have in mind- an ambiguous oral contract or an

ambiguous written contract? Again, the soliciting agent gave some marketing
information to the Shocklees.92 In one part, the document stated that the
premiums would be "payable for life," and in another, it stated that the
'
forecasted dividends were "neither guarantees nor estimates for the future."93

Arguably, these two disclosures are contradictory, thereby creating some
confusion for unsophisticated laypersons that really do not understand
"vanishing premiums." 94
Furthermore, the allegedly ambiguous language certainly did not appear

in MassMutual's "written contract." 95 The Fifth Circuit correctly noted that
MassMutual's whole-life insurance "policy and the application [comprised]
the entire contract. '9 6 Yet, the Fifth Circuit cited the Eighth Circuit's analysis
and holding in a similar vanishing premiums case97 and declared that "[c]ourts

should not strain to find an ambiguity in an insurance policy when none
exists. '"" More disturbing, the court of appeals advanced the following
statement without presenting a sound discussion or explaining the relevance
of the statement: "The policy on its face, however, evinces no ambiguity
[regarding the origin of the premium] payments. . . [A]s with most

92.

Shocklee, 369 F.3d at 439.

93.

Id.

94. For many unsophisticated, easy-to-fleece or naive applicants, the origin of the dividends under
a whole-life insurance contract is not always clear. That explains why many jurisdictions insist that
insurers adequately disclose information so that applicants sufficiently understand that market conditions
influence the rate of return on dividends, which will affect whether premiums will indeed "vanish" after
seven years. See, e.g., Von Hoffmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 202 F. Supp. 2d 252,254 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (noting that the illustrations included a disclaimer stating that investment returns were not
guaranteed and if investments failed to perform as predicted, additional premiums would be required
beyond the vanishing date shown in the illustration). Moreover, even when insureds understand the origin
of the dividends and the way that vanishing premiums works, problems remain. Often insureds do not
receive the dividends when returns on investment have been good to stellar. Quite simply, insurers'
deceptive and fraudulent practices explain why insurers failed to pay dividends to "participating members"
under whole-life insurance contracts. Of course, that forces owners of whole-life contracts to sue insurers
to recoup unpaid dividends, and therefore, to ensure that premium payments vanish after seven years. See,
e.g., Noonan v. Northwestern Mot. Life Ins. Co. 687 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
the policies required Northwestern to pay dividends based on the annual surplus of the company, after the
insureds sued Northwestern for breaching the contract by paying insureds only interest from a short-term
bond account and by unilaterally changing the way company distributes surplus profit to annuity
policyholders). See also Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Klempner, 866 So. 2d 74, 74-75 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003) (reversing an order that granted class certification for some medical and non-medical policy
holders that did not receive dividends from an annual divisible surplus after the insurer reclassified their
polices as "non-contributing, 'medical market class').
95. Shocklee, 369 F.3d at 441.
96. Id. at 440.
97. Id. at 440-41 (citing In re Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 346 F.3d 830,836-37
(8th Cit. 2003) ("In a recent case, the Eighth Circuit examined similar 'vanishing premiums' insurance
policies under Louisiana law.... The policies at issue in MinnesotaMutual are identical in all material
respects to the policy at issue here .... The Eighth Circuit's analysis is persuasive." (citation omitted))).
98. Id.at441.

INSURANCE DECISIONS

2005]

individually-purchased life insurance policies, the insured is responsible for
paying the premiums."99

Clearly, the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Shocklee is highly superficial. A
better analysis would have outlined the answers to these questions:
(1) whether the MassMutual soliciting agent's representations, the Shocklees'

first premium payment, and the temporary-conditional binder created a valid
oral, temporary-insurance contract, and (2) if so, whether that oral contract
was ambiguous. There is an abundance of authority in Louisiana,"°° in sister

states,'' as well as in the Eight Circuit °2 supporting the position that binders
create oral, temporary-insurance contracts. Also, if the Fifth Circuit had
found an oral contract, it would have had to harmonize another settled
Louisiana principle with its strained conclusion in Shocklee: If ambiguity

remains in an insurance contract after applying other general rules of
construction, the ambiguous language must be construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer.01 3

99.

Id.

100. See Borer v. Security Indus. Life Ins. Co., 245 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. Ct. App. 1971), writ ref'd, 247
So. 2d 394 (La. 1971) (embracing the proposition and declaring that it is essential to the existence of
immediate coverage-respecting temporary binders and temporary insurance -that there is mutual intent
among the parties to insure beginning on the date of premium payment or application); Colomb v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 539 So. 2d 940,943-44 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring that a liability insurer, whose
policy did not unambiguously exclude coverage for the insured's alleged negligent misrepresentations
before entering into an oral contract, had duty to defend insured against negligence claim, even though
there was some evidence suggesting that an "occurrence" happened before the policies went into effect).
101. See, e.g., Miss. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Todd, 492 So. 2d 919, 929 (Miss. 1986)
(embracing the proposition that "a binder is a contract for temporary insurance, until either a permanent
policy can be written or its issuance approved or disapproved by the insuror") (citations omitted); Celtic
Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Tex. 1994) (holding that normally and by statute an agent
has no authority to bind an insurer or create a temporary oral or written contract, but concluding that the
company will be vicariously liable for any of the soliciting agent's misconduct -misrepresentations and
fraudulent activities-which are "within the actual or apparent scope of the agent's authority"); see also
Jenkad Enters., Inc. v. Transp. Ins., Co., 18 S.W.3d 34,37 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (reaffirming that a "binder
is a contract of temporary insurance, either oral or written, [and, is] effective at the date of application for
permanent insurance and terminating upon the issuance, delivery, and acceptance of the policy, or by a
rejection of the application").
102. See, e.g., Hilt Truck Lines, Inc. v. Riggins, 756 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cit. 1985) (finding that
underthe Arkansas Insurance Code the binder and correspondence between an applicant and the insurance
agent created a temporary contract of insurance, which "shall be deemed to include all the usual terms of
the policy [for] which the binder was given [along] with such applicable indorsements as are designated
in the binder").
103. Valentine v. Bonneville Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d 665, 668 (La. 1997).
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C. Corporate-OwnedLife Insurance: Whether Under Texas's
Law a CorporateEmployer, as the Self-ProclaimedBeneficiary,
Has an Insurable Interest in the Continued Existence of an Insured
Employee's Life Under a Corporate-OwnedLife Insurance Contract

Under Texas's law, the owner of, the insured under, and the beneficiary
named in a life-insurance contract are not identical. First, ownership allows
a person to exercise absolute control over the contract, regardless of whether
the owner or another party pays the premiums."° Therefore, an insured, a

designated primary or secondary beneficiary, or another third party-for
example, a parent, a child, or a spouse-may purchase and own a lifeinsurance contract that insures the life of another." 5 Second, if the insured6
owns the policy, the insured has complete authority to name the beneficiary.°
On the other hand, if the insured is not the owner, the right to name the
beneficiary resides exclusively with the owner, rather than with the insured.0 7
But for sure, there are numerous instances where the owner of a life-insurance
contract allows the insured to designate the primary or contingent

beneficiary.'O In addition, the owner of and the designated beneficiary under

104. See, e.g., Little v. X-Pert Corp., 867 S.W.2d 15, 15-16 (Tex. 1993).
[F]our couples, James and Glee Little, David and Myma Smith, Alfred and Patricia Ann Smith,
and Harold and Ruth Lawley, formed X-Pert Corporation. Each couple owned 25 percent of
the corporation's outstanding shares ....[A]Il eight shareholders and X-Pert executed a BuySell Agreement [that] contained mutual covenants to buy and sell a shareholder's interest at
death or if a shareholder wished to make an inter vivos sale of X-Pert stock. The covenants
were intended to allow the surviving or remaining parties to the Buy-Sell Agreement to
maintain ownership and control of the corporation. To carry out the covenants applicable to a
shareholder's death, the shareholders agreed in the Buy-Sell Agreement to buy life insurance
policies on James Little, David Smith, Alfred Smith, and Harold Lawley, with X-Pert named
as legal beneficiary. X-Pert was to maintain the policies and pay all premiums.
Id.
105. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 1103.054, which reads as follows:
An individual of legal age may: (1) apply for a policy insuring the individual's life; and
(2) designate in writing in the application for the policy any individual, partnership,
association, corporation, or other legal entity as: (A) a beneficiary of the policy; (B) an
absolute or partial owner of the policy; or (C) both a beneficiary and an absolute or partial
owner of the policy.
106. See, e.g., McAllen State Bank v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 423 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1968, writ granted) (finding that in the life insurance policy-under the heading of
"Ownership" and under the sub-heading, "Control of Policy"-the insured was "'the owner of this policy
unless someone else [was] designated by endorsement [and that] [a]ll of the insured's rights belong[ed]
to the owner"'), rev'd by 433 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1968).
107. See, e.g., Van Der Meulen v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ refrd) (observing that "[n]othing contained in [the] endorsement [to the
contract] shall operate to prevent the Owner from exercising the right to name and change beneficiaries
or the right to elect any method of settlement provided under the settlement provisions of this contract").
108. See, e.g., Davis v. Tenn. Life Ins. Co., 562 S.W.2d 868, 869 ('ex. Civ. App.-Houston [1 st
Dist.) 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.) (reporting that "[the employee's] life was insured under Tennessee Life
Insurance Company Group Policy... [that tlhe insurance premiums were paid entirely by Reading and
Bates [Offshore Drilling Company]. .. [and that when] an employee first began work for Reading and
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the contract may be identical." 9 The owner of and the insured under a life-

insurance contract may also be the same person.

0

However, as early as 1887,

the Texas Supreme Court declared that a person must have an insurable

interest in the insured's continued existence to qualify as a bona fide owner
of a life-insurance contract."'
In light of those settled principals, consider the facts, as well as the Fifth
Circuit's findings and questionable ruling, in Mayo v. HartfordLife Insurance
Co. 2 In 1993, Wal-Mart established a trust to serve as the legal holder of its
corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) policies.' 3 Those contracts insured
the lives of its 350,000 employees, who presumably were directors, general
lower-level
managers, supervisors, salespersons, as well as full- and part-time
5
4
beneficiary.1
the
as
itself
designated
Wal-Mart
employees."

Bates he was required to sign a card designating a beneficiary for the insurance to which he was entitled").
109. See, e.g., Little v. X-Pert Corp., 867 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. 1993).
James Little and his wife sold all of their X-Pert stock to fellow shareholder Alfred Smith.
Until that time, James Little had been an officer and director of X-Pert. James Little died
approximately one month later. Pursuant to the Buy-Sell Agreement, a $250,000 insurance
policy had been purchased on his life from Jackson National Life Insurance Company, showing
X-Pert as the owner and beneficiary.
Id. Cormack v. Aspentech, Inc., No. 01-99-00444-CV, 2000 WL 330179, at * 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (observing that the applicant "applied for
$500,000 term life insurance and [that in the] signed application, he named [a third party] as the owner
and beneficiary. Six years later, he completed a signed application for a 'policy change' converting the
coverage from term to whole life. The face amount was unchanged, and the owner and beneficiary were
identified as 'Same as Original Policy."').
Barrientos v,Nava, 94 S.W.3d 270, 281 (Tex. App. -Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2002, no
110. See, e.g.,
pet.).
When life insurance is owned by the insured, and he directs the insurance company to pay the
insurance proceeds on his death outright to either a named person or the trustee of a trust, "the
pay-out arrangement, though revocable by the insured, is an inter vivos donative document of
transfer that is a substitute for a will."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF PROPERTY § 32.4 cmt. f (1990)).
111. Price v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 4 S.W. 633, 634 (Tex. 1887).
[P]olicies procured by persons having no interest in the life of the insured are void atcommon
law, as against public policy. [The court also noted that such a] policy holder has nothing to
lose for which he can claim indemnity; on the contrary, his interest is in the early death of the
insured. When that occurs he ceases to pay premiums, and receives the amount of the policy.
This creates a temptation to destroy human life, and the common law forbids the contract.
Id.
112. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. Jan. 2004).
113. Id.at402.
114. Id.
Wal-Mart's COLI policies insured the lives of all employees, also called "associates," with
service time sufficient for enrollment in the Wal-Mart Associates' Health and Welfare Plan,
unless those associates elected not to participate in a special death benefit program that WalMart introduced in conjunction with the COLI program. Fewer than one percent of the 350,000
eligible employees opted out of the program, which was discontinued by early 1998.
Id.
115. Id.
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Even a conservative reading of the record reveals that legitimate
economic or pecuniary reasons caused Wal-Mart to insure more than a third
of a million employees. "Wal-Mart's COLI program was intended to be
'mortality neutral,' [under which the employees'] death benefits. . . would
fund [other] employee[s'] benefit plans and death expenses, or [would] be
repaid to the insurer as self-correcting 'cost of insurance' adjustments.""' 6
More important,
Wal-Mart acted in pursuit of tax benefits related to the deductibility of
premium payments, and was only one of many similarly situated companies
which took this course of action. After Congress and the IRS eliminated the
tax advantages of Wal-Mart's COLI program, Wal-Mart unwound the
otherwise
unprofitable program, surrendering the last of its policies by
7
2000.1
Douglas Sims was a Wal-Mart associate and was insured under a COLI
policy until his death, although the special death-benefit program was
discontinued before Sims' death."' His estate discovered that Sims was
insured under a COLI contract and filed a declaratory-judgment suit against
Wal-Mart, alleging a violation of Texas's insurable-interest doctrine outlined
above."' 9 The estate asked the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas to declare Sims' rights under the COLI policy. 20 The estate
also asked the district court to declare whether Wal-Mart had an insurable
interest in the continued existence of Sims' life that would permit the
company to become the owner of and the designated beneficiary in the lifeinsurance contract.121
Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, which the district court
denied. 22 Sims' estate then filed a motion for partial summary judgment,
arguing that Wal-Mart lacked an insurable interest in Sims' life. 123 Wal-Mart
responded with across-motion for summary judgment, arguing that Wal-Mart

116.

Id.

117.

Id.

118.
119.

Id.
Id.

120. Id. at 402-03 (The estate wanted "the imposition of a constructive trust on the policy benefits,
and disgorgement of the money [that] Wal-Mart [allegedly] unjustly received at some point in 1999.").
121.
122.

d.at403.
Id.

Wal-Mart [asked] for summary relief on the grounds that... Georgia law applie[d], and thus
Sims ha[d] no claim and, in the alternative, [that] the Texas statute of limitations barr[ed] Sims'
claim. After the district court denied [that] motion, Wal-Mart moved for reconsideration,
renewing its choice of law argument and adding that recent developments in Texas law placed
doubt on the public policy underlying the state's insurable interest doctrine.
123.

Id.
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had an insurable interest. 124 Curiously and surprisingly, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas did not dismiss the estate's

suit altogether.' 25 To be sure, under Texas's law, whether a policy owner, an
26
insured, or a beneficiary has an insurable interest is a substantive question.
But procedurally, one's claiming that another has no insurable interest is an
affirmative defense. 27 Moreover, only insurers-rather than insureds or their
estates-have the right to raise that defense.' 8 Nevertheless, the district court

granted Sims' estate's motion for summary judgment; Wal-Mart appealed.2 9
Initially, the Fifth Circuit had to resolve a choice-of-law question. 30
Wal-Mart argued that the district court erred when the court used Texas's
rather than Georgia's substantive law to resolve the parties' dispute.' 3' The

court of appeals, however, declared that when "making a [choice-of-law]
determination, a federal court['s] exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply
the [choice-of-law] rules of the forum state."' 132 And the appellate court held

that Texas's law applied for several reasons: (1) "[t]he parties 'reside' in
Texas (Wal-Mart by place of business) and the employment relationship was
also wholly in Texas"; (2) "itjhe injury and the conduct causing it [occurred]

either in Texas or Georgia (or both), [if] one considers the injury to be the
misappropriation of money, the insuring of a non-insurable interest, or some

124.

Id.

125.

Id.

126. Id. at 403, 406.
127. See, e.g., Colonial County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 30 S.W.3d 514,524 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2000, no pet.) (finding that "[w]hen the vehicle was stolen and the insured made a claim under the
policy, [the insurer refused it] on the previously undisclosed reason that Hector... no longer owned the
car [and therefore] did not have an insurable interest. This defense was not disclosed to Hector when he
bought the policy."); Henry v. Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co., 405 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth
1966, no writ) (finding that "the defense of no insurable interest [was not] available to [the insurer, since]
[tihe contract with plaintiff made no provision requiring [an] insurable interest").
128. See, e.g., Stillwagoner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 979 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998,
pet. ref'd).
Appellees argued before the trial court that "[iut is well settled that only the insurer can raise
the [beneficiary's] lack of insurable interest," citing 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, § 41.5 (1996),
which states: "[T]he majority of courts which have considered the issue hold that only the
insurer can raise the objection of want of insurable interest." On appeal, they concede that
Texas followed the minority rule allowing any interested party other than the insurer to raise
the issue. But now Appellees argue that the Texas rule is no longer operative since the
legislature granted an insurable interest to a beneficiary named by the insured because the
legislation "eliminated the issue of whether such a beneficiary had an insurable interest."
Id. (alteration in original). See also Tamez v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 999 S.W.2d 12,
14-16 (rex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (observing that "[a) majority of state courts
have held that only the insurer can raise the objection of lack of insurable interest," but holding that the
administrators "have standing to challenge the existence of an insurable interest").
129. Mayo, 354 F.3d at 402.

130.
131.
132.

ld. at 403-06.
id. at 403.
Id.
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events"; and, (3) Sims lived and worked at
other construction of the relevant
133
a Wal-Mart store in Texas.
Then the Fifth Circuit examined the three-pronged, insurable-interest
doctrine outlined in Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. 34 In
Drane,the Texas Supreme Court declared that an insurable interest in the life
of another exists if: (1) the owner of the life-insurance contract is "so closely
related by blood or affinity that he wants the [insured] to continue to live,
irrespective of monetary considerations," (2) the owner of the contract is "a
creditor," or (3) the policy owner has "a reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit or advantage from the continued life of [the insured]."' 35
Wal-Mart argued that it had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit in the continued lives of its employees sufficient to bring it within the
last category described in Drane.'36 More specifically, Wal-Mart stressed that
it had "an expectation of financial gain from the continued lives of its
employees [in light of] the costs associated with the death of an employee,
such as productivity losses, hiring and training a replacement, and payment
of death benefits."' 31 And as reported above, Wal-Mart's COLI program was
designed in part to fund the benefit plans of its 350,000 employees.' 38
Astonishingly, the Fifth Circuit refused to accept Wal-Mart's argument.
First, the appellate court noted that Texas's lower courts embrace the view:
"'The mere existence of an employer/employee relationship is never sufficient
to give the employer an insurable interest in the life of the employee."'" 39 For
sure, that is Texas's law. But Wal-Mart never asserted an insurable interest
based on an employer-employee relationship."'4 So, the Fifth Circuit's
claiming otherwise is highly suspect. Second, Wal-Mart certainly argued, and
the facts clearly established, that Wal-Mart had a pecuniary interest in the
continued lives of its employees.' 4' But the Fifth Circuit dismissed that
argument in an arguably cavalier manner without supporting evidence. The
court of appeals stated:

133. Id. at 404-05 (concluding that "[t]he plurality of factors favor the application of Texas law,
particularly given that courts evaluate such contracts for their quality, not their quantity- and that all of

the factors must be considered in the light of [Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] § 6[(2) (1971)1]").
134. Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 161 S.W.2d 1057 ('rex. 1942).
135. Id. at 1058-59.
136. Mayo, 354 F.3d at 406-07.
137. Id. at 407.
138. Id. at 402.
139. Id. at406 (quoting Stillwagonerv. Travelers Ins. Co., 979 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1998, pet. denied)).
140. Id. at 406-07.
141. Id.
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[Wal-Mart also argues that] it possesses an expectation of financial gain from
the continued lives of its employees by virtue of the costs associated with the
[But those] costs are associated with the loss of
death of an employee ....
any employee.., and, as [Texas's] precedent clearly indicates, employers
lack an insurable interest in ordinary employees.142

To support the latter assertion, the Fifth Circuit cited just two cases' 43
and Stillwagoner v.
- Tamez v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London'
Travelers Insurance Co. 4 ' But the insurable-interest rulings in Tamez and
Stillwagoner were not based on whether the employees were "ordinary,"
professional, seasonal, permanent, or temporary employees. 4 6 To be precise,
the court in Tamez held: "[An employer does not have a pecuniary interest
in the continued life of its employee, unless that employee is crucial to the
operationofthe business.' 147 And in Stillwagoner,the court never mentioned
or discussed the relevance of the employees' classification. 4 ' To put it
mildly, the Fifth Circuit wittingly or unwittingly mischaracterized Texas's
insurable-interest law in Mayo. Clearly, employers in Texas have an insurable
interest in the continued lives of their employees, if they can satisfy the test
stated in Tamez. a9 Arguably in Mayo, Wal-Mart satisfied the insurableinterest tests outlined in Drane and Tamez.
There is one final observation. In Mayo, Wal-Mart filed a motion
requesting certification of the insurable-interest question to the Supreme Court
of Texas. 5 ° But the Fifth Circuit denied that motion, asserting that its
"familiarity with the [insurable-interest] doctrine... and the unambiguous

line of Texas lower court decisions, make certification unnecessary.''.
Without doubt, the certification ruling was a major mistake. The Texas
Supreme Court should address this issue more thoroughly, for insurableinterest decisions in Texas should not turn on whether a life-insurance

142. Id. at 407 (citing Stillwagoner, 979 S.W.2d at 362).
143. Id. at 407 n.4.
144. Tamez v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 999 S.W.2d 12, 18-19 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
145. Stillwagoner,979 S.W.2d at 361-66.
146. Tamez, 999 S.W.2d at 18-21; Stillwagoner, 979 S.W.2d at 363-64.
147. See Tamez, 999 S.W.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
148. See Stillwagoner, 979 S.W.2d at 361-62 ("Even in the absence of evidence we may assume
that [decedent's] death forced some readjustments which normally accompany the death of an employee.
But an insurable interest does not result from the cessation of ordinary service.").
149. See, e.g., Davis v. Tenn. Life Ins. Co., 562 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [ist
Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (relying on the facts in Davis, where an employer insured an "ordinary"
employee under a life insurance policy that the employer owned. The employee designated his mother
as the beneficiary of the policy. When the employee died, his wife sued for half of the proceeds of the
policy, on the theory that the policy was community property. The mother prevailed in the suit.).
150. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 400,406 (5th Cir. Jan. 2004).
151. Id. at406 (emphasis added) (ruling that "Wal-Mart's motion to certify to the Texas Supreme
Court is denied").
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contract is an accidental-death,' 52 a corporate-owned,' 53 or a group-life
policy.' 54
D. Credit-Life Insurance: Whether Defending PartiesWere
Sufficiently Diverse to Permit a DistrictCourt to Remove State
Common-Law Actions Against Insurers,Lenders, and
Agents from a Mississippi State Court to a FederalDistrict Court
Clearly, financial consumers confront very real abuses, fraudulent
conduct, and deceptive practices when they attempt to secure automobile,
home, and personal loans.' 55 Very often, lenders force or encourage
unsophisticated borrowers to purchase credit-life insurance as a condition for
receiving a loan, which often has a high interest rate.' 56 And to make matters
worse from the borrowers' point of view, the lender selects the credit-life
insurer.' Frequently, the insurer sells policies that require borrowers to pay
an excessively high premium. 5 8
Ross v. CitiFinancial,Inc. illustrates one of the types of conflicts that can
erupt from an arguably questionable relationship involving borrowers, lenders,
insurance agents, and credit-life insurers. 59 Here are the brief facts.
CitiFinancial and its predecessors (CitiFinancial) are lenders doing business
in Mississippi, but they are Maryland, Tennessee, and Georgia corporations6
with their principal places of business located in those respective states. 0

152. See Tamez, 999 S.W.2d at 19 (ruling in favor of the employee's estate-on the merits-and
holding that the employer who purchased an accidental-death policy on the employee's life and designated
itself as the beneficiary had no insurable interest in employee's life); Stilliwagoner, 979 S.W.2d at 361
(ruling in favor of the employee's estate on the merits, finding a wagering contract, and holding that the
employer who purchased an accidental-death policy on a temporary employee's life and designated itself
as the beneficiary had no insurable interest in employee's life).
153. See Ball v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. 04-02-00702-CV, 2003 WL 21467219, at *6 (Tex.
App. -San Antonio 2003, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication) (ruling in favor of the employer- on
procedural grounds- who purchased a company-owned life insurance policy on an employee and claimed
that it had insurable interest in employee's life). But see, Torrez v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 118 S.W.3d
817, 821 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism'd) (ruling against the employer-on procedural
ground-who purchased a company-owned life insurance policy on an employee and claimed that it had
insurable interest in employee's life).
154. See, e.g., Davis, 562 S.W.2d at 869 (finding that the employer was the owner of the group life
policy, therefore by operation of law, the employer had an insurable interest in the continued existence of
its employees' lives).
155. See generallyinfra Part IV.A and accompanying notes (discussing RICO implications of the
actions of credit life insurers).
156. See generally infro Part IV.A and accompanying notes (discussing RICO implications of the
actions of credit life insurers).
157. See generally infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes (discussing RICO implications of the
actions of credit life insurers).
158. See generallyinfra Part IV.A and accompanying notes (discussing RICO implications of the
actions of credit life insurers).
159. Ross v. CitiFinancial, 344 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003).
160. Howard v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 811,816 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
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Union Security Life Insurance (Union Security) and American Security
Insurance (American Security) Companies are Delaware corporations. 6 '
Their principal places of business are located in Georgia, but they sell a
variety of insurance products in Mississippi, including credit-life insurance. 62
'63
CitiFinancial employed three agents who were licensed to sell insurance.
They were citizens of Mississippi, and they sold insurance in that state on
behalf of their employer and CitiFinancial.'6"
Denise Howard and Susie Ross resided in Mississippi. 65 Howard, Ross,
and other similarly situated borrowers in Mississippi approached CitiFinancial
to secure loans. 66 The lender granted the loans, but required the borrowers
to purchase credit-life insurance from Union and American. 1 67 Finding this
and other lending practices offensive, the borrowers filed a lawsuit in a
Mississippi state court.' 68 In addition to suing the two insurers-American
Security and Union Security, the disgruntled borrowers also sued
CitiFinancial and CitiFinancial's employees, 69
the three who were licensed
insurance agents and residents of Mississippi.
The plaintiffs listed a variety of violations and claims in the complaint. 0
According to the borrowers, the insurers and lender engaged in the following
impermissible conduct: (1) The insurers sold insurance contracts, which
generated premiums that were excessive when compared to market rates;
(2) the insurance agents' undisclosed commissions inflated the insurance
premiums; (3) the insurers did not offer an alternate and, presumably, lessexpensive insurance contract; and (4) the insurers violated Mississippi's law
by practicing in insurance packing, padding, flipping, and churning. 7 ' The
lenders allegedly increased the total amount of their loans by including the
cost of insurance within the loan amounts, and they unnecessarily refinanced
the loans, thereby generating even more premiums.'
Given the discussion that follows, the following observations are
warranted. First, a careful reading of the opinion did not clearly disclose
plaintiffs' causes of action, those requiring plaintiffs to prove specific prima

161.

Id.

162.

Id.

163.

Id. at 816 n.2 (noting that "[Tracy] Mitchell, [Darla] Farmer and [Valerie] Stevens are or were

licensed insurance agents of CitiFinancial.")
164. Id.
165. Ross v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 460 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003).

166.

Id.

167. Howard, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 816 ("Plaintiffs allege that, '[c]ontrary to law, [the lenders]
required collateral protection insurance, credit life insurance, credit accident and health insurance,
accidental death and dismemberment insurance, involuntary unemployment insurance, property insurance,

and/or other insurance in connection with their loans ..

.

168.

Id.

169.

Id.

170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Ross v. CitiFinancial, 344 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003).
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facie cases. For example, plaintiffs accused the defendants of breaching
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.7 7 However, that is not a
cause of action; instead, it is an allegation under Mississippi's law.'74
Therefore, to collect damages for a breach of covenant, a plaintiff must file a
specific cause of action that sounds either in tort or in contract. 175 The
76
plaintiffs in this case failed to do that.
Second, the borrowers sued the defendant for allegedly breaching a
fiduciary duty. 177 But again, that is merely an allegation rather than a cause
of action under Mississippi's law. Actually, to recover for a breach of a
fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must file a specific cause of action that sounds in
tort, rather than in contract.'78 The only unquestionable causes of action
appearing in the complaint were common-law negligence, fraud, the tort of
civil conspiracy, and an unconscionable violation of Mississippi's version of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 7 9
CitiFinancial and the other defendants removed the lawsuit to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441,18 claiming diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.181 In doing
so, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs fraudulently joined
CitiFinancial's insurance agents. 82 The district court denied plaintiffs'
remand motions and found that the court had subject matter jurisdiction under
section 1332 because the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined the three insurance
agents. 183 In addition, the district court found that Mississippi's general threeyear statute of limitations"8 barred most of plaintiffs' causes of action.' The

173. See id.
174. See id. at 461-62.
175. See Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Miss. 2004) (holding that a
breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing arises from the existence of a contract between parties, but
a suit for breaching the covenant sounds either in tort or in contract, or in both).
176. Ross, 344 F.3d at 461-67.
177. Id.at461.
178. See Tyson v. Moore, 613 So. 2d 817, 823 (Miss.1992) (declaring that a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty is "appropriately recognized as an action in tort, not contract").
179. See Howard v. CitiFinancial, 195 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
180. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed... to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a)
(2000); see also Laughlin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 882 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
"removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction").
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000); Ross v.
CitiFinancial, 344 F.3d 458,461 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003).
182. Howard, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 817 ("Defendants [argued] that [p]laintiffs... fraudulently joined
the non-diverse [d]efendants to avoid federal jurisdiction and, therefore, the [court could] properly assert
federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case.").
183. Ross, 344 F.3d at 461.
184. Howard, 195 F. Supp. 2dat819. See also MISS.CODE ANN. § 15-1-49(l) (1990), stating: "(1)
All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years
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lower court also found that plaintiffs could not prevail against CitiFinancial's
insurance agents for the agents' alleged negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentations, and they could not recover for the agents' alleged breach
of a fiduciary duty. 86 Shortly thereafter, an interlocutory appeal followed.'87
Two procedural and two substantive questions appeared before the Fifth
Circuit. '8The first procedural question was whether the district court applied
the correct standard to find that the plaintiffs fraudulently joined non-diverse
defendants.' 89 The court of appeals addressed this question fairly easily by
reviewing settled principles.' 90 At the outset, the Fifth Circuit observed that
a fraudulent joinder could be established conclusively by (1) proving actual
fraud in one's pleading of jurisdictional facts or by (2) proving plaintiff's
inability to establish liability against a non-diverse defendant.' 9'
In recent years, the Fifth Circuit has refined the second prong by
stressing that a district court (1) must determine whether an arguably
reasonable basis exists for concluding that state law would impose liability;192
(2) may "pierce the pleadings" by using summary judgment-type evidence to
establish fraudulent joinder vel non;' 93 (3) "must ... take into account all
unchallenged factual allegations, including those alleged in the complaint, in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff"; 94 and (4) must resolve all
ambiguities of state law in favor of the non-removing party.' 95 The Fifth
Circuit found that the Southern District Court of Mississippi properly
considered and applied these rules. 96 In particular, the district court "cited the
'reasonable basis' standard.. . and.., never looked for a 'mere theoretical
possibility of recovery.'" 97 Therefore, from the Fifth Circuit's point of view,

next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.").
185. Ross, 344 F.3d at 461.
186. Id.
187. See id.

188.

Id.

189. Id.
190. See id. at 461-63.
191. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644,647 (5th Cir. Mar. 2003) (citing Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds,
181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999)).
192. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,312 (5th Cit.

2002) (This means that there must be a reasonablepossibility of recovery, not merely a theoreticalone.);
see also Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 236 F.3d 282, 286 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing the "reasonable basis"
standard and rejecting the contention that a theoretical possibility of recovery is enough to support no
fraudulent joinder); Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1999) ("While the burden

of demonstrating fraudulent joinder is a heavy one, we have never held that a particular plaintiff might
possibly establish liability by the mere hypothetical possibility that such an action could exist.").
193. See Travis, 326F.3d at648-49 (citing Cariere v. Sears, Roebuck&Co., 893 F.2d 98,100(5th
Cir. 1990)).
194. ld. at 649.
195. Id.
196. Ross v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2003).
197. Id.
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the district court properly found that the plaintiffs' borrowers
fraudulently
98
joined the CitiFinancial insurance agents as defendants.'
The second procedural question before the court of appeals was whether
Mississippi's statute of limitations requires an affirmative act to toll the
statute for the various actions cited in the complaint.'99 Plaintiffs maintained
that the district court erred by requiring them to prove an affirmative act of
concealment.2' And they asserted that, in cases of fraud, no subsequent act
of concealment is necessary. 20 ' Although the Mississippi Supreme Court has
not ruled on this issue in the context of credit-insurance sales, the defendants
argued that a subsequent affirmative act of fraudulent concealment is
necessary to toll limitations where the underlying claim is for fraud.2 2
Mississippi's law is clear: (1) The statute of limitations period begins to
run when the claims are discovered; (2) "Claims asserted three years after
their accrual may be actionable ifthey were fraudulently concealed and
[p]laintiffs could not discover them with reasonable diligence";203 and (3) To
toll the limitations period, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged
in "affirmative acts of concealment."' 4 And, even though the plaintiff tried
with due diligence to discover the claim, the plaintiff was unsuccessful. 0 5
After examining the facts in light of these rules, the Fifth Circuit declared that
Mississippi's law required the plaintiffs' borrowers to prove an affirmative act
of fraudulent concealment.2 6 More specifically, to toll the statute of
limitations the borrowers had to prove that the insurance agents fraudulently
concealed activities -which generated the claims-until after the agents
consummated the sale of the credit-life insurance sales in order. 207 The
borrowers failed to establish the necessary proof. 20 8 Therefore, the district
court's ruling was proper. 0 9
As mentioned earlier, appellants asked the Fifth Circuit to decide two
substantive questions. 2 0 The first question was whether insureds might

199.
199.

Id.
Id.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

If a person [who is liable] for any personal action shall fraudulently conceal the cause of action
from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the cause of action shall be deemed to have
fnst accrued at, and not before, the time at which such fraud shall be, or with reasonable
diligence might have been, first known or discovered.

MISS. CODE. ANN. § 15-1 -67.
204.

Ross, 344 F.3d at 463 (emphasis added).

205.
206.

See Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So. 2d 883, 887 (Miss. 2000).
Ross, 344 F.3d at 463.

207.
208.

Id. at 464.
Id. at465.

209.

Id. at 464.

210.

See supra text accompanying note 188.
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reasonably rely on insurance agents' oral representations -which were
contrary to the terms in the written contract-to prove a fraudulent or a
negligent misrepresentation.2 1 1 "The district court held that, under
[Mississippi's] law, a plaintiff has a duty to read a contract before signing it
'
and cannot reasonably rely on oral misrepresentations regarding its terms."212
did not
Accordingly, the district court declared that the insured-borrowers
2 13
state a valid claim for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.
But the complainants disagreed." 4 They insisted that Mississippi's rule
-a party must read a contract before signing it-does not apply if insurance
agents' fraudulent or false representations induced innocent applicants to
purchase credit-life insurance contracts."' The plaintiffs argued that the
Mississippi Supreme Court created two exceptions to the rule that the court
will impute knowledge of written terms in a contract to the contract
signatories: where there is fraud in factum2" 6 and where there is a petition for
equitable relief.217 Therefore, plaintiffs argued that at least one of those
exceptions applied to this case.2"'
Again the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.2" 9 The court
of appeals held that neither exception applied to this controversy because
22
plaintiffs' alleged injury was in effect fraud in the inducement,
misrepresentations about the terms of the credit-life insurance contracts.221
Mississippi's law is clear: "[A party] is under an obligation to read a contract
before signing it, and will not as a general rule be heard to complain of an oral
misrepresentation the error of which would have been disclosed by reading
the contract. 222

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Ross, 344 F.3d at 464.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (6th ed. 1990) (defining fraud in factum as

a "'[m]isrepresentation [about] the nature of a writing that a person signs with neither knowledge nor
reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or essential terms."') (first alteration in

original)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting BLACK'SLAwDICrIONARY 661(6th ed. 1990) in defining fraud in the inducement
as "'[firaud connected with [the] underlying transaction and not with the nature of the contract or

document signed"' (alteration in original)).
221.

Id.at 464-65.

222.

Godfrey, Bassett& Kuykendall Architects, Ltd. v. Huntington Lumber & Supply Co., 584 So.

2d 1254, 1257 (Miss. 1991) (alteration in original); see also Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc., 826 So.

2d 719, 726 (Miss. 2002) (holding that in "Mississippi, a person is charged with knowing the contents of
any document that he executes"); Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs & Sage, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987)
(declaring that in the context of an insurance policy, knowledge of contract terms is "imputed to [the
contracting party] as a matter of law" (alteration in original)).
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The final substantive issue was whether a fiduciary relationship exists

between borrowers-who purchase credit-life insurance contracts-and
insurance agents, who are the lender's employees, but who pitch those

contracts for third-party insurers. 223 The insured-borrowers alleged that the
insurance agents breached their fiduciary duty to the borrowers by (1) failing
to obtain adequate insurance at a reasonable and fair price, (2) failing to act
in the best interests of insured borrowers, and (3) failing to disclose to the
borrowers that the insurance agents would directly or indirectly receive
remuneration for the insurance policies that the agents sold to the
borrowers.224 On the other hand, the agents maintained that the borrowers
could not reasonably prevail on a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty because
the agents did not owe any fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs as a matter of
Mississippi's law.22
Quite bluntly, the Fifth Circuit performed a very superficial and arguably

a results-oriented analysis to address this final question. In particular, the
appellate court cited inferior Mississippi and federal courts' rulings226 as well
as non-insurance rulings227 to reach a highly strained conclusion. The
appellate court declared that under Mississippi's law, "'there is no fiduciary

relationship or duty between an insurance company and its insured in a first
party insurance contract,"' except for when an insurance agent is procuring
insurance for the applicant-insured.22 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling against the insured borrowers and
remanded the case. 29

223. Ross, 344 F.3d at 466.
224. Howard v. CitiFinancial, 195 F. Supp. 2d 811, 823 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
225. Id.
226. See Langston v. Bigelow, 820 So. 2d 752, 756 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) ("'[ulnder Mississippi
law, there is no fiduciary relationship or duty between an insurance company and its insured in a first party
insurance contract"' (quoting Gorman v. S.E. Fidelity Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 33, 38 (S.D. Miss. 1985))).
227. See Ross, 344 F.3d at 466 (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 818 So. 2d 1073 (Miss.
2001) ("fiduciary duty between bank, credit insurance company, and lendee arose where claim of 'hidden
scheme' between bank and insurance company increasing insurance rates"); Lowery v. Guar. Bank & Trust
Co., 592 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1991) (long history of dealings with bank aside from specific note gave rise to
fiduciary duty between bank and lendee (insured)); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Baymon, 732 So.
2d 262, 270 (Miss. 1999) ("'The general rule is that there is no presumption of a fiduciary relationship
between a debtor and creditor."' (citation omitted))).
228. Ross, 344 F.3d at 466,
Although [p]laintiffs point to affidavits in which some [p]laintiffs state they trusted and relied
on [the insurance agents], none of this evidence shows circumstances justifying such reliance.
Plaintiffs do not claim [that defendants] failed to procure insurance; moreover, they do not
claim [that defendants] violated the written terms of the insurance contract or created a hidden
scheme to defraud them.
Id. (citing First United Bank of Poplarville v. Reid, 612 So. 2d 1131, 1137 (Miss. 1992) (finding a
fiduciary duty when a bank employee agreed to buy credit-life insurance for a loan applicant and
concluding that the bank had a duty to get insurance because it became an insurance agent)).
229. Id. at 467.
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Undeniably, a careful reading and analysis of Mississippi's insurance law
reveals that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly decided the breach of fiduciary duty
claim and the court's conclusion rests on an unintelligible reading of
Mississippi's law. Therefore, the appellate court should have reversed the
district court's ruling, remanded the case, and instructed the district court to
apply and reconsider the facts in light of the following settled principle of law
that appears in Lowery v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., and in a host of
Mississippi Supreme Court's decisions: "[An insurance] agent has a duty to
use the degree of diligence and care which a reasonably prudent person would

ordinarily exercise in the transaction of his own business, including the
obligation of providing the proper information concerning the progress of the
business entrusted.

230

E. Marine-CargoInsurance: Whether a DistrictCourt's Exercise of
PersonalJurisdictionOver Co-Insurers, Venue Rulings, and
Apportionment of Liability Among Co-Insurers Were Proper
Under Louisiana'sLaw
At the outset, it is worth mentioning that this controversy has been before
the Fifth Circuit twice - in Adams v. UnioneMediterraneaDi Sicurta(Adams
1)23t and in Adams v. Unione MediterraneaDi Sicurta (Adams 11).232 And,
although the procedural questions in this case are very familiar and fairly easy
to understand, the facts are not. They are more elaborate and less familiar, in

230. Lowery v. Guar. Bank & Trust Co., 592 So. 2d 79,83 (Miss. 1991); see Sec. Ins. Agency, Inc.
v. Cox, 299 So. 2d 192, 194 (Miss. 1974); Citizens' Bank v. Frazier, 127 So. 716, 717-18 (Miss. 1930).
Frazier ...borrowed an additional sum of $3,000 and secured it with a deed of trust on 41
additional bales of cotton, but insurance was not secured by the bank on the cotton. Upon
bookkeeper, who was a subagent
granting the second loan the bank immediately requested its
for an insuranceagency in Starkville, Mississippi to procure insurance for the additional loan.
The subagent attempted to get into communication with the insurance agency by telephone but
was unsuccessful... It is our view under the holding of Citizens' Bank [v. Frazier], Security
was agent for plaintiffs for the purpose of procuring insurance on the rental home. When the
plaintiffs entrusted their insurance business to Security for the purpose of securing insurance
on the rental house in addition to that in force on the home place and relied on Security to give
them renewal notices, Security owed plaintiffs the duty to use that degree of diligence and care
with reference thereto which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the transaction of his
own business.

Cox, 299 So. 2d at 194 (emphasis added).
[T]he only reasonable and just view that can be taken of this transaction is that the contract
made between the parties, and its effect, was one by which the bank agreed to act for appellee
in procuring the insurance, and to use that degree of diligence and care therein about which a
reasonably prudent man would ordinarily exercise in the transaction of his own business of a
like nature, and this includes, of course, the obligation, if the facts of the case raise such an
obligation, of furnishing tothe principal the proper and pertinent information concerning the
progress of the business thus intrusted.
Citizens' Bank, 127 So. at 717-18.

231.
232.

Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta (Adams 1),220 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2000).
Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta (Adams 11), 364 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004).
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part, because the controversy involves multiple foreign insurers as well as
insureds residing in or doing business in Great Britain, Italy, Switzerland, and
the United States, or both.233 Consequently, a more detailed outline of the
facts appears below before discussing the Fifth Circuit's rather
straightforward findings and conclusions. 2"
Steven Henry Adams is a London-based underwriter as well as a
representative for other underwriters at Lloyd's of London (Underwriters).235
Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta (UMS) is an Italian insurer that insures cargo
on ships and other seaworthy vessels. 236 Duferco SA (Duferco) is a Swiss
company whose principle place of business is located in Lugano,
Switzerland.237 Duferco manufactures and ships steel and steel products
worldwide. 238 Duferco agreed to ship 158 steel slabs to A.K. Steel
Corporation of Middletown, Ohio.239 Canal Barge Company, Ltd. contracted
to transport the steel. 2 °
During the shipment, the Underwriters and UMS concurrently insured
the steel cargo under separate marine-cargo insurance contracts.24 1 The
Underwriters insured the steel under an open cargo/shippers' interest
insurance policy, which identified Canal Barge Company and Duferco as the
named insureds. 242 UMS insured Duferco under a separate open-cargo
policy; 243 however, UMS also insured A.K. Steel under that policy. 244 The
policy limits outlined in Underwriters and UMS's insurance contracts were $5

233. Id.
234. See infra notes 235-57 and accompanying text.
235. Much has been written about Lloyd's of London, its history and operations as well as about
the various syndicates and names at Lloyd's that underwrite insurance risks around the world. To learn
more, consider reading the following sources: Willy E. Rice, "Commercial Terrorism" From the
TansatlanticSlave Trade to the World Trade Center Disaster: Are InsuranceCompanies & Judges
"Aidersand Abettors" of Terror?-A CriticalAnalysis ofAmerican and British Courts' Declaratoryand

EquitableActions, 1654-2002, 6 SCHOLAR 1,49-52,69-72 (2003) (reviewing the evolution of Lloyd's of
London and its celebrated- although infamous-names, and chronicling their and other insurers
participation in the terrors of the transatlantic slave trade); and, Corfield v. DallasGlen HillL.P., 355 F.3d
853, 857-59 (5th Cir. 2003) (presenting a thorough review of the operations at Lloyd's of London).
236. Adams 1. 220 F.3d at 664.
237. Id.
238.

ORACLE, STEEL MAKER DUFERCO AuTOMATES GLOBAL FINANCES AND GAINS STRATEGIC

VISIBIrrY, http://www.oracle.com/customers/profiles/PROFILE9190.HTML (last visited Feb. 26,2005)
[hereinafter ORACLE]; see DUFERCO, at http://www.duferco.com (last visited Feb. 26,2005) [hereinafter
Dusu-co).
239. ORACLE, supra note 238.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Adams 1, 220 F.3d at 664.
243. Id.
244. Adams 11, 364 F.3d 646, 656 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004) (noting that "A.K. Steel was an additional
insured under the UMS [policy]").
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million and $20 million per shipment, respectively .245 The value of the steelslabs cargo was $7,580,000.246
In October 1993, two of Canal Barge Company's barges-carrying the
158 slabs of steel-broke away from a flotilla of barges that carried a total of
1,290 slabs. 24 7 The two barges sank in the Mississippi River while en route
from New Orleans to Cincinnati.2 4' The loss occurred during the final leg of
a long journey that originated in Italy. 9 Duferco and the Underwriters
ultimately agreed that $986,352.41 was the value of the lost steel.250 Both
UMS and Duferco tried to salvage the sunken cargo; those efforts were
unsuccessful. 5 ' Shortly thereafter, Duferco filed a claim with UMS to cover
the loss. 25 2 UMS denied Duferco's claim. 2 53 Duferco then submitted a claim
254
to the Underwriters in London and abandoned the sunken cargo altogether.
At the same time, American Eagle Marine, Inc.-a professional salvage
company -attempted to salvage the lost cargo, believing that all who had an
interest in or a claim to the sunken slabs had abandoned the cargo in its
entirety. 255 American Eagle successfully salvaged eighty percent of the lost
cargo-127 slabs-and sold them to A.K. Steel, the original buyer for
$525,424.32.2s6 American Eagle "made a net profit of $190,975.68. "257

In Adams I, the Underwriters in London filed a lawsuit in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.2 5' They sued UMS -who denied
Duferco's claim- for contribution; and they filed an action against American
Eagle and A.K. Steel-the salvor and purchaser of the salvaged steel,

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 649.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.

250.

Id. at 649.

251.

Id.

252. Adams 1,220 F. 3d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 2000).
253. Id. ("UMS denied the claim primarily because Duferco failed to warrant proper loading of the
cargo. In the meantime, A.K. Steel (the original intended purchaser) confirmed that it did not own the
cargo and assigned any and all of its rights to Duferco.").
254. Id. "After the accident, Duferco made a claim with UMS. Duferco, through its agent, the
Italian Claims Agency ("ICA"), awarded a salvage contract to American Eagle to raise the cargo." Id. "In
the letter, an ICA representative wrote [to American Eagle] that the cargo 'had been abandoned."' Id.
(citation omitted)

255.

Id. at 665.

256.

Id.

American Eagle did not negotiate with potential buyers for the steel before commencing the
salvage operation ....

American Eagle first contacted A.K. Steel [and] Steel offered to

purchase what it described as the "Duferco Steel, that had sunk in the Mississippi." American
Eagle was unaware that A.K. Steel was the original intended purchaser of the steel.

Id. (citation omitted). "In negotiations, American Eagle refused to warrant title to the steel as insisted by
A.K. Steel." Id. "American Eagle successfully salvaged 127 steel slabs, relinquishing them to A.K. Steel

as they were placed aboard barges in the river." Id.
257.

Adams 11, 364 F.3d 646, 649 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004).

258.

Id.
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respectively - for conversion.259 The district court declared that Underwriters
could not recover any potential share of the losses in an action against UMS
for contribution without first fully compensating Duferco for the loss. 2"
Therefore, the London underwriters paid Duferco $986,352.41 for the loss
and, through an assignment, obtained Duferco' s rights against UMS and other
possible tortfeasors. 26' Amazingly, after adamantly refusing to reimburse
Duferco for the lost cargo, UMS sued A.K. Steel and American Eagle for its
alleged share of the salvaged steel's market value.262 But UMS also filed two
pretrial motions, asserting that the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana should dismiss the case because (1) that court did not
have personal jurisdiction over UMS and (2) the forum was improper. 263 The
district court denied UMS's motions.2" Instead, the district court granted
Underwriters' motion for partial summary judgment and apportioned
26
Duferco's loss between the two insurers, Underwriters and UMS. 1
Later, the district court conducted a bench trial, in which it found that
UMS had a contractual duty to reimburse Duferco for the lost steel.266 And
because the London underwriters had paid Duferco and the latter had assigned
all its rights to the former, UMS had to reimburse the Underwriters according
to the pro-rata share-and up to the policy limits -identified in their
respective marine-cargo insurance contracts.267 The court then awarded the
Underwriters 80% of the approximately $900,000 that they had paid to
Duferco."6 ' The district court also found that American Eagle and A.K. Steel
had converted the salvaged steel.269 Therefore, the court awarded the
Underwriters 20% and UMS 80% of the $190,975.68 -the market value of
the salvaged steel that A.K. Steel and American Eagle realized after paying
salvaging expenses.270
In Adams I, UMS appealed the district court's adverse personaljurisdiction, venue, and apportionment-of-liability rulings to the Court of

259. Adams 1, 220 F.3d at 664.
Plaintiffs later discovered a successful salvage of 127 of the sunken steel slabs by American
Eagle and A.K. Steel. Adams demanded that American Eagle and AK Steel return the cargo
or pay its value. When the two companies refused to do either Plaintiffs amended their petition
to assert a claim against A.K. Steel and American Eagle for the value of the converted steel.
Adams I, 364 F.3d at 649.
260. Adams 1, 220 F.3d at 664.
261. Adams 11, 364 F.3d at 649.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.

266.

Id.

267.

Id.

268.

Id.

269.

Id.

270.

Id. at 649-50.
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.27' The Fifth Circuit addressed those issues and
remanded for further proceedings only on those issues.272 When remanded,
the district court found adequate contacts existed with Louisiana to justify the
273
UMS appealed
exercise of jurisdiction and again entered a judgment.
274
again.
Again in Adams 11, UMS challenged the district court's personal
275
jurisdiction, venue, and apportionment-of-liability conclusions. In addition,
Underwriters challenged the district court's order that gave UMS a pro-rata
portion of the award against A.K. Steel and the court's refusal to award
attorney's fees.276 And A.K. Steel appealed the district court's award to UMS,
its additional
arguing that UMS had no contractual right to sue A.K. Steel2 77
doctrine.
subrogation
a
marine-under
the
under
insured
As mentioned at the outset, this case does not introduce any novel or
unfamiliar questions of law. The Fifth Circuit's holdings comported very
closely to settled principles of law. To illustrate, in Adams 1, the district court
278
That
found both specific and personal jurisdiction to hear this controversy.
279
might
4(k)(2)
court also suggested that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
0
confer the court's jurisdiction over the Italian insurer, UMS. 21 Put simply,
under Rule 4(k)(2) a federal district court may exercise jurisdiction over a
28
person, if (1) that person does not concede to jurisdiction in another state, '

271. Id. at 650 (To be sure, other parties appealed on other grounds. Underwriters cross appealed
arguing that UMS was not entitled to an award from A.K. Steel, because UMS refused to pay anything to
cover Duferco's losses and UMS refused to reimburse Underwriters a portion of the litigation costs for
suing A.K. Steel and American Eagle. A.K. Steel appealed the district court's judgment against it. But,
the Fifth Circuit only addressed the personal-jurisdiction, venue, and apportionment-of-liability questions
in Adams 1).
272. Adams 1, 220 F.3d at 664.
Regarding the dispute between the insurers, we conclude that UMS did not waive its personal
jurisdiction defense, and we reverse and remand for the district court to determine jurisdiction.
We do not decide the other issues UMS and the [Underwriters] raise on appeal against each
other. As to the conversion dispute, we affirm on all grounds except one.
Id.
273. Adams H, 364 F.3d at 650.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 234 F. Supp. 2d 612,620-25 (E.D. La. 2002).
279. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) states:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising
under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is
not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
Id.
280. Adams, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26.
281. See, e.g., ISI Int'l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001) ("If
... the defendant contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other
where suit is possible, then the federal court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2).").
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and (2) that party has sufficient ties to the United States, as a whole, to satisfy
constitutional-due-process concerns. 2
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court indeed had proper
jurisdiction over UMS, because the Italian insurer did not identify other
venues in the United States where personal jurisdiction would attach. 283 The
appellate court also found that UMS had insured and paid numerous claims
to companies in the United States.2 Furthermore, the Italian insurer had
underwritten hundreds of shipments to the United States. 285 Additionally,
"UMS used and paid a number of individuals in the United States as claims
adjusters, surveyors, investigators and other representatives to enable it to
conduct business in this country. 286
Therefore, in light of those findings, the Fifth Circuit declared:
Given the volume of activity, we have no difficulty concluding that UMS has
continuous and systematic contacts with the United States as a whole. It was
foreseeable that suit in U.S. courts would result from these business contacts.
[UMS] was well aware of the shipments to the United States and in fact
enabled the prosecution of claims in the United States by providing claims
agents and surveyors here. Thus, subjecting UMS to [a] suit here does not
offend notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
UMS also asked the Fifth Circuit to determine whether the District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana was the proper venue to decide the
controversy.288 The district court ruled that venue was proper and denied
UMS's motion to dismiss. 289 On the other hand, the Italian insurer argued
"that the district court should have enforced the forum-selection clause
contained in the insurance contract between UMS and Duferco." 29 To be
sure, under that clause, 9' the proper forum would have been a court of
competent jurisdiction in Italy.
The Fifth Circuit supported the district court's ruling because the lower
court found that the Underwriters' suit against UMS "was a contribution

282. See, e.g., World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. MV Ya Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 1996).
283. Adams II, 364 F.3d 646, 651 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004).
284. Id.
285. Id. ("Specifically records produced by UMS and Duferco show that UMS insured
approximately 260 shipments to the United States between 1989 and 1995 for Duferco alone; 138 of these

Duferco shipments to the United States made between 1991 and 1994 were valued at over $130 million.").
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 651 n.4 ("These facts have not been contested by UMS.").
Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted).
Id. at 652.

289.

Id.

290. Id.
291. Id. That clause reads: "Competent Court--Article 16. The competent Court, at the choice
of the Plaintiff party, is exclusively that of the Legal Authority of the place at which the Insurer or the
Agency to which the Policy has been allocated or at which the contract has been concluded, has its

management."
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action and not a subrogation action." '92 As such, the London underwriters did
not stand in Duferco's shoes, and they could not be bound by the forum
selection clause in an agreement to which the Underwriters were not a
party.293 UMS still insisted, "under American, English, or Italian law an
insurer who sues a co-insurer for contribution is bound by provisions in the
co-insurer's insurance policy."294 In the end, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
Italian insurer's argument and held that "[tihe district court correctly refused
to enforce UMS's forum selection clause. 295
The final question involved a substantive matter- whether the district
court correctly apportioned the liability among the various parties.296 There
were three disputes, which the Fifth Circuit quickly addressed.29 7 And given
that the apportionment disputes were essentially a collection of mini actions
in equity rather than in law, the court of appeals decided each without creating
new law or citing many settled principles.298 First, UMS challenged "the
district court's summary judgment apportioning payment of the loss between"
the London underwriters and UMS according to their respective policy
limits.299 The district court's order apportioned Duferco's loss on a 4:1 ratio
based on UMS's policy limit of $20 million and the Underwriters' $5 million
limit. 3°° But UMS argued "that the loss should have been apportioned based
upon the value of the insured lost cargo," and each insurer should have shared
lost cargo was the same, and the
the loss equally. 3"' After all, the value of the
3 02
loss fell within each insurer's policy limit.

292.

Id.

If [the Underwriters'] suit was based on [their] subrogation rights, [the Underwriters] would

be bound by the forum selection clause. [The Underwriters] seek contribution from UMS as
a co-insurer. The subrogation agreement obtained from Duferco does not transform the nature
of their claims against UMS into subrogation claims; rather the subrogation agreement folds
into the contribution claim.
Id.

293. See id. (concluding that under settled law the London underwriters were not parties to the
UMS-Duferco contract, therefore they were not bound by the forum selection clause in the UMS policy)
(citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) ("It goes without saying that a contract
cannot bind a nonparty."); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 1999)
("Under the general principles of contract law, it is axiomatic that courts cannot bind a non-party to a
contract, because that party never agreed to the terms set forth therein.")).
294. Id. The court noted that "UMS cites cases where courts have dismissed contribution actions
where the defendant co-insurer had no coverage, or where plaintiffs did not comply with notice
requirements in the policy.... UMS further quotes an English marine insurance treatise to support its
arguments.... UMS reliance on [those] authorities is misplaced." Id. at 652-53.
295. Id. at 653.
296. See id. at 654.
297. See id. at 654-56.
298.

See id.

299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that the district court's decision to
apportion the loss was based upon the lower court's interpretation of the
Duferco-UMS's contract3. 3 and Italian Code, 3" rather than on American
substantive law.30 5
Second, the Underwriters challenged the district court's decision to split
the $190,975.68 tort award against A.K. Steel on a pro-rata basis between the
two insurers-the Underwriters receiving 20% and UMS receiving 80%.306

The London underwriters argued that the Italian insurer should not receive
any money from A.K. Steel. 30 7 As reported earlier, UMS reimbursed the

Underwriters for paying UMS's share to cover Duferco's expenses after

losing the steel slabs.30 8 The district court disagreed. 3" Certainly, UMS did

not make payments to help compensate Duferco for the lost steel, 3t0 but the
lower court found that the Italian insurer was a subrogee under the UMSDuferco insurance contract.31'Therefore, from the district court's perspective,

UMS could assert a subrogation claim against A.K. Steel. 1 2 Of the
$190,975.68, the district court awarded approximately $151,000 to UMS. 1 3

The London underwriters appealed.3 t4
On review, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's award in favor of

the Italian insurer.3" 5 Put simply, after examining the doctrine of equitable
317

subrogation,3 1 6 the court of appeals found that UMS was not a subrogee;
therefore, the district court should have awarded the entire $190,975.68 to the

303. The "other insurance" clause in the Duferco-UMS insurance contract dictated the mode of
apportionment and stated: "Article 9. When for one and the same risk, several insurances with several
insurers have been taken out separately-even by various contracting parties-Article 1910 of the Civil
Code [of Italy] will apply." Id.
304.

"Article 1910 of the Italian Civil Code provides:

'Insurance with more than one insurer....

An insurer who has made payment has a right to recourse against the other insurers for a proportional
contribution based on the indemnities owed in accordance with their respective contracts. If one of the
insurers is insolvent, his share shall be divided among the others."' Id.
305. Id. at 655.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See id.
at 647.
315. Id. at655.
316. Id.The court stated that "under the doctrine of equitable subrogation ... where an insured is
entitled to receive recovery for the loss from... the insurer and the tortfeasor, it is only after the insured
has been fully compensated for all of the loss that the insurer acquires the right to subrogation." Id.
(quoting 16 LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 223:134, at 147-48 (3d ed. 2000)). The court further
stated: "an insurer [will not] be subrogated to the rights of the insured unless it had paid the loss in full."
Id. at 654 (quoting 6A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACICE, § 4121,

at 395 (1972)).
317.

d.at 655.

INSURANCE DECISIONS

20051

907

Underwriters.318 The Fifth Circuit then remanded the case and ordered the
district court to give UMS an opportunity to satisfy the Underwriters'
judgment against UMS.31 9 If UMS paid its fair share of Duferco's loss, it
would be entitled to an equitable credit for its share of the tort recovery from
A.K. Steel.320 Finally, A.K. Steel of Ohio argued that the Italian insurer
should not recover A.K. Steel's allegedly fair share of the profits from the
salvaged steel. 32 ' From A.K. Steel's viewpoint, it was also insured under the
Duferco-UMS marine-cargo insurance contract; therefore, it should have
received the approximately $191,000-UMS's alleged share of the profit from
the salvaged steel.322 The Fifth Circuit disagreed.323
The court of appeals accepted A.K. Steel's argument: An insurer
generally cannot subrogate against its insureds.324 The Fifth Circuit ruled:
5
Courts do not bar all insurer-initiated suits against an insured." The Italian
underwriter sued A.K. Steel for conversion--for exercising illegal control
over, and profiting from, the salvaged steel.326 UMS demanded that A.K.
Steel reimburse the company.327 But to repeat, UMS did not pay anything to
make Duferco whole.328
To resolve the dispute, the Fifth Circuit held that A.K. Steel ultimately
had suffered no loss in the entire ordeal.329 In fact, A.K. Steel became
unjustly enriched from its salvaging activities.330 Therefore, the appellate
court declared UMS could receive reimbursements from A.K. Steel even
"
'
though the company was an insured under UMS's policy.33

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
insurance
against its

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 656 (reaffirming that "an insurer may not sue its own insured to recover under the
policy" and that the doctrine of equitable subrogation will not allow an insurer to recover
insured or from an additional assured any part of the insurer's payment for a risk covered under

a property insurance contract) (citing Peavey Co. v. MN ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168, 1177 (5th Cir. 1992)).
325. Id.
An insurer may recover damages from an insured for losses outside the policy. In particular
an insurer may bring a reimbursement action against its insured for recovered property or an
insurers overpayment for losses, even where a subrogation action is forbidden .... "An insurer
may recover payments it has made for lost property if the property is subsequently found."
Id. (quoting 6 LEE R. Russ, COUcH ON INSURANCE, § 226:4, at 15-16 (3d ed. 2000)).
326.

See id.

327.

id.

328.

Id. at 649.

329.

Id. at 656.

330.
331.

Id.

Id.
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F. Property Insurance: Whether Under FederalLaw
"Complete Diversity" of Citizenship Requires a Court to
Considerthe Citizenship of Every UnderwriterSubscribing to a
Lloyd's of London Insurance ContractWhen the Lead Underwriter
Only Sues on Its Own Behalf
Although Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP is a case of first impression

for the Fifth Circuit, the procedural question in the case is quite familiar and

uncomplicated.332 On the other hand, the underlying facts are fairly intricate
because they involve a breach-of-contract controversy between a limited
partnership and certain underwriters at Lloyd's of London.333 The original
complaint listed several parties doing business at Lloyd's of London as
defendants.334 Therefore, before discussing the Fifth Circuit's decision, the
author outlines the structure and operations at Lloyd's of London and discuss

who is liable when a party sells and breaches a Lloyd's property insurance
contract.
At the outset, it is important to establish that Lloyd's of London, the
Corporation of Lloyd's, and the Society of Lloyd's are labels for the same

entity.335 Lloyd's is more than three hundred years old.336 Contrary to popular
belief, Lloyd's of London is not an insurance company.337 It neither
underwrites various risks nor sells contracts of insurance.338 Instead, Lloyd's
provides office space and administrative assistance for its members.339

Lloyd's also provides a market for its members to insure or underwrite certain
percentages of risks and to sell or assign those percentages to other

members.3

o

332. Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003).
333. See id. at 855-56.
334. Id. at 855.
335. See, e.g., Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 2002).
Through a succession of Parliamentary Acts (the Lloyd's Acts 1871-1982), the United
Kingdom Parliament has authorized Lloyd's to regulate an English insurance market located
in London, England .... The Corporation of Lloyd's, which is also known as the Society of
Lloyd's, provides the building and personnel necessary to the market's administrative
operations. The Corporation is run by the Council of Lloyd's, which promulgates "Byelaws,"
regulates the market, and generally controls Lloyd's administrative functions.
Id.
336. See Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1997) (reporting that
"Lloyd's is a 300-year-old market in which individual and corporate underwriters known as 'Names'
underwrite insurance").
337. See Smith v. Lloyd's of London, 568 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing ANTONY
BROWN, LLOYD'S OF LONDON (1974); John M. Sylvester & Roberta D. Anderson, Is It Still Possible To
LitigateAgainst Lloyd's in FederalCourt?, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1065, 1068 (1999)).
338. See Lowsley-Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D.N.J. 1995)
(Stipulations,
3-4).
339. Lowsley-Williams, 884 F. Supp. at 167 (Stipulation, 1); Society of Lloyd's, 303 F.3d at 32627.
340. See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 41 (6th Cir.
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At Lloyd's, there are two general classes of members-"names" and

"syndicates.""34

Names are individuals and corporations who finance the

insurance market and ultimately insure risks.342 Also, names are investors and
underwriters. 43 They invest in or underwrite a percentage of the risk under

an insurance contract, hoping to realize a wholesome return on their
investments. 3" Most names do not actively participate in the insurance
market
346
are
on a daily basis.345 Instead, groups of names called syndicates

responsible3 for forming insurance contracts 347 and underwriting various risks
at Lloyd' s. 4

The syndicates insure all types of tangible and intangible interests
350
worldwide.3 49 They also sell reinsurance contracts-Treaty of Reinsurance

1994) (citing Clifford Chance, Doing Business in the United Kingdom, §§ 46.02, 46-6 to 46-8 (Barbara
Ford et al. eds., 1990); Eileen M. Dacey, The Structures of the Lloyd's Market, in Lloyd's, the ILU, and
the London Insurance Market 1990, at 33, 49-50 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 555, 1990)).
341. See infra text accompanying notes 342-56.
342. See Lowsey-Williams, 884 F. Supp. at 167-68 ("Persons desiring to be [n]ames must pay an
entrance fee, keep certain deposits at Lloyd's, and meet several specific requirements, including the
possession of a certain degree of wealth, in order to become [n]ames.") (Stipulations, 9 10 & 66);
Sylvester & Anderson, supra note 337.
7-8).
343. Lowsley- Williams, 884 F.Supp. at 167 (Stipulations,
344. See id. at 168.
The maximum amount that each [n]ame may underwrite is determined in relation to the
[niame's wealth, in addition to other factors. Since [niames assume unlimited liability, fniames
are liable to the full extent of their personal wealth for any risks undertaken. For any given
contract, each [niame is liable only for the percentage of the risk which that [nlame has agreed
to underwrite and for no other portion of the risk assumed by any other [n]ame.
11-13). See also Willy E. Rice, "Commercial Terrorism" From the Transatlantic
Id. (Stipulations,
Slave Trade to the World Trade Center Disaster: Are Insurance Companies & Judges "Aiders and
Abettors " of Terror?-A CriticalAnalysis of American and British Courts' Declaratory and Equitable
Actions, 1654-2002, 6 SCHOLAR 1, 49-52 (2003) (outlining the historical structure and operations at
Lloyd's).
345. See Layne, 26 F.3d at 42.
346. Lowsley- Williams, 884 F. Supp. at 168. "In order to increase the efficiency of underwriting
risks and to combine the resources of numerous underwriters, names form groups called syndicates." Id.
(Stipulation, T 16).
347. See Chem. Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1999)
(reporting that during a given operating year, a group of names will form a syndicate which will in turn
subscribe to policies on behalf of all names in the syndicate).
348. Layne, 26 F.3d at 41-42.
349. See generally Chem. Leaman Tank Liner, 177 F.3d at 214-15 (insuring against contamination
of ground water for cleanup costs in New Jersey); Layne, 26 F.3d at 41 (insuring a tavern against fire loss
in Tennessee); Lowsley- Williams, 884 F. Supp. at 167 (insuring rights and duties under reinsurance
contracts in New Jersey).
350. N. River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1995).
The foreign reinsurers are Underwriters and Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's of London,
and foreign companies subscribing to reinsurance.... London reinsurers [reinsure primary
insurers] under so-called 'treaty programs."... A reinsurance treaty is an ongoing contractual
relationship between two insurance companies in which he primary insurer agrees in advance
to cede, and the reinsurer to accept, specified business that is the subject of the contract. Under
a treaty, a reinsurer agrees to indemnify a primary insurer with respect to a portion of the
primary insurer's liability in a designated line of business.... [T]ypical[ly], the reinsurance
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Under a typical contract, multiple
-to other insurers worldwide."'
syndicates collectively underwrite one hundred percent of the coverage.35 2 On
the other hand, syndicates themselves have no independent legal identity.353

Consequently, a syndicate bears no liability for the risk under a Lloyd's
policy.354 Rather, the individual names comprising the syndicates are jointly
and severally liable3 5 under the contract.356
Against that background, consider the facts in Corfield."7 Dallas Glen
Hills L.P. (DGH) is a limited partnership.35 ' One partner definitely resided in
Texas. 5 But there was dispute about whether the other partners resided in

Delaware and in New York."6 Liberty Corporate Capital, Ltd. (Liberty) is a
treaty involve[s] the participation of many reinsurers, each accepting a percentage of the total
liability under a single treaty.
Id. See alsoIn re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1991). "Reinsurance is arranged by
specialized brokers and underwriters. Much reinsurance is done by syndicates doing business through
Lloyd's of London." Id.
351. See generally Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1997)
(notwithstanding, the jurisdiction where the contract operates to insure each agreement must contain a
clause designating English law as the law governing disputes arising under the agreement).
352. Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 858 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003); see Layne, 26 F.3d
at 42 ("These syndicates . .. are comprised of some 30,000 member-investors, sometimes called
'underwriters' or 'names,' who hope to share in any profit the syndicate might make.") (quoting Daly v.
Lime St. Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 2 FTLR 277, 279 (Q.B. 1987)); Sylvester & Anderson, supranote
337, at 1068.
353. Sylvester & Anderson, supra note 337, at 1068; see also Corfield, 355 F.3d at 858 ("[A]
[slyndicate is a creature of administrative convenience through which individual investors can subscribe
to a Lloyd's policy.").
354. See Lowsley-Williarns, 884 F. Supp. at 167-68. "[Plolicyholders have no contractual
relationship with Lloyd's.... [In addition,] there is no contractual relationship among members of a
syndicate, between syndicates, or between [a] policyholder and a syndicate. Syndicates do not assume
liability or underwrite risks; [niames do." Id. (Stipulations, 5 & 19-21). See also Corfield,355 F.3d
at 858.
Lloyd's requires [niames to pay a membership fee, [to] keep certain deposits at Lloyd's, and
[to] possess a certain degree of financial wealth. Each [niame is exposed to unlimited personal
liability for his proportionate share of the loss on a particular policy that the [niame...
subscribed to as an underwriter. Typically hundreds of [niames will subscribe to a single
policy, and the liability among the [niames is several, not joint.
Id. (citing Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 177 F.3d at 221; Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Cos., 241
F.3d 154, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2001)).
355. See Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325,327 (5th Cir. 2002). The Council of Lloyd's
controls Lloyd's administrative functions. Id. The Council also develops regulations or "byelaws" for the
syndicates and names. Id. One regulation requires names to become members ofLloyd's before they can
participate in the insurance market. Id. Also, names "must pass a means test to ensure... [they can] meet
their underwriting obligations." Id. But more important, they must appear in person-before a
representative of the Council in London-and swear that they accept exposure to"unlimited personal
liability" for the privilege to underwrite insurance in the Lloyd's market. Id.
356. Corfield, 355 F.3d at 859. "[Although] an insured receives a Lloyd's 'policy' of insurance,
[the insured] has in fact received... numerous contractual commitments from each [n]ame who has agreed
to subscribe to the risk. The [names are jointly and severally obligated to the insured for the percentage
of the risk each has agreed to assume." Id.
357. See discussion infra notes 358-66 and accompanying text.
358. Corfield, 355 F.3d at 856.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 856-57. An amended complaint alleged "that all of DGH's partners were ... citizens
of Texas" and a second amended complaint "alleged that all of DGH's partners were either citizens of
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"
' In fact, Liberty is a large syndicate of
member at Lloyd's of London.36
names that insure against perils associated with and causing property losses.362
Liberty insured DGH under a Lloyd's commercial-property insurance
contract.363 The policy limit was $500,000. 364 Liberty insured 32.79% of the
risk; therefore, Liberty had complete authority to accept or deny claims as
well as the power to prosecute or defend lawsuits.365 During the policy period,
DGH experienced a loss and filed a property-loss claim with Liberty.3"
Liberty Syndicate 190 (Syndicate 190) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Liberty Corporate Capital, Ltd. 367 Acting through Syndicate 190, Liberty
instructed an adjuster to inspect DGH's property and submit a report.368
Liberty rejected DGH's claim after evaluating the adjuster's finding.369
Liberty determined that the policy did not cover the property Ioss. 3 70 Thomas
Corfield (Corfield) is a British subject and an "active" underwriter for
Syndicate 190.371 Corfield underwrites insurance himself; he also represents
certain other underwriters at Lloyd's, those insuring DGH under the property
insurance contract.372 Like many insurers who anticipate an insured's lawsuit
after rejecting a claim, Corfield filed a declaratory-judgment action -under
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 373- in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas.374 Corfield commenced the action on his
behalf and on behalf 37
of
other underwriters who assumed portions of the risk
5
under DGH's policy.
In the complaint, Corfield asked the district court to declare whether
Liberty had a duty to pay for DGH's property losses.376 To be sure, if the
court had found no coverage and, therefore, declared that Liberty had no
contractual duty to pay, Liberty would have effectively shielded itself from a
bad-faith or a breach-of-contract lawsuit or both.377 Corfield alleged that

361. Id. at 856.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 855 n.1.
366. Id. at 855.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) reads in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.... any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
374. Corfield, 355 F.3d at 853.
375. Id. at 856.
376. id.
377. See id. at 853.
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jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship.378 However, Corfield's
complaint failed to identify DGH's citizenship, only stating that DGH was a
Texas limited partnership.379 Moreover, the district court questioned whether
Corfield properly pleaded his own citizenship, given that he brought an action
both on his own behalf and as the representative of the other underwriters."'
Repeatedly, the district court ordered Corfield to identify the DGH
partnership's citizenship and each of the partner's citizenship.38'
In response to the district court's order, Liberty replaced Corfield as the
named plaintiff and filed a final complaint for declaratory relief in which
Liberty alleged that it was suing only on its own behalf as the lead
underwriteron the policy. 38 2 Liberty dropped the allegations that it was suing
as a representative on behalf of the other underwriters.383 Liberty also alleged
384
that all of DGH's partners were citizens of Texas, Delaware, or New York.
Nevertheless, to find diversity the district court decided to determine the
citizenship of each underwriter who subscribed to the policy to achieve
complete diversity. 385 Furthermore, entertaining DGH's argument that at least
one of the Lloyd's underwriters was a citizen of Texas, the district court
decided that the parties were not completely diverse. 386 DGH cited Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 387 and moved to dismiss the case for lack of

378. Id. at 855. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), (3) (2000) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum [of] or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest or costs, and is
between- ... (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of
different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties....
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), (3) (2000).
379. Corfield, 355 F.3d at 856.

380.
381.

Id.
Id.

382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 856-57.
385. Id. at 857. The federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), provides in relevant part:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds... $75,000... and is between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state[.J"
See also Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087, 1094 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the diversity statute
requires "complete diversity" of citizenship and that a district court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction
if one of the plaintiffs shares the same state citizenship as any one of the defendants) (citing Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (5th Cir. 1974)).
386. Corfield, 355 F.3d at 856.
DGH argued that for diversity purposes the district court must consider the citizenship of every
underwriter subscribing to a Lloyd's policy when determining if complete diversity is satisfied.
DGH also asserted that at least one underwriter on the Policy was a citizen of Texas as was at
least one of DGH's partners. Thus, DGH argued that complete diversity was lacking.
Id.
387. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) reads in pertinent part: "Every defense... to a claim for relief in any
pleading... be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defense... may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter[.]" Id.

20051

INSURANCE DECISIONS

38 9
subject matter jurisdiction. 88 The district court granted DGH's motion.
3 °
Liberty timely appealed.
Liberty asked the Fifth Circuit to determine a fairly narrow question:
whether complete diversity requires a district court to consider the citizenship
of every underwriter who subscribed to a Lloyd's of London policy when the
lead underwriter sues only on its own behalf.31 As mentioned earlier, this
was a question of first impression for the Fifth Circuit.3 92 But several other
federal circuits have addressed the procedural question appearing in Corfield,
reaching conflicting results. For example, the Second Circuit held that a
district court must view all names in a syndicate as dispensable parties when
considering diversity of citizenship.393 The Second Circuit found that all
names under a contract are contractually bound and Lloyd's rules require all
names to abide by any judgment rendered against the lead underwriter.394
The Seventh Circuit also ruled that lower courts must treat the syndicates
at Lloyd's as entities and the citizenship of every subscribing name must be
considered when determining a syndicate's citizenship.395 Conversely, the
Third Circuit held that the citizenship of the lone underwriter is the only
citizenship relevant for diversity purposes.396 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
declared that only the single underwriter's citizenship
is relevant when
3 97
determining whether complete diversity exists.
After reviewing the decisions outlined above, the Fifth Circuit adopted
the Second Circuit's analysis and conclusion to decide the diversity question
in Corfield.398 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, declaring
the following:

[T]he district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this claim because
DGH is alleged[ly] a citizen of Texas, Delaware, and New York, and Liberty
is alleged[ly] a citizen of the United Kingdom. Liberty's 32.79 percent of
risk is approximately $163,950 . .. [ an amount well in excess of the

388.
389.

Corfield,355 F.3d at 856.
Id. at 857.

390.

Id.

391.

Id.

392.

id.

393.
394.
350857, at
395.

Id. at 859-63.
See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 82 ClV. 7327JSM, 1999 WL
*5 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 241 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001).
See Ind. Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1998).

396.
1999).
397.

See Chem. Leaman Tank Liner, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir.
See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 43 (6th Cir.

1994).
398. Corfield, 355 F.3d at 863.
In the current posture of the instant case, Liberty is suing only in its individual capacity as lead
underwriter on the Policy. Thus, Liberty's case is presented to us in the exact procedural
posture suggested by the Second Circuit in Squibb I and ultimately approved by the Second

Circuit in Squibb 11.We find the Second Circuit's approach to be based upon sound reasoning.
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jurisdictional amount. The other subscribing [nlames are not parties before
the [c]ourt and their citizenship need not be considered when determining
whether the parties are completely diverse. Thus, the district court erred in
dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 39
HII. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS: STATE STATUTORY
CLAIMS & DECISIONS

A. Health Insurance Plans: Whether ERISA Preempts a
Louisiana DeclaratoryJudgment Trial Where an InsuredHMO
Member Asks a Court to Declare that the Employer's
Equitable-SubrogationClaims Are Unfounded
Like the petitioners in Adams and Corfield, the litigants in Arana v.
Ochsner Health Plan (Arana 1) asked the Fifth Circuit to decide whether a
federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide a controversy.' °
But in Arana I, the parties to the suit styled the procedural conflict as one
involving a federal-preemption rather than a diversity question. 40'
Furthermore, after the court of appeals resolved the procedural debate in
Arana I, the parties asked the Fifth Circuit to determine a substantive question
in Arana 11.402 And once more, in the latter case, the court of appeals had to
decide a critically important and timely equitable-subrogation question that
arguably has some implications for the entire managed-care industry in this
country.403
Consider the brief facts in Arana LI' Julio C. Arana's mother worked
for LeCler Printing Company." Ochsner Health Plan, Inc. (OHP) provided
health benefits for LeCler's employees under a managed-health and benefits
plan. 6 OHP covered Arana under his mother's health plan. 4"7 During the
coverage period, Arana was seriously injured when a 1996 Ford Crown
Victoria struck the 1995 Nissan Pathfinder that Arana was driving. n°
illowing the accident, OHP paid nearly $180,000 in health benefits to treat

399.
400.
401.

Id.
Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan (Arana 1), 338 F.3d 433,436 (5th Cir. July 2003).
Id. at 438.

402.

Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan (Arana I1), 352 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003).

403.

Arana 1, 338 F.3d at 437 n.6.

Participating in this case as amicicuriae are Louisiana Managed Health Care Association, Inc.,
et al.; Benefit Recovery, Inc.; Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of the United States Department of
Labor; and Professors Edward H. Cooper and Dana M. Muir of the University of Michigan Law
School. Professors Cooper and Muir filed their brief at the request of the court, and we are
grateful for their participation.
Id.
404.
405.

Id.
Arana 11, 352 F.3d at 975.

406.

Id.

407.
408.

See id.
Id.
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Arana's accident-related injuries. 9 When the accident occurred, several
other insurers -State Farm, Allstate, the Fireman's Fund, and United Fire covered collectively the Crown Victoria, the Pathfinder, and uninsured
motorists. 1 0 Each of those insurers paid substantial benefits to Arana under
the terms of their respective policies.41 ' State Farm and Allstate paid
$150,000."' And collectively, Fireman's Fund and United Fire paid $962,500
to settle Arana's claims against the tortfeasor.413
After discovering that Arana received more than one million dollars from
the insurers, OHP wrote to Arana's mother and United Fire notifying both that
OHP had a contractual right to recover the health benefits it had paid on
Arana's behalf. 414 Shortly thereafter, Arana filed a declaratory-judgment
action in a Louisiana state court arguing that Louisiana's law barred OHP's
equitable-subrogation claim.415 OHP removed Arana's lawsuit to the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on the grounds that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)416 completely preempted Arana's
state-declaratory-judgment action.417
The district court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction because
418
Arana stated a claim "to recover benefits" under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
From the district court's perspective, Arana's assertion that his action could
proceed only under Louisiana's state law was unconvincing. 4 9 The lower
court found that OHP was attempting to reduce the amount of benefits it had
paid under a health plan, an ERISA-related claim. The district court did award
partial summary judgment to Arana on the merits of his other claims.420

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Id.
Id.
See id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Arana 1, 338 F.3d at 435-36.

Arana raised two claims: (1) a request for a declaratory judgment "requiring OHP to release its
notice of lien and to withdraw and release OHP's subrogation, reimbursement and assignment
claims" because LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:663 bars OHP from asserting these rights; and (2) a
request for statutory penalties and attorney's fees under LA. REV. STAT. § 22:657 for OHP's
allegedly wrongful attempt to assert a lien against his tort settlements and obtain reimbursement
from him. Arana brought the case as a class action, but no class has been certified.
Id.
416.
417.
418.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
Arana I1, 352 F.3d at 975.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 502(a)(1)(B), which reads in pertinent

part
(a) A civil action may be brought-

(1) by a participant or beneficiary(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of

the plan...
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
419. Arana H, 352 F.3d at 979.
420. Arana I, 338 F.3d at 436 n.5.
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Arana appealed the district court's adverse ruling to a Fifth-Circuit panel,
arguing that federal courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this
action."' More specifically, he asserted that ERISA did not completely
preempt his state-declaratory-judgment action.422 The panel agreed.4 23 OHP

then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for rehearing en banc to determine whether
jurisdiction was proper.424 The full court of appeals agreed to decide the
controversy.425
In Arana I, right away the Fifth Circuit cited a settled principle of federal
law, the "well-pleaded complaint rule": Under the federal removal statute, a
federal district court may remove a state-court civil action to federal court if
the claim arises under federal law or there is diversity jurisdiction, providing
that the defendant is not a citizen of the state where the action commences.426
But there is an exception to this settled rule: "Congress may so completely
[preempt] a particular area [of law so] that any civil complaint [involving such
character. "427 Consequently, those
claims would be] necessarily federal 4in
28
civil claims would be preempted, too.

The Fifth Circuit observed that federal law is clear regarding another
matter: State law claims are completely preempted if the petitioner attempts
to secure relief within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 429 Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit ruled in Arana I that the district court had federal subject matter
jurisdiction.43 The court of appeals held that Arana's state-court suit stated

a claim to recover benefits or to enforce rights, which were completely

421.
ld. at 436.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 436-37.
The panel held that Arana's first claim [was] not a claim 'to recover benefits' within the scope
of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) because OHP has already paid Arana all of the health benefits due
and Arana [was] not seeking additional benefits. The panel also rejected OHP's argument that
Arana's first claim [was] one "to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan" under
§ 502(a)(1)(B) because Arana [was] not seeking to enforce the plan's terms but... to declare
a portion of the plan illegal under Louisiana law if enforced. Finally, the panel determined that
Arana's second claim, which [sought] penalties and attorney's fees, [was] not within the scope
of ERISA § 502(a) because, (although] LA. REv.STAT. § 22:657 may conflict with ERISA, a

jurisdiction.
mere conflict with federal law is insufficient for
Id.
424. Id. at 437.
425. See id.
426. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000), which reads:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or
right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable
Any other such action shall be
without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
removable only if none of the parties
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
See also Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (declaring that "[as] a general rule,
absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim").
427. Arana 1, 338 F.3d at 437 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)).
428. See Taylor, 482 U.S. at 63-64.
429. See id. at 62-66.
430. Arana 1, 338 F.3d at 440.
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preempted under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 431 The en banc court returned the
case to a Fifth-Circuit panel to address the merits of Arana's substantive
claims.432
In Arana 11, the only issue before the panel was the viability of Arana's
declaratory-judgment action under Louisiana's law. 4 3 Once more, Arana
cited Louisiana Revised Statute Section 22:663."34 He asserted that the statute
prohibited OHP from becoming a subrogee. 43 Therefore, OHP could not
seize any of the money that the four liability insurers gave Arana to settle
6
Arana's third-party claims against the respective insureds.
Section 22:663 states in relevant part:
No group policy of accident, health or hospitalization insurance... shall be
issued by any insurer doing business in this state which

. .

excludes or

reduces the payment of benefits to or on behalf of an insured [if those]
benefits have been paid under any other individually underwritten contract
or plan of insurance for the same claim determination period. Any group
policy provision in violation of this section shall be invalid.3 7
To defend itself, OHP argued that the statute did not apply because OHP was
not an insurer.4 38 The Fifth-Circuit panel agreed.439
First, the panel in Arana 11 observed that OHP was a health maintenance
4
But, the panel found
organization (HMO), one that provided insurance.'
were not insurers"
OHP
like
HMO's
exceptionsnarrow
some
that- barring
2
panel stated that
the
Fifth-Circuit
Second,
law."
under Louisiana's statutory

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

Id.
Id.
Arana !I, 352 F.3d at 976.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:663 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003).
Arana 11, 352 F.3d at 978-79. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1825 "defines subrogation as 'the

substitution of one person to the rights of another.' Subrogation generally takes place after insurance
proceeds have been paid out and the insurance company, substituting itself in place of the insured, seeks
reimbursement from a third-party." Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1825).

436.
437.

See Arana I1,352 F.3d at 979.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:663 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).

438.

See Arana I1, 352 F.3d at 976.
Id. at 976-77.
See id.

439.
440.

441. Id. "OHP is a health maintenance organization, however, not an insurer, and Louisiana law
has carefully identified the Insurance Code provisions that apply to HMOs. Thus, '[a] health maintenance
organization is an insurer but only for the purposes enumerated in R.S. 22:2002(7). "' Id.; see also Tucker
v. Ochsner Health Plan, 674 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an HMO is not an
insurance company for purposes of a statute granting special venue provisions for insurance claims);
Crawford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 814 So. 2d 574, 580 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to follow
Tucker on the grounds that Blue Cross was an insurer rather than an HMO).
442. Arana 11, 352 F.3d at 979. Section 22:2002(7) of the Insurance Code states that "[a] health
maintenance organization [is] an insurer for the purposes ofR.S. 22:213.6 and 213.7, Part XVI, comprised
of R.S. 22:731 through 774, Part XXI-A, comprised of R.S. 22:1001 through 1015, and Part XXVI-B,
comprised of R.S. 22:1241 through 1247.1, of Chapter 1 of this title," and states that "[a] health
maintenance organization shallnot be considered an insurerforanyotherpurpose." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 22:2002(7) (emphasis added).
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if "the Louisiana legislature [wishes] to prohibit subrogation[,] it is free to do
so, but the plain language of § 22:663 does not allow [the Fifth Circuit] to
expand the reach of the statute."" 3 Therefore, the appellate court reversed the
district court's ruling and declared: "OHP is not an 'insurer' [under]
§ 22:663, and § 22:663 does not in any event prevent subrogation. Arana has
no claim under Louisiana law."'
B. Property Insurance: Whether an Allegedly Ambiguous Clause
in a PropertyInsurance Contract Was Reimbursement or a
SubrogationProvision that Allowed Recovery Under a "Plan Priority"
or a "Make Whole" Theory
New OrleansAssets, L.L.C. v. Woodward presents another controversy
involving the doctrine of equitable subrogation in Louisiana." 5 But unlike the
insurer in Arana II, the insurer in Woodward presented a fairly novel,
interesting, and, arguably, daring question, "[one] that the Louisiana Supreme
Court has not addressed squarely.""' 6 However, the facts surrounding the
controversy are fairly common occurrences. 47 New Orleans Assets, L.L.C.
(NOA) owns an office building that houses the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's regional headquarters." 8 After the building was completed,
NOA spent nine-million dollars to remove widespread mildew and mold from
the exterior walls." 9 NOA sued the various designers and builders alleging
that faulty design and construction caused the mold and mildew.450
Reliance Insurance Company insured NOA's building under a property
insurance contract. 51 While Reliance insured NOA's loss, the latter could not
cover insurance proceeds because Reliance became insolvent.452 But, NOA
later settled its claim with several of the designers and builders, but the
settlement did not cover all of NOA's loss. 53 The parties could not determine
precisely the total cost of NOA's loss, but they agreed the settlement and the
remaining unpaid loss greatly exceeded $149,900.454
For certain, that number is significant for two reasons. 455 First, Louisiana
created the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA).456 LIGA's
primary responsibility is to assist insureds and pay insureds' claims when

443.

Arana II, 352 F.3d at 979.

444.

Id.

445.

See New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004).

446.
447.

Id. at 376.
Id. at 373-74.

448.

!d. at 373.

449.

Id.

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.1376 (West 1995).
Id.
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insurance companies become insolvent.457 As a result, LIGA became the
Second,
successor to Reliance, NOA's original property insurer.
Louisiana's insolvency statute is clear about another matter: Regardless of an
insured's loss, the maximum amount that LIGA must pay is $149,900 per
from LIGA, which
claim.459 Therefore, NOA could only recover $149,900
4 °
was considerably smaller than NOA's property loss.
Yet, after NOA filed a property-loss claim with the successor insurer,
LIGA refused to pay even $149,900. 41' Therefore, NOA commenced a
breach-of-contract action against LIGA in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana.462 During the proceeding, LIGA learned of
the settlement between NOA and the tortfeasors who negligently designed and
constructed NOA's building." 3 LIGA filed a motion for summary judgment
citing language in the original contract between NOA and Reliance.4"
To justify its petition for summary relief, LIGA argued that NOA had a
contractual duty to reimburse LIGA first after NOA received settlement
dollars. 465 LIGA stressed that its statutory liability to NOA, if any, was
capped at $149,900; NOA received more than that amount in the settlement.466
Therefore, LIGA argued that there was no contractual obligation to pay NOA
anything.467 In fact, LIGA advanced an arguably novel and imaginative
theory of recovery for itself.468 The state-created guaranty association stressed
that
the Reliance contract also governed its present relationship with NOA;
therefore, under the terms of that agreement, NOA had a contractual duty to
reimburse LIGA for all payments received in the settlement. 469 Incredibly,
LIGA advanced that theory even though NOA was not fully compensated for
or recovered completely from its property loss. 470 More astonishing, the
district court agreed with LIGA's argument and granted summary judgment
in their favor.47 NOA appealed.472

457.

Id.

458. Woodward, 363 F.3d at 373. "LIGA was 'deemed the insurer' and had 'all rights, duties, and
obligations of the insolvent insurer."' Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1382(A)(2) (West Supp.
2004)). "In effect, when Reliance went bankrupt, LIGA stepped into the shoes of Reliance and became
NOA's property insurer." Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1382(A)(2)).
459. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1382(A)(1)(a)(iii). Actually, LIGA's maximum exposure under
this provision is $150,000 per claim minus a $100 deductible. Id.; Woodward, 363 F.3d at 374 n.l.
460. Woodward, 363 F.3d at 374 n. 1.
461. See id.

462.

Id.

463.

See id.

464.

Id.

465.

Id.

466.

Id.

467.

See id.

468.

Id.

469.
470.
471.

Id.
Id.
Id.

472.

Id.
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The question before the Fifth Circuit was very narrow: whether a
disputed clause under the property-insurance contract was a subrogation or a
reimbursement clause.473 In particular, the following provision appeared in
the contract: "If you [the insured] waive your rights against another party in
writing after [a] loss or damage, we [the insurer] can recover from you any
'
amount you received for that waiver."474
According to LIGA, that language
created a reimbursement rather than a partial-subrogation clause; therefore,
the guaranty association asserted that NOA had a duty to reimburse LIGA for
funds that LIGA never paid on NOA's behalf, even though the settlement did
not make NOA whole.475
Quite often, an insured party-like NOA-receives benefits from its
insurer, as well as from third-party tortfeasors, to compensate for an
assortment of property losses and bodily injuries. 476 The facts outlined in
Arana H illustrate this practice very well.477 Therefore, anticipating such an
outcome, smart insurers typically insert distinguishable subrogation and
reimbursement clauses in the insurance contracts.
Louisiana's equitable subrogation doctrine permits an insurer to step into
the insured's shoes to assert rights against and to seek reimbursement from the
insured's third-party tortfeasor. 78 But as we learned in Arana II, there is a
proviso: The insurer may acquire those rights only after the insurer pays
funds to make its insured nearly whole again after the insured experiences a
loss. 479 On the other hand, Louisiana's doctrine of reimbursement allows the
insurer to commence an equitable action against the insured only to recover
funds that the insurer paid to or on behalf of the insured.4"'
After considering these two doctrines, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
following: "[Since the disputed clause in the Reliance contract] provides for
both subrogation rights and reimbursement, we treat it as a subrogation clause.
...[And because] the make whole doctrine applies to subrogation agreements,
the make whole doctrine applies to this case."48 ' Therefore, the court of

473.
474.
475.
476.

See id.
Id. at 375 n.5.
Id. at 376.
See, e.g., Arana 11,
352 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003).

477. See supra notes 402-13 and accompanying text.
478. See Barreca v. Cobb, 668 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (La. 1996) (declaring that underthe "subrogation
[doctrine], the insurer stands in the shoes of the insured and acquires the right to assert the actions and

rights of the [insured]") (citation omitted).
479. See Arana II, 352 F.3d at 978-79.
480. See Barreca,668 So. 2d at 1131. "While subrogation and reimbursement are similar in effect,
they are different principles. With subrogation, the insurer stands in the shoes of the insured..., whereas
with reimbursement, the insurer has a direct right of repayment against the insured .. ." Id. (citing
Copeland v. Slidell Mem'l Hosp., 657 So. 2d 1292, 1298-1299 (La. 1995)). Thus, the agreement

appearing in this case, although entitled "subrogation recovery agreement" does not conventionally
subrogate Copeland to the Wallaces' rights against the tortfeasor, it only affords Copeland the right of
repayment from the insured. Id.
481. New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004).
When, as in this case, an insured party recovers only part of its loss from a tortfeasor, two
different rules might establish the priority between an insurer and the insured to the recovery:
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appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary relief in favor of LIGA
and remanded the case for further proceedings.4 82
Arguably, the Fifth Circuit's holding in Woodward was correct, but the
manner in which the appellate court reached that result is a bit disturbing. As
reported at the outset, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has not addressed the disputed question in this case.483
Nevertheless, the appellate court refused to certify the case to the'' 8Supreme
Court of Louisiana,"' preferring instead to "make an Erie guess. 1 1
Louisiana adopted five doctrines to interpret disputed language in
insurance contracts -traditional principles of contract construction,486 the
doctrine of plain meaning,487 the ambiguity doctrine,488 the doctrine of
reasonable expectation, 489 and the adhesion doctrine." The Fifth Circuit did
not carefully consider any of the previous doctrines to resolve the dispute in
Woodward.49 ' Even after LIGA reminded the court of appeals that the
Louisiana Supreme Court employs at least one of these doctrines to interpret
insurance contracts, the Fifth Circuit dismissed LIGA's concern cavalierly.4 92
In a very brief footnote, the Fifth Circuit stated: "Viewing the clause as a
whole, and mindful of the examples set in Barreca and Smith, both of which
allude to reimbursement but provide for subrogation, we construe the contract
as providing for subrogation."'4 93

(1) Plan Priority,under which priority is given to the plan for full recovery "off the top," [or]
(2) Make Whole, under which priority is given to the beneficiary to keep everything he recovers
from third parties until he is made entirely whole.
Id. at 374 (quoting Sunbeam-Oster Co. Group Benefits Plan for Salaried & Non-Bargaining Hourly
Employees v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (5th Cir. 1996)).
482. Id. at 377.
483. Id. at 376.
484. id. at 377 o.10. "Because we render a decision in this case, we deny as moot NOA's
alternative motion to certify this issue to the Louisiana Supreme Court." Id.
485. id. at 376; see Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.
1992). "[l]t is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest court of the state
would decide." Id. (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 89 (1938)).
486. See Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (La. 1996) (holding that "[a]n
insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary contract
principles").
487. See La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759,763 (La. 1994) (holding
that the parties' "intent is to be determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain and popular
meaning of the words used in the policy").
488. See Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1134, 1138 (La. 2002) (repeating
that the "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished the contract's text
and in favor of the insured").
489. See La. Ins. Guar.Ass'n, 630 So. 2d at 764 (holding that a court should construe an insurance
contract "'to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties in the light of the customs and usages of the
industry"' (quoting Trinity Indust., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 916 F.2d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1990))).
490. See Duncan v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 747 So. 2d 656, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (observing that
"[i]t is well settled that... insurance policies are generally contracts of adhesion").
491.
See New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 373, 377 n.9 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004).
492. Id. ("LIGA points out, and we fully recognize, that the ordinary meaning of the text governs
the meaning of contracts." (citing Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1134, 1137 (La.

2002))).
493.

Id.; Smith v. Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 521 So. 2d 772, 776 (La, Ct. App. 1988),
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But very likely, the Louisiana Supreme Court could invest more time and
perform a more thorough analysis to reach a sound and just interpretation of
the disputed language in the Reliance contract. To reach that end, the
supreme
court would have followed the methodology that it so carefully outlined in
Succession of Fannaly.494 In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
An insurance policy is [a] ... contract subject to the general rules of contract
The extent of coverage under an insurance contract is
interpretation ....
dependent on the common intent of the insured and insurer. Thus, when
interpreting an insurance contract, courts must attempt to discern the
common intent of the insuredandinsurer. In ascertaining the common intent
of the insured and insurer, courts begin their analysis with a review of the
words in the insurance contract. Words in an insurance contract must be
ascribedtheir generallyprevailingmeaning, unless the words have acquired
a technical meaning, in which case the words must be ascribed their technical
meaning. Moreover, an insurance contract is construedas a whole and each
provision in the contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions.
One provision of the contract should not be construed separately at the
expense of disregarding other provisions. When the words of an insurance
to no absurd consequences, courts
contract are clear and explicit and lead
495
must enforce the contract as written.
To be sure, the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Woodward certainly did not cite or
consider the principles outlined in Succession of Fannaly as it should have.
C. Health Insurance Plans: Whether Under Texas's Law the
DistrictCourt Properly Certifieda Large Class of Self-Funded
ERISA Health Plansfor ArbitrationAfter a ReinsurerAllegedly
Breached Several Health-RelatedReinsurance Contracts
Pedcor Management v. Nations Personnel of Texas presents a major
disagreement over a class certification.49 6 But unlike the former two cases, the
conflict in Pedcor concerns whether plaintiffs have a right to certify a class
for an arbitration hearing rather than for a trial by jury.497 Interestingly, the
aggrieved Pedcor complainants are large numbers of American healthinsurance plans and the defendants are foreign reinsurers.' 9' But more
important, the holding in Pedcoris likely to have an impact and even greater
relevance beyond the Fifth Circuit. 499

494.

Succession of Fannaly, 805 So. 2d at 1138.

495.

Id. at 1136-37 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

496. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel, Inc., 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir.
Aug. 2003).

497.
498.
499.

Id. at 359.
Id. at 357.
See id. at 362-63 n.36.
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In Pedcor, four usually allied parties find themselves involved in a
somewhat unusual fracas. North American Indemnity (NAI) is a Belgianincorporated reinsurance company, which sells reinsurance throughout the
United States.5 A reinsurance contract is also called a Treaty of
Reinsurance." t At least 408 employers -who established self-funded plans
(Plans) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)purchased reinsurance from NAI. 5 2 American Heartland Health
Administrators (AHHA) is the third-party administrator of the Plans. 0 3 And
Pedcor Management Company, Inc. Employee Welfare Benefit Plan (Pedcor)
is one of the plans that purchased reinsurance from NAI. 5 °4
The dispute in Pedcorarose when NAI allegedly breached its reinsurance
contracts by refusing to pay various claims.5" 5 Initially, NAI sued AHHA
-the Plans' third-party administrator-for negligently underwriting the
Plans.50 6 NAI filed the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.57 Later, Pedcor and several other individual Plans
5 8
The district court denied
intervened successfully as plaintiffs against NAIV
NAI's motion to dismiss its original suit against AHHA without prejudice and
entered a take-nothing judgment. 9 Soon thereafter, the district court held a
hearing with Pedcor and the other intervening Plans."' The purpose of the
hearing was to discuss the possibility of certifying a class of plans to
commence an arbitration hearing against NA. 511

500. Id. at 357.
501. See, e.g., N. River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.3d 160,162 (2d Cir. 1995).
The foreign reinsurers are Underwriters and Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's of London,

and foreign companies subscribing to reinsurance ....

London reinsurers [reinsure primary

insurers] under so-called "treaty programs".... A reinsurance treaty is an ongoing contractual
relationship between two insurance companies in which the primary insurer agrees in advance
to cede, and the reinsurer to accept, specified business that is the subject of the contract. Under
a treaty, a reinsurer agrees to indemnify a primary insurer with respect to a portion of the
primary insurer's liability in a designated line of business .... [Typically,] the reinsurance
treaty involve[s] the participation of many reinsurers, each accepting a percentage of the total
liability under a single treaty.
Id.; see also In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Reinsurance is arranged by
specialized brokers and underwriters. Much reinsurance is done by syndicates doing business through
Lloyd's of London.").
502. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 357.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
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Pedcor's counsel participated in the hearing, but after much
consideration, the counsel filed written suggestions advising against class
certification." 2 Nevertheless, the district court certified a class "to consist of
all employer plans that bought reinsurance from North American
Indemnity, 5 13 but who failed to receive reimbursements from the Belgium
reinsurer. The district court also stated that it would compel arbitration soon
51 5
14
after certifying the class. Pedcor timely appealed the certification order.
Before the Fifth Circuit, Pedcor challenged the district court's classcertification decision and the lower court's order compelling an arbitration of
the disputed claims between the Plans and NAIL" 6 At the very start, the Fifth
Circuit examined the arbitration clauses appearing in the various reinsurance
contracts.517 The court of appeals found that each arbitration clause contained
the following relevant language: (1) Any dispute under the reinsurance
agreement must go to arbitration; (2) As a general matter each party must
choose one arbitrator, and the two chosen arbitrators must select a third
arbitrator to form a panel; and (3) "[Alrbitration shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Texas." 518
But the Fifth Circuit found no express provision in the reinsurance
contract clauses regarding consolidating claims or certifying a class of plans
for arbitration.519 Therefore, to help determine whether the district court
applied the correct legal standards or abused its discretion, the court of
appeals examined the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle, which appeared after
the district court's certification order
5 20
and the parties' first appellate brief.
In Green Tree, the Supreme Court reviewed a state court's decision that
ordered class arbitration under South Carolina's law. 21 And like the contract
in Pedcor, the arbitration agreement in that case did not clearly allow or
prevent class arbitration. 22 After concluding that the agreement did not
expressly forbid class arbitration, a plurality of the Court held: "Under the
terms of the parties' contracts, the question -whether
the agreement forbids
52 3
class arbitration-is for the arbitrator to decide."

512.

Id. ("Pedcor's counsel . . . had been granted leave to appear as amicus curiae in the

proceedings ... ").
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id.
Id. at 357 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 358.
See id. at 358-63.
Id. at 357.
See id. at 360.
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).

521.

See id.

522.
523.

Id. (citing Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 359 (S.C. 2002)).
Id. at 45 1.
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It did not take the Fifth Circuit long to settle this dispute. The appellate
court only wanted to know if the arbitration clauses in Green Tree and the
present case were sufficiently similar.524 Finding that the clauses were
similar, the Fifth Circuit declared that "arbitrators should decide whether class
arbitration is available or forbidden," vacated the district court's certification
order, and remanded to the district court.525

IV. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS: FEDERAL STATUTORY
CLAIMS

& DECISIONS

A. Credit-Life Insurance: Whether an Insured Had Standing to
Commence a Putative, Class-Action Suit Against Credit Life
Insurers Under the Federal Civil RICO Statute
Although the procedural question in Brown v. ProtectiveLife Insurance
526
Co. is fairly common, material background information is extremely scanty.
Nevertheless, a careful reading of what appears in the opinion suggests that
527
Marylena Brown approached Crescent Bank & Trust and applied for a loan.
Whether Brown applied for a consumer, business, or property loan is
unclear. 5 But as a condition for awarding the loan, Crescent required Brown
529
to purchase credit-life insurance from Protective Life Insurance Company.
This would make sense, for this is a common practice in the banking

industry.53 °
It appears that Brown received the loan because she paid $1,876.70 to
53
But, whether the lender or the insurer
cover the insurance premium.
532
Apparently, it did not matter who
received that money is also unclear.
received the premium payment, for Brown sued Protective Life, Crescent
Bank & Trust, and another unidentifiable party-Banner of New Orleans

524. Pedcor,343 F.3d at 359. "The clarity of Green Tree's holding- that arbitrators are supposed
to decide whether an arbitration agreement forbids or allows class arbitration-leaves us to decide only
whether the instant case is sufficiently analogous to Green Tree to come within its rule." Id.
525. Id. at 363.

526.

Brown v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003).

527.
528.

See id.
See id.

529.
530.

Id. at 407.
See, e.g., Bryant v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d 1044, 1044-45 (La. Ct. App. 1993).

[Husband-and-wife applicants] borrowed $80,000.00 from the [b]ank, securing the loan with

a home mortgage. The [applicants] alleget] that they advised.., an employee acting as agent
for the [blank, that they wanted credit disability insurance in an amount sufficient to cover the
full amount of the loan [if the husband became] disabled. [The applicants alleged that the bank
obtained the] policies of credit disability insurance from Heritage Life Insurance Company.
. . and Gulfco Life Insurance Company... with the Bank named as beneficiary under the
policies.

The [applicants] allegedly paid $3,000.00 [to the bank as] premiums for the

insurance....
Id.
531.
532.

Brown, 353 F.3d at 408.
See id.
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33

More specifically, she filed a class-action suit in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, on behalf of herself and a proposed class of
similarly situated consumers. 34
35
In her complaint, Brown accused the defendants of violating RICO.
In particular, she accused the defendants of violating section 1962(c), which
"prohibits 'any person employed by or associated with any enterprise' from
participating in or conducting the affairs of that enterprise through a pattern
Inc.

of racketeering activity. 536 Once more, an explanation of the alleged
corruption does not appear in the decision; we only know that the violation
was "related to Protective Life's sale of [credit-life] insurance.

5 37

But this is

a common complaint among consumers who have been forced to purchase
credit-life insurance; 538 it has been litigated before in other jurisdictions.539

533. See id.
534. Id. at 407.
535. Id. at 406. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) states in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations
of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to:
ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise;
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person,
including,... from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or
reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000).
536. Brown, 353 F.3d at 407 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000)).
537. Id. at 406.
538. See, e.g., Karen Slater, Insurers Allege Abuse of Credit-Life Policies,WALL ST. J., Jan. 1,
1988, 1988 WL-WSJ 473496.
Sellers of a type of life insurance often criticized by consumer activists as too expensive charge
that they are being ripped off-by consumers. The product is credit-life insurance, which pays
the balance outstanding on a loan if the borrower dies. Insurers say a growing number of
terminally ill people borrow large sums shortly before death to get the associated insurance.
Lenders and auto dealers [receive] big commissions [from] insurers to sell credit-life coverage
to consumers who take out personal and auto loans. ... [I]nsurers say [there have] been abuses
of the coverage. "Deathbed draws" of credit life are "conceptually a fraud," although perfectly
legal, says [the] regulatory counsel at CUNA Mutual Insurance Society, the largest writer of
credit-life policies. Credit-life insurers aren't getting much sympathy from consumer activists.
Id.
539. See, e.g., Printis v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 583 S.E.2d 22, 22-23 (Ga. 2003).
Felicia Printis purchased a car, a service agreement, and optional credit life and disability
insurance for the 60-month term of her financing contract. After receiving credit for her tradein and ... down payment, Printis owed $20,711.45. [The seller told Printis] that the finance
charge ... would be $2,117.95, making the total [loan] amount ... $22,829.40.... Bankers
Life Insurance Company [provided the credit life insurance to insure the $22,829.40 loan].
[Subsequently], Printis filed a complaint .... [She asserted that her indebtedness was really
$20,711.45 plus accrued interest, rather than $22,829.40. Therefore, she paid too much for the
credit life insurance]. She sought a refund [for] the difference... ($47.65). [In her complaint,
Printis] claimed that the insurer ... committed a RICO violation (mail fraud and wire fraud)
by "conspiring with its agents and auto dealers to sell this illegal, unnecessary, and excessive
insurance coverage at [a] greater expense to the consumer ......
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Brown also alleged that Protective Life engaged in a pattern of
racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314." This federal statute prohibits
the interstate transportation of stolen property. 4' To establish an offense
under the statute, the government must prove that (1) the defendant engaged
in the interstate transportation of goods, merchandise, wares, money, or
securities; (2) the value of the transported items was $5,000 or more; and
(3) the defendant knew that such items had been stolen, converted, or taken
42
by fraud.
The district court dismissed Brown's class-action suit, ruling that she did
not have standing to bring the RICO action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).543 Brown appealed in a timely fashion, and the Fifth
Circuit agreed to decide a single procedural question: whether Brown had
standing to commence a putative, class-action suit against the credit-life
insurers under the federal civil RICO statute.54
To address Brown's procedural question, the Fifth Circuit observed that
a RICO plaintiff has standing to bring an action and recover only to the extent
that a RICO violation has injured the aggrieved party's business or
property.545 The appellate court also stated that a person who represents a
class of members must allege and show that she has been injured.546 It is not
enough to establish that unidentified members of the class have suffered.547
The Fifth Circuit also declared that, as the only named RICO plaintiff, Brown
had to allege that she was injured by predicate acts. 48 Those acts were "(1) the
interstate transportation of (2) goods, merchandise, wares, money, or
securities valued at $5,000 or more (3) with the knowledge that such items
9
have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.""M

See Brown, 353 F.3d at 406. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 reads in relevant part:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares,
merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have
been stolen, converted or taken by fraud... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.

540.

18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000).
541.
18 U.S.C. § 2314.
542. See United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Dowling v. United
States, 473 US. 207, 214 (1985)).

543. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) states in pertinent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading... shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: ...
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted....
FED.R. Civ. P. 12(b).
544. Brown, 353 F.3d at 407.

545.

Id.; see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,496 (1985).

546.

Accord Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 659 (3d Cir. 1998)

(abrogated on other grounds). "To link their own injuries to the alleged RICO enterprise, plaintiffs must
allege what happened to them .... Until the putative class is certified, the action is one between the
[named plaintiffs] and the defendants." Id.

547.

See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).

548.

Brown, 353 F.3d at 407.

549.

Id. (quoting United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249,253 (5th Cit. 2002)).
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In light of those various federal principles, the Fifth Circuit ultimately

concluded that Brown did not meet the standing requirements to commence
a RICO class-action suit.55 Put simply, she could not prove a personal loss
greater than $1,876.70, which was the total amount that she paid as a premium
for credit-life insurance.5 5' Certainly, Brown amended her complaint and
cited predicate acts, which arguably proved a loss greater than $5,000.551 But
that number was based on the allegations of unnamed plaintiffs, those
claiming that Protective Life had deceived them."5 3 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Brown's RICO claim,
because Brown was the only named plaintiff and she could not prove the
requisite financial loss to her business or property.554
B. IndustrialLife Insurance: Whether Insured African-Americans
Sufficiently Satisfied the "Class Definition" Requirements to
Commence a Class-Action, Racial-DiscriminationSuit Against
IndustrialLife Insurers Under the Civil Rights Act of 186642 U.S.C.§§ 1981 and 1982
In re Monumental Life Insurance Company also presents a class-

certification controversy involving allegations of racial discrimination for
more than a half century.555 Monumental Life Insurance Company
(Monumental), American National Insurance Company (American), and
Western and Southern Insurance Company (Western) include over 280
companies that issued "industrial life policies over a fifty- to sixty-five-year
period. ' 556 During that period, African-Americans, like other ethnic groups,

550. Id. at 408.
551.
Id.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id.
Assuming arguendothat Brown raised the issue of proceeds in response to Protective Life's
motion to dismiss, the proceeds are insufficient to state a RICO cause of action because the
insurance proceeds, which were returned to Brown, did not harm Brown's business orproperty.
Only the $1,876.60 that Brown paid for the loan- the premium- harmed Brown's business or
property. Whether, and by how much, the insurance premiums and proceeds from Protective
Life's credit life insurance plans harmed other, unnamed individuals is irrelevant to the
question of whether Brown has RICO standing. Brown can only allege injury by Protective Life

in the amount of her $1,876.70.
Id.

555. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. Apr. 2004) (reporting that the
court withdrew the original-343 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2003)-"for the limited purpose of making minor
adjustments in the analyses contained in parts IILA, H.B,and V," and stating that "the greater portion of
the opinion remains intact").
556. In re Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 412 n.3 ("Over the years, defendants have acquired other
insurance companies and thereby assumed blocks of in-force insurance policies issued by them.
Monumental currently administers policies issued by 200 different companies, while Western .. .
administers policies issued by approximately 80 companies. [American] has assumed an indeterminate
number of in-force policies.").
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purchased 7 many of those contracts from Monumental, American, and
5
Western.
After investigating these insurers' current and historical patterns and
practices of pricing and marketing industrial-life contracts, a class of AfricanAmericans commenced a class-action suit against the insurers in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 558 The complaint alleged that the
insurers violated The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982."59 More explicitly, the complainants accused the insurers of
discriminating against African-Americans for decades during the sale and
administration of low-value life insurance policies."s°
Allegedly, the impermissible discrimination occurred in two forms"
"dual rate" and "dual plan" discrimination.56
' Under the first scheme, the
insurers supposedly sold identical industrial-life contracts to AfricanAmerican and Anglo-Americans, while requiring African-Americans to pay
a higher premium-dual rate.562 Under the second practice, the insurers
purportedly insured African-Americans under "specially-designed
substandard" industrial policies, while insuring Anglo-Americans under
comparable plans that offered more superior and substantial benefits -dual
plans.563
The complainants moved for class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)" and asked the court to award notice 565 and opt-out

557.
558.
559.

See id.at412.
See id. at 412-13.
42 U.SC. §§ 1981(a), 1982 (2000); In re Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 412. 42 U.S.C.

§ 198 1(a) states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 states: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property." Id.
560. In re Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 412 ("[Typically,] industrial life policies ... have face
amounts of $2000 or less and require small weekly or monthly premiums.").
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id. "These practices are memorialized in the insurer's rate books and records, which explicitly
distinguish dual rate and dual plan policies by race." Id. "As an example, a 1962 [American] rate book
shows that, for a twenty-year-old [African-American], a $500 '20 Pay Life' industrial policy charged a
weekly premium of $0.41, while a twenty-year-old [Anglo-American] paid only $0.32." Id. at 412 n.4.

564. Id. at 412; FED. R. Cir. P. 23(b) states:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
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rights566 to class members.567 Also, the aggrieved insureds sought (1) an
injunction to prevent the insurers from collecting allegedly discriminatory

premiums, (2) a reformation of the insurance contracts to equalize benefits,
and (3) restitution for past premium overcharges or benefit underpayments.56
To be sure, Monumental, American, and Western denied the
accusations.569 They also argued that class certification was improper because
the plaintiffs' class definition did not and could not readily identify the class
members. 7 ° More important, the insurers stressed that a precise class
definition was truly essential under Rule 23(b)(3) because the complainants
asked the district court to grant notice and opt-out rights.57'

The district court denied plaintiffs' request for certification, finding that
their claims for monetary relief was predominate over their injunctive relief
claims, making a Rule 23(b)(2) certification inappropriate.172 The court also

applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole....
FED. R, Civ. P. 23(b)(l)-(2).
565. See Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 994 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (concluding
that the notice requirements under Rule 23(b)(2)-for class members who ask for monetary relief-will
not always be equivalent to those required under Rule 23(b)(3)).
566. In re MonumentalLife, 365 F.3d at 416-17.
As "fundamental requisites of the constitutional guarantees of procedural due process," ...
notice and opt-out are mandatory for damage classes certified under rule 23(b)(3). Though rule
23 does not explicitly extend these safeguards to rule 23(b)(2) classes, due process requires the
provision of notice where a rule 23(b)(2) class seeks monetary damages.
Id. (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974)). But see Penson, 634 F.2d at 994
(concluding that there is no absolute right of an opt-out in a Rule 23(b)(2) class-action suit even where
the members ask for and receive monetary relief). See also Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894,
898 (7th Cir. 1999) (contemplating the use of opt-out rights for a Rule 23(b)(2) class); Eubanks v.
Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible
to afford district courts the discretion to grant opt-out rights for Rule 23(b)(2) classes).
567. In re Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 413.
568. Id. at 412-13.
569. Id. at 412 & n.2 ("[The insurers defended their respective] practice on the basis that (1) the
race-distinct pricing was justified; (2) [regulators approved] the practice ... (3) the racially discriminatory
policies were no more profitable than were those sold to whites; and (4) some of the discriminatory
policies were remediated,").
570. Id. at413. But see id. at414.
Plaintiffs' filings in the district court clarified any ambiguities by stating that "the class is
limited to industrial policies sold at a substandard (i.e., higher) rate for African-Americans and
a lower rate for Caucasians, or as a substandard plan (i.e., a more costly plan) for AfricanAmericans and a corresponding less expensive plan for Caucasians." Plaintiffs define
industrial life insurance policies as "(1) policies labeled as 'industrial' or( 2) those policies with
a face amount of less than $2,000.00 and weekly or monthly home premium collection."
Id.
571. ld. at 413.
A precise class definition is necessary to identify properly "those entitled to relief, those bound
by the judgment, and those entitled to notice." Some courts have stated that a precise class
definition is not as critical where certification of a class for injunctive or declaratory relief is
sought under rule 23(b)(2). Where notice and opt-out rights are requested, however, a precise
class definition becomes just as important as in the rule 23(b)(3) context.
Id. (quoting 5 JAMES W. MOORE ErAL., MOORE's FEDERALPRACTICE § 23.21 [6], at 23-62.2 (3d ed. 2003);
DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (citations omitted)).
572. In re Monumental, 365 F.3d at 413.
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found the majority of class members would not benefit from injunctive
relief..73 Furthermore, given the number of companies and policies involved,
individualized hearings were necessary to determine damages. 7 4 The
defendants sought, and the Fifth Circuit granted, an interlocutory review under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). 5"
Writing for the Fifth Circuit's majority, Justice Jerry Smith characterized
plaintiffs' action as "[an] ultimate negative value [class-action] lawsuit. "576
Put simply, an action is a negative-value suit if a court determines that it is
economically infeasible for class members to litigate individually.577 And in
Monumental, the court of appeals found the majority of class members were
"poor and uneducated. 578 Still, the appellate court stressed that "[a]ll classes
must satisfy the four baseline requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. 11579
To settle the dispute in this case, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily and
predominantly on its observations and decision in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp.5 8 0 First, as noted above, complainants wanted a class certification as
well as injunctive relief, restitution, and damages.5 8' The district court
concluded that "'this is a case in which individuality overrides any bland
group-think, and money [is] the prime goal ... not injunctive relief."582 To
justify its decision to deny any relief to the African-American complainants,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District Louisiana cited Allison
and stated: "Rule 23(b)(2) certification is improper . . . where the class's
request for injunctive relief merely serves as a bootstrap for a claim of
monetary damages. '

573.
574.
575.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 413.
Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) reads:

A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court
granting or denying class action certification under this rule if application is made to it within
ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
576. In re Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 411.

577.

See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84

F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cit. 1996).

578.

In re Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 420 ("Doubtless most class members, the majority of

whom are poor and uneducated, remain unaware of defendants' discriminatory practices.").
579. Id. at 414-15 ("Assuming these requirements are satisfied, a rule 23(b)(2) class may be
certified if 'the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole."') (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)).
580. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
581. Id.
582. In reMonumental Life, 365 F.3d at 415 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)).
583, Id.
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But the Fifth Circuit declared that the district court either misread or
misinterpreted the class-certification ruling in Allison."' First, to help correct
any misconceptions of and an appreciation for that ruling, the court of appeals
made several observations. The Fifth Circuit admitted that Rule 23(b)(2)
places greater emphasis on awarding injunctive and declaratory relief because
the rule anticipates the formation of a fairly "'homogenous and cohesive
[class] with few conflicting interests among its members.' "' 585 But, the court
of appeals correctly observed that once a request for damages enters the
picture, class cohesiveness generally disappears." 6 Consequently, a trier of
fact then must address the merits of individual claims. 87 That requires
separate hearings, which effectively negates an efficient and less expensive
lawsuit."'
Therefore, to remove any remaining doubt about its central holding in
Allison, the Fifth Circuit stated that for monetary relief to be a viable remedy
under Rule 23(b)(2), it must benefit the class as a whole." 9 In addition, the
class must establish that injunctive or declaratory relief forms the basis of the
class-action suit and that a request for monetary relief is incidental. 90
Therefore, in light of Allison's principles, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case.59'
C. PropertyInsurance: Whether the McCarran-FergusonAct
Preempts a Class-Action Suit Against an Insurer- Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the FairHousing Act of 1968-for Allegedly
Using DiscriminatoryCreditScoring to Sell More Expensive
PropertyInsuranceto Non-Caucasians
The six non-Caucasian complainants in Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp 92 are
insureds under various automobile and homeowners' insurance contracts.593
Their insurers are Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Texas Lloyd's, and
various other subsidiaries of Allstate Corporation (Allstate), all of which sell

584.

Id. ("Allison did not hold, as the district court believed, that monetary relief predominates

where it is the 'prime goal' or a mere bootstrap to injunctive relief. Instead, 'determining whether one
form of relief actually predominates in some quantifiable sense is a wasteful and impossible task that
should be avoided."' (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 412 (citing 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1775, at 470 (2d ed. 1986))).
585. In re MonumentalLife, 365 F.3d at 415 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 413) ("Class certification

centers on the defendants' alleged unlawful conduct, not on individual injury.").
586.
587.

Id.
Id.

588.
589.
590.

Id. at415-16.
Allison, 151 F.3d at415.
Id.

591.

In re Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 421.

592. Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. Sept. 2003).
593. Id. "This nationwide class action [challenges the] insurers' use of credit scoring in the pricing
of automobile and home owners' policies[.]" 1d. at 300.
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insurance in Texas and Florida."' Like the African-American plaintiffs in
Monumental, the racial minorities in Dehoyos filed a class-action suit,
alleging that Allstate violated sections 198 19' and 1982596 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866."' The complainants also alleged that Allstate violated the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). 98 The lawsuit commenced in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas.599
Specifically, the Dehoyos complainants accused Allstate of employing
an impermissible discriminatory "'credit-scoring system' to target nonCaucasian[s] ... for the sale of more expensive insurance policies.""6 They
also claimed that the credit-scoring system actually selects non-Caucasian
applicants for more expensive policies when compared to the premiums that
Caucasians pay for identical coverage." Allstate filed a Rule 12(b)(6) 2
motion to dismiss, arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) °
preempts the application of the federal antidiscrimination statutes to the
present controversy. 4' The district court denied the motion, finding that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act did not preclude the application of the civil-rights
statutes." ° But, the lower court granted a leave for an interlocutory appeal. 6
The sole issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether the MFA precludes
a nationwide lawsuit to challenge Allstate's credit-scoring and pricing
schemes under sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). 6°7 Under the MFA, "No Act of Congress
shall be construed to invalidate, impair,or supersedeany law enacted by any

594.

See id. at 293.

595.

Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000) states:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).

596.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). Section 1982 states: "All citizens of the United States shall have

the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
597. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293.

598. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000). More specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) states: "[Ilt shall
be unlawful... [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
599.

Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293.

600.

Id.

601.

Id. at300.

602.

FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) states in pertinent part: "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for

relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ... failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted ...... FED. R. Clv. P. 12(b)(6).
603.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1999).

604.

Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293.

605.
606.
607.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 294.
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State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance... unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."608
In Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court outlined the methodology
that courts must apply when deciding preemption questions under the MFA. ° 9
First, the Court expressly rejected the assumption that the MFA approved a
state-supremacy "field preemption" approach to the application of federal law
to the insurance industry.6 10 Instead, the Court emphasized that courts must
employ a "conflict preemption" analysis to determine whether federal law
impairs states' authority and ability to regulate the business of insurance."
The Supreme Court stated that the following formulation captures the
meaning of impairment under 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b): "[1] When federal law
does not directly conflict with state regulation, and [2] when application of the
federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a

State's administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude
its application."62
But, to actually decide whether the MFA prevents federal laws from

impairing state agencies' ability to regulate the business of insurance, the
Court ordered federal courts to consider and satisfy three criteria:
(1) the federal law in question must not be specifically directed at insurance
regulation; (2) there must exist a particular state law, or declared regulatory
policy enacted for the purpose of regulating insurance; and (3) application
of the federal law to the controversy in question must invalidate, impair or
supercede that state law.613
Applying Humana'spreemption standard, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit declared that the MFA did not preempt the application of the federal

608. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000) (emphasis added); see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52
F.3d 1351, 1363 (6th Cir. 1995). "The McCarran-Ferguson Act is a form of inverse preemption, so
principles defining when state remedies conflict (and so are preempted by) federal law are pertinent in
deciding when federal rules 'invalidate, impair, or supersede' state rules." Cisneros, 52 F.3d at 1363.
609. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1999).
610. Id. at309.
The Court rejects the Humana petitioners' suggestion that the word "impair," in the McCarranFerguson Act context, signals Congress' intent to cede the field of insurance regulation to the
States, saving only instances in which Congress expressly orders otherwise. If Congress had
meant generally to preempt the field for the States, Congress could have said either that "no
federal statute [that does not say so explicitly] shall be construed to apply to the business of
insurance- or that federal legislation generally ... would be "applicable to the business of
insurance [only] to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law."
Id. at300 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
611. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 294 (citing Humana, 525 U.S. at 300).
612. Id. at 295 n.3 (citing Humana, 525 U.S. at 307, 310).
613. Id. at 294-95 (citing Humana, 525 U.S. at 307, 310); Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294
F.3d 702,708 (5th Cir. 2002) (declaring that the test under McCarran-Ferguson is not whether a state has
enacted statutes regulating the business of insurance, but whether such state statutes will be invalidated,
impaired, or superseded by the application of federal law, and concluding that MFA preemption would
not be found merely because a state has a mechanism in place for regulating insurance contracts).
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civil-rights statutes.6"' The appellate court found that the federal
antidiscrimination laws did not interfere with Florida's and Texas's insurance
statutes and regulations or with those states' ability to regulate the business

of insurance.615
But Justice Edith Jones dissented and argued that
[Tihis nationwide class action challenging insurers' use of credit scoring in
the pricing of automobile and home owners' policies [cannot] proceed intact
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The allegations of intentional race
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 do not appear to be
preempted, but they are a diversion. Plaintiffs' principal attack is under the
impact of a facially-neutral
Fair Housing Act against the alleged disparate
16
component of insurance pricing decisions.
The majority in Dehoyos cavalierly dismissed Justice Jones's "diversion"
argument in a two-sentence footnote.1 7
From this commentator's perspective, the majority's refusal to address
the dissenting justice's concern was highly unwarranted. For sure, Justice
Jones raised a valid issue, even though the outcome in the case would have
remained the same. But here we will address that issue. Associate Justice
Jones wrote the following: "[t]he majority, in my view, fails to recognize
that a [disparate- impact] claim goes to the heart of the risk adjustment that
underlies the insurance business. . . . 'Risk discrimination is not race
discrimination.' Every insurer sets its prices according to the risk embodied
in covering particular categories of customers." 6t More specifically, Justice
Jones stated:
what I take issue with here is the claim founded upon the allegedly disparate
impact of credit history, a facially neutral risk classification factor, utilized
within a complex state regulatory scheme. The circumstances under which

614. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 299.
615. Id. at 298-99.
Appellants argue that the application of the [civil-rights] statutes at issue here would frustrate
Texas and Florida state insurance policy by frustrating the ability of those states to regulate
insurance pricing policies .... Obviously this assertion is not nearly enough to withstand [a]
Humana scrutiny. Appellants cannot demonstrate that the federal law in question frustrates a
policy associated with the regulation of insurance pricing without identifying an actual policy.
Id.
616. Id. at 300 n.1 (Jones, J., dissenting). "In this court, §§ 1981 and 1982 have been confined to
cases involving intentional racial discrimination, not [disparate-impact] claims." Id. (Jones, J., dissenting)
(citing Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803, 809 n.9 (5th Cir. 2000); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800
F.2d 1381, 1385 (5th Cit. 1986)).
617. Id. at 294 n.1 ("The dissent invites us to label Appellees' claims under §§ 1981 and 1982 a
diversion and to comment on the merits of those claims. We decline to go beyond the preliminary
questions presented by this interlocutory appeal.").
618. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 300-01 (Jones. J., dissenting) (citing NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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[Congress enacted] the McCarran-Ferguson Act... further underscore the
majority's error in holding that [disparate-impact] claims under the Fair
61 9
Housing Act are not preempted.

But it appears that the dissenting justice overlooked, dismissed, or
minimized the fundamental question: whether allowing disgruntled insureds
to commence private causes of action against insurers-for allegedly
practicing disparate-impact, racial discrimination under federal or under
"substantially equivalent" ' state fair-housing laws -seriously invalidates,
impairs, or supercedes a state's ability to regulate the business of insurance.62
Without doubt, the answer to this question is a resounding no.
Even Florida's and Texas's insurance codes prohibit insurance
companies from practicing disparate-impact discrimination on the basis of
race or ethnicity." 2 In those states, allegedly aggrieved racial minorities may
commence private causes of action against insurers to secure various remedies
in a court of law.623 Clearly, those suits have not impaired Texas's and

619. Id. at 303 (Jones, J., dissenting).
620. See Willy E. Rice, Judicial Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws: An Analysis of Some
Unexamined Problems that the FairHousing Amendments Act of 1983 Would Eliminate, 27 How. L. J.
227, 235 (1983) (reporting that "[a]s of 1979, [the Department of Housing and Urban Development]
recognized only twenty-two states that provided rights and remedies 'substantially equivalent' to those
provided underTitle VIII [of the FairHousing Act of 1968]"); United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro.
Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1008, 1011 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993).
Metro is a "certified" agency, which means that HUD has determined that the Fort Wayne
General Ordinance under which Metro operates is "substantially equivalent" to the federal Fair
Housing Act.... For an agency to be certified, the Secretary of HUD must determine that the
substantive rights protected by the local agency, the procedures followed by the local agency,
the remedies available to the local agency, and the availability of judicial review of local
agency actions, are "substantially equivalent" to those created by the federal Fair Housing Act.
Metro. Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d at 1011 n.3; 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(3)(A) (1988).
621. See Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 300-03 (Jones, J., dissenting).
622. See FLA. STAT. cb. 627.917(1) (2003).
The commission shall establish and promulgate a uniform statewide reporting system to
classify risks for the purpose of evaluating rates and premiums and for the purpose of
evaluating competition and the availability of motor vehicle insurance in the voluntary market.
The system shall divide risks into classifications based upon variations in hazards or expenses
of claims. The classification system may include any difference among risks that can be
demonstrated to have a probable effect upon losses or expenses, but in no event shall the
system adopted by the commission discriminate among risks based upon race, creed, color, or
national origin. The classification system shall divide the state into geographical areas based
upon hazards or expenses of claims.
Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.25(1) (West 2004).
"It is unlawful for any . . . insurance company ... the business of which consists in whole or
in part of the making of commercial real estate loans to deny ... other financial assistance..
. to discriminate against him or her in the fixing of the amount, interest rate, duration, or other
term or condition of such loan or other financial assistance, because of the race, color, national
origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion of such person .... activists.
Id.
623. See, e.g., Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 424 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(permitting a private action against the insurer for practicing disparate-impact discrimination on the basis
of disability); Cortez v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 61 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001,
pet. granted) (permitting a private action against the insurer for practicing disparate-impact discrimination
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Florida's insurance commissioners' abilities to regulate the business of
insurance.624 Furthermore, the majority in Dehoyos correctly and
appropriately observed "[e]very circuit that has considered the question has
determined that federal anti-discrimination laws may be applied in an
insurance context, even where the state insurance agencies have mechanisms
in place to regulate discriminatory practices."62
V. THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS: STATE COMMON-LAW CLAIMS
& DECISIONS

A. Third-PartyLiability Claims: Injury to Persons
1. Injury to Persons: Whether Under Louisiana's

Equitable-SubrogationLaw a Lessee's Excess Liability Insurer
May Recover Fundsfrom a Lessor-Owner that the Insurer Paid
to Settle a Third-PartyPersonalClaim Originatingon
the Lessor's CommercialProperty
Westchester Fire Ins. v. Haspel-Kansas Investment (Haspel) presents
another equitable-subrogation conflict originating in Louisiana.626 But unlike
the subrogation controversies appearing in Arana II and Woodward, the
627
disagreement in Haspel involves a third-party liability insurance contract.
Also, in the present case, a third-party victim rather than the insured sustained

on the basis of race).
624. See Cortez, 61 S.W.3d at 71; Garcia, 424 S.W.2d at 895.
625. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 295 ("Specifically, the Eleventh, Seventh, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits... have determined that the [McCarran Ferguson Act] does not prevent the application of federal
anti-discrimination laws to the insurance industry."); see Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co,, 267 F.3d
1209, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the insurer's argument fails "[a]bsent more convincing
evidence that racial discrimination in the insurance context is an integral part of Alabama's regulatory
scheme [and refusing to ]conclude that Alabama intended to condone racial discrimination in its scheme
of insurance regulation"); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1363 (6th Cir. 1995)
(concluding "that the presence of additional remedies in the Fair Housing Act does not cause the Act to
invalidate, impair or supersede Ohio insurance law [and holding] that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not preclude HUD's interpretation of the Fair Housing Act"); Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v.
Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486,1491-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (following American Family and holding that
federal regulation that provides additional remedies to those provided under state insurance plan does not
violate the McCarran-Ferguson Act); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 27 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's reverse preemption rule did not bar a disparate-impact
discrimination action against an insurer under the Fair Housing Act of 1968); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins.,
724 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that applying the Fair Housing Act in insurance context
would not impair or supersede any state law, although North Carolina forbids discriminatory rates in the
insurance business).
626. Westchester Fire Ins. v. Haspel-Kansas Inv.,
342 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003).
627. Compare id. at 421-22, with Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 332 F.3d 973,976 (5th Cir. June
2003) (involving a dispute over whether the first-party carrier had a contractual right to subrogate), and
New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004) (involving action to
recover unpaid damages from a first-party insurer).
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personal injuries and compensation for those injuries.62 More important, the
reported facts about the underlying third-party case in Haspel are fairly
extensive and quite dramatic. 629 But material facts about the conflict between
the major adversaries are absent, which makes the Fifth Circuit's analysis
extremely superficial and its conclusion highly suspect.63
Here is a synopsis of the underlying facts. Haspel-Kansas Investments
owns a small shopping center in New Orleans.6 3' K&B Drug Stores (K&B)
leases space from Haspel-Kansas.632 Significantly, K&B was the only store
in the shopping center that operated twenty-four hours a day.633 In addition,
the patrons of three nearby nightclubs parked in the shopping center's parking
lot.634 This created a problem for K&B.6 3' Therefore, a K&B representative
with the
wrote letters to Haspel-Kansas, reporting various problems associated
63 6
lot.
parking
the
in
congregating
and
parking
patrons'
nightclubs'
In fact, K&B repeatedly asked Haspel-Kansas to correct the problems
and provide better security.63 7 Haspel-Kansas refused.638 K&B then hired offduty New Orleans police officers to provide security inside and outside of the
store. 639 On one fateful evening, an assailant shot and severely injured Jermol
Stinson in the shopping center's parking lot, in the vicinity of K&B Drug
Store.' The culprit shot Stinson in the neck and Stinson became paralyzed."4
When the shooting occurred, a uniformed police officer- working as security
for K&B - was in the very vicinity of the assailant.1 2 Initially, Stinson filed
a third-party negligence suit against K&B in a Louisiana court. 64 Right away,
K&B filed an action against Haspel-Kansas, demanding that the landlord
contribute to the defense of, and make reimbursements for, any out-of-pocket
expenses associated with the third-party lawsuit. 6' Later, Stinson added
Haspel-Kansas as a defendant. 645
Ultimately, K&B and Haspel-Kansas agreed to mount a joint defense
against Stinson's lawsuit (Demand Agreement). 6' As consideration for that

628.
629.

Westchester Fire Ins., 342 F.3d at 418.
Id.

630.

See id.

631.

Id.

632.

Id.

633.
634.
635.

Id.
Id.
Id.

636.

Id. ("The problems cited ranged from vandalism and car theft, to reports of gunfire in the

vicinity of the store.").

637.

Id.

638.

Id.

639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.

646.

Id.
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agreement, K&B dismissed its earlier demand for contribution from HaspelKansas." 47 Under the Demand Agreement, the parties agreed that K&B would
not relinquish its right to sue for indemnity or contribution in a later suit if
Stinson prevailed. 6 8 Unexpectedly, Stinson dismissed his claims against
Haspel-Kansas with prejudice and settled his claims against K&B for two
million dollars."S Travelers Insurance Company and Westchester Fire
Insurance Company insured K&B under a primary and an excess liability
K&B' s excess insurer, paid
insurance contract, respectively.65 ° Westchester,
651
one-million dollars of that settlement.
In a separate proceeding, Westchester Fire Insurance Company sued
Haspel-Kansas in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.652 The complaint listed several theories of recovery. First,
Westchester filed an equitable action for contribution.653 Westchester asserted
that Haspel-Kansas was a joint tortfeasor when the Stinson incident
occurred.654 Yet, the landlord did not contribute anything to help settle the
lawsuit.6 55 Therefore, Westchester claimed that Haspel-Kansas had a duty to
reimburse Westchester. 5 6 After all, Westchester was K&B's subrogee under
the excess-insurance contract, and the insurer had paid half of the settlement
costs. Sadly, the reported facts do not disclose the amount of the requested
reimbursement.65 7
Second, citing the doctrine of equitable subrogation again, as well as
clauses in the lease agreement between K&B and Haspel-Kansas, Westchester
sued the latter for a breach of warranty and for indemnity.658 Once more, the
facts neither disclose nor discuss the type of warranty under the lease
agreement.659 But it appears that Westchester accused Haspel-Kansas of
breaching an express or an implied warranty to provide a secure and safe
parking lot for its tenants.660 The indemnity clause in the lease agreement
stated in pertinent part:

647.

Id.

648.

Id.

649. Id.
650. Id.
Id. Significantly, the opinion does not state whether K&B or K&B's primary insurer651.
Travelers-paid the additional $1,000,000 to settle Stinson's third-party suit. Id.
652. Id.
653. Id.; see also Honeycutt v. Whitten, 95 So. 216 (La. 1923) (noting "that under the equitable
doctrine of contribution among joint and [solitary] obligors a legal situation (arises] in which one of the
[obligorsi might, as a result of [a] conventional agreement, acquirets] a claim against the other"); Meeker

v. Klemm, 11 La. Ann. 104 (1856) (declaring that "liability for contribution to a general average loss...
rests upon the broad and equitable doctrine that no one shall enrich himself at another's expense").
654. Westchester FireIns., 342 F.3d at 418.

655.

Id.

656.
657.
658.
659.
660.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 421.
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Lessor agrees to hold [Lessee] harmless . . . from any responsibility for
injury to person . . . resulting from any occurrence in, on, or about the

Shopping Center outside of the leased premises, including without limitation
661
the sidewalks and parking areas, not due to the negligence of the [Lessee].
Following a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment in favor of
the commercial landlord and dismissed the excess insurer's claims with
prejudice. 2 The district court found that Westchester's action for
contribution was baseless because neither party was liable for Stinson's
damages.663 More specifically, the district court determined that HaspelKansas's conduct was not the cause-in-fact of Stinson's injuries.'
Additionally, the lower court ruled that Westchester could not collect under
the indemnity clause in the lease agreement because the excess insurer
voluntarily settled Stinson's negligence suit.665 Westchester timely appealed
the district court's ruling. 6
To repeat, Haspel presented the Fifth Circuit with yet another conflict
involving the doctrine of equitable subrogation in Louisiana." But unlike
Arana II and Woodward, the substantive question before the court of appeals
668
in Haspel was not whether the excess insurer was a bona fide subrogee.
Under the facts in this case, Westchester clearly had the right to "stand in its
insured's shoes" and exercise any right against Haspel-Kansas that K&B
could exercise. Instead, the broad question in Haspel was whether the excess
insurer- as a subrogee- could prevail against its insured's landlord under the
equitable doctrine of contribution."
To help answer that question, the Fifth Circuit had to decide whether
Haspel-Kansas - ajoint-tortfeasor-committed an action that harmed Stinson
for purpose of causation. 670 Assuming that the landlord committed simple
negligence, the court of appeals had to decide whether Haspel-Kansas' s action
or inaction was the cause-in-fact of the third party's injuries. 671' Examining
Louisiana's law 672 and the testimony of the parties' expert witnesses during

661.

Id.

662.

Id.at 418.

663.
664.

Id. at 419.
Id. at 418.

665.

Id. at 421.

666.

Id. at 417.

667.

See id.

668.

Id.

669.

Id. at 418.

670.

Id.

671. Id. at 419.
672. ld. To impose liability for negligence under LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 2315, Louisiana courts
perform a duty-risk analysis and require a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant had a duty to
conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her
conduct to the appropriate standard of care; (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact
of the plaintiff's injuries; (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff's
injuries (the scope of protection element); and (5) defendant's breach produce actual damages. Id.
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the bench trial, 73 the Fifth Circuit embraced the district court's findings and
conclusion. 674 In particular, the appellate court held that even assuming K&B
or Haspel-Kansas was negligent on that fateful night in New Orleans, neither
one's conduct was the cause-in-fact of Stinson's injuries. 675 Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit declared that Westchester's claim for contribution from HaspelKansas was unfounded because neither party was liable for Stinson's
damages.676
Embracing the district court's findings, the court of appeals also declared
that Haspel-Kansas did not have to reimburse Westchester as the subrogee
under K&B's lease agreement. 677 According to the Fifth Circuit, K&B
voluntarily chose to settle Stinson's negligence claim to avoid an uncertain
outcome in a personal-injury jury trial; therefore, "K&B [could not] benefit
'
from the indemnity clause."678
Finally, the court of appeals stressed that
forcing the landlord to reimburse its tenant under the facts in this case "would
lead to a perverse result[. A]n indemnitee would have the incentive to settle
even frivolous claims in order to avoid the costs and risks associated with
'
litigation, and then demand indemnity for the pay-out." 679
To be very blunt, in Haspel,the analyses are exceedingly superficial and
they ignore settled principles of law and public policy in Louisiana. But more
important, the holding is unsound at best and perverse at worse. First, under
its "cause-in-fact" analysis, the Fifth Circuit held that neither K&B nor
Haspel-Kansas negligently caused Stinson's injuries."' Therefore, neither
party had to pay damages, although K&B and its excess insurer settled the
case.6"' But under the appellate court's duty-to-indemnify analysis, it declared
"[u]nder the indemnity provision, K&B is entitled to indemnity for any
responsibility not due to its negligence. Although K&B did not admit liability
as part of the settlement, it did unilaterally decide to settle a negligence suit,
thereby creating K&B's 'responsibility' under the indemnity provision. "682

673. Id. at 419-20.
During the bench trial both parties presented expert testimony regarding the effectiveness of
additional parking lot security.... The district court found that the evidence showed that the

shooting of Stinson was "an unplanned, irrational attack directed at [Stinson] personally in
apparent retaliation for some perceived affront or exchange of words, or simply a most
unfortunate encounter with [Stinson] as he was leaving the parking lot." The district court
agreed with Haspel-Kansas that none of [its expert's recommended] security measures ...
would have deterred [the] shooting.

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.

Id.at42 1.

679.

Id. (emphasis added).

Id.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 422.
Id.

680. Id. at 421.
681. Id.
682. Id.
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Without doubt, this is nonsense and judge-made law. The appellate court
cites no Louisiana cases or opinions to support this conclusion.5 3
Furthermore, an alleged tortfeasor' s decision to unilaterally settle a third-party
personal injury suit out of court is not primafacie evidence of the alleged
tortfeasor's negligence or "responsibility." Even the Fifth Circuit correctly
observed that Louisiana's law is exceedingly clear: The burden is on the
plaintiff- in this case, Stinson - to prove in court that an alleged tortfeasor
was negligent or responsible.684
Besides, the appellate court's negligence/responsibility and cause-in-fact
analyses are truly diversionary, presumably to achieve a strained result. The
conflict in Haspelcenters on two alleged tortfeasors - a landlord and tenant and the tenant's insurer-subrogee; 85 the conflict involves the doctrine of
contribution, which sounds in equity. The conflict does not involve a thirdparty victim's claim against two alleged tortfeasors and a subrogee, and it
certainly does not involve a cause of action for negligence, which sounds in
tort.

686

Again, K&B and Westchester settled the claim, although the district
court found that Haspel-Kansas was not negligent.8 7 Yet, the court of appeals
declared that K&B and its insurer-subrogee must bear the entire burden under
a theory of equitable contribution,6"' even though undisputed evidence

revealed that K&B tried repeatedly to get its landlord-Haspel-Kansas-to
institute effective measures to reduce incidences like the Stinson affair. 689 To
repeat, the Fifth Circuit ruled against K&B and Westchester because K&B
unilaterally decided to settle the third-party claim.6 °

But from this commentator's perspective, that justification is highly
suspect. In fact, the Fifth Circuit could have reached the same conclusion

more convincingly simply by citing the Louisiana Supreme Court's
observation in Taylor v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co.:
"Louisiana courts have long recognized that when a plaintiff settles with and
releases one of several joint tortfeasors, he thereby deprives the remaining
obligors of the right to contribution against the released obligor. ' 691
However, the settled principle appearing in Taylor does not apply to the
present case.692 Under the Demand Agreement between K&B and Haspel-

683. Id. at 421-22.
684. Id. at 419.
685. Id.at 418.
686. Id.
687. Id. at 421.
688. Id. at 422.
689. Id. at 418. "Prior to the shooting, a representative of K&B wrote letters to Haspel-Kansas to
infonn the landlord of problems.... K&B repeatedly requested assistance from Haspel-Kansas [to solve]
the security problems. Haspel-Kansas [informed] K&B that [Haspel-Kansas was not] obligated to
provide security for the parking lot." Id.

690.

See id.

691.
692.

Taylor v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 237, 239 (La. 1993).
Westchester FireIns., 342 F.3d at 418.
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Kansas, the parties agreed to commence a joint defense in the underlying
third-party lawsuit.693 Once more, as consideration for that agreement, K&B
agreed to dismiss its earlier demand for contribution from Haspel-Kansas.
But there was a proviso under the demand agreement: If Stinson prevailed,
the parties agreed that K&B could exert its legal right and sue Haspel-Kansas
for indemnity or contribution in a later suit.6"
Of course, Stinson prevailed by settling the case with K&B, after
dismissing his claims with prejudice against Haspel-Kansas. 695 In Louisiana,
as in all jurisdictions, valid contracts are enforceable if the parties' intent is
clear696 and sufficient consideration supports the agreement.697 Arguably, the
legal counsel for a sophisticated client-partnership like Haspel-Kansas
Investment understood Taylor's equitable-contribution doctrine and knew that
a court would not force the commercial landlord to reimburse K&B or its
insurer (Westchester) if the latter voluntarily settled the Stinson claim. Yet,
698
Haspel-Kansas gave that right away under the Demand Agreement.
Curiously, the Fifth Circuit wittingly or unwittingly failed to discuss this
issue.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit stated that allowing one or several alleged
tortfeasors-for instance, K&B and its insurer, Westchester-to take the
initiative and settle a third-party personal-injury suit is unwarranted. Even
worse, permitting a motivated party to secure a settlement is a perversion.
From the court of appeals' perspective, the practice would cause the motivated
tortfeasor to settle "frivolous claims in order to avoid the costs and risks
associated with litigation."699 Of course, the Fifth Circuit does not define
"frivolous."
More important, avoiding defense costs and minimizing various risks
associated with ajury trial are extremely legitimate, intelligible, and economic
reasons to encourage fair settlements between insureds and alleged victims
and contribution among alleged joint tortfeasors. Furthermore, defendants and
their insurers are better situated to determine whether such claims are
frivolous or legitimate. To conclude, it would be helpful if the Fifth Circuit
embraces and remembers the learned advice of one appellate court in
Louisiana: "[C]ourts should encourage, not deter, [practices that may] settle

693.

Id.

694.
695.

Id.
See id.

696. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. City of New Orleans, 555 So. 2d 1345, 1348 (La.
1990) (reaffirming that courts will enforce contracts according to the true intent of the parties when the
intent is clear and leads to no absurd consequences and provided that the agreement is not contrary to good
morals or public policy).
697. Cf Becker & Assocs., Inc. v. Lou-Ark Equip. Rentals Co., 331 So. 2d 474,476 (La. 1976)
(citing Article 2462 of the LA. CIv. CODE ANN., which, in pertinent part, provides: "One may purchase
the right, or option to accept or reject, within a stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after the
purchase of such option, for any consideration therein stipulated....
698.

Westchester FireIns., 342 F.3d at 418.

699.

Id.
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any aspect of an action[,] [a view that comports] with the well established
principle that compromise and settlement should be promoted and encouraged
wherever possible." 7
2. Injury to Persons: Whether Mississippi's "Volunteer Doctrine"
Prevents an Insured's Excess Insurerfrom Receiving Contributions
from a PrimaryCarrierAfter the FormerSettled a Third-PartySuit,
and Whether the PrimaryInsurerIs Liable for a Bad-FaithRefusal to
Defend Its InsuredAgainst a Third-PartyLawsuit
Although the facts in the underlying lawsuit are different, the adversaries
and one of the substantive questions in Genesis Insurance Co. v. Wausau
Insurance Cos.7"' are remarkably similar to those appearing in Haspel. 2 In
Genesis, we find two insurers-a primary and an excess carrier-squabbling
over whether the excess carrier should recover funds from the primary insurer
under Mississippi's equitable doctrine of contribution.7 3 Yet, the Fifth
Circuit's analysis in Genesis differs significantly from the appellate court's
ruling in Haspel. Additionally, we find a different outcome even though
Mississippi's and Louisiana's doctrines of contribution are remarkably
similar.
To be fair, the court of appeals attempted to conduct a more intelligible
and thorough analysis in Genesis than it did in Haspel. More astonishing and
welcoming, the Fifth Circuit even addressed some of the major concerns that
this commentator raised about its lackluster analysis in Haspel.7° Still, as
discussed and explained below, the court of appeals's analysis of the
remaining substantive question in Genesis is less than stellar.
Here are the relevant facts. The President Casino (President) is located
in Biloxi, Mississippi." 5 The casino owns shuttle buses to transport its guests

700. See Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 246 So. 2d 313, 323 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Rodriguez v. La. Tank,
Inc., 657 So. 2d 1363, 1368 (La, Ct. App. 1995).
It is well settled that the law favors compromise and voluntary settlement of disputes out of
court with the attendant saving of time and expense to both the litigants and the court. These

same reasons compel favorable consideration of compromises of pending litigation. It is
common knowledge that the institution of law suits frequently leads to compromise of the
underlying dispute thus terminating the litigation. A compromise need not necessarily settle
all differences between parties. Disputants frequently settle some of their differences and
mutually consent to litigate remaining issues on which they cannot agree. To declare that all
partial settlements that result in dismissal of a suit with prejudice necessarily preclude a
subsequent action to pursue remaining rights, which are specifically reserved, would tend to
discourage compromise.
Rodriguez, 657 So. 2d at 1368.
701. Genesis Ins. Co. v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 343 F.3d 733,734 (5th Cir. Aug. 2003).
702. Compare id. (dealing with an excess carrier trying to recover funds from the primary carrier),
with Westchester Fire Ins., 342 F.3d at 418 (dealing with a claim brought to recover portion of settlement
paid as indemnity).
703. Genesis, 343 F.3d at 734.
704. Id. at 739-20 (discussing a business' choice to settle or defend itself in litigation).
705. Id. at 734.
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and employs persons to drive the buses.7" 6 Edith Baker was a guest at the
President. 70 7 After entering a crosswalk in front of the casino's entrance, a
President employee drove one of the shuttle buses into Baker.7"' The impact
threw Baker at least fifteen feet.70 9 She "suffered a variety of injuries,
including a fractured skull, broken ribs.... the permanent loss of smell and
taste... [and] damage to her jaw.""7 0
At the time of the accident, Wausau Insurance Companies(Wausau) - the
primary insurer-insured President under a business-automobile contract.
The casino immediately reported the accident to Wausau, who sent an adjuster
to investigate the mishap and submit a report.71 ' Five months later, the
adjuster completed his investigation.7" 2 By that time, the third-party victim
had retained
an attorney.7 13 Neither Baker nor Wausau offered to settle the
4
case.

71

Therefore, the case lingered until three days before the third anniversary
of the accident. 5 At that time, Baker filed a personal-injury suit in a
Mississippi circuit court. 716 The complaint alleged that President and its
employee negligently operated the shuttle bus.717 Later, the circuit court
approved Baker's motion to amend her complaint to include a premisesliability claim.7"' According to Baker, President created a hazard by
negligently placing a crosswalk in an inappropriate location and by failing to
place warning signs and indicators near the crosswalk. 71 9
Wausau hired an attorney to defend President,7 2 0 but Wausau sent a
reservation-of-rights letter7l2 to President, stressing that Wausau was reserving

706.

Id.

707.

Id.

708.

Id.

709.

Id.

710.

Id.

711.

Id.

712.
713.
714.
715.
716.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

717.
718.
719.
720.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

721. To review the contents of a fairly typical reservation-of-rights letter, see Moeller v. American
Guaranty & Liability Insurance Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1066 (Miss. 1996).

American Guarantee agreed to provide a defense under a reservation of rights... stating: ...
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that we will, at this time, proceed with the

investigation, handling, and defense of this case with a full reservation of all of our rights. This
is done with the distinct understanding that no action [that we take] on your behalf shall

constitute either an admission of coverage under the policy or an acknowledgment of any
responsibility to pay damages in any judgment against you. We further reserve the right to
withdraw from the handling of this matter upon notification to you.... [Tihe company does
not waive any of the other policy provisions.
Moeller, 707 So. 2d at 1066.
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its right to deny coverage regarding the premises liability claim.722 President
also notified Genesis Insurance Company (Genesis), President's
comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurer.723 At that time, Genesis hired
counsel. 724 Eventually, the Mississippi circuit court set a trial date for the
underlying lawsuit and denied all motions for a continuance.725 However, the
personal-injury trial never occurred. 26 Negotiations among the parties
ensued, and shortly thereafter, they reached a $400,000 settlement.727 Wausau
agreed to pay Baker $200,000; and, Genesis and President agreed to pay the
third-party victim $200,000 -each paying $100,000.72
Genesis filed a declaratory-judgment action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. 729 The CGL insurer asked the
federal district court to declare that Wausau's business-automobile policy
covered all of Baker's personal-injury claims.130 Genesis argued that it was
President's excess insurer; therefore, it was liable, if at all, only for an amount
above the $1,000,000 primary coverage under the Wausau policy.' Before
the district court issued its declaration, Genesis and President filed a joint
motion for summary judgment.732
In their motion, Genesis and President asserted that Wausau's policy
unambiguously covered all claims in the underlying lawsuit.733 The motion
also alleged that Wausau was estopped 734 from denying coverage on the
grounds that Wausau exclusively undertook the claim, handling it for nearly
five years, without issuing a non-waiver notice or a reservation-of-rights
letter.735 Furthermore, Genesis and President asserted that they agreed to
contribute $200,000 to help settle the underlying suit with the belief that each

722.
723.
724.

Genesis, 343 F.3d at 735.
Id.
Id.

725.

Id.

726.

Id.

727.

Id.

728.
729.
730.
731.
732.

Id.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 735; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986) (declaring that after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate
when the record reflects that no genuine issue of any material fact exists); Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Or.
Cardio-Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2001) (embracing the view that a "material fact is one
that 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law' and a 'dispute about a material fact is
"genuine" ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party"') (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
733. Genesis, 343 F.3d at 735.
734. See Brown v. Progressive Gulf Ins. Co., 761 So. 2d 134, 136 (Miss. 2000) (reaffirming that
"[tihe doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon fundamental notions of justice and fair dealing" and
before a court applies the doctrine, a party must establish: (1) that he changed his position after relying
on another's conduct; and (2) that he has suffered a detriment after relying on another's conduct and after
changing his position).
735.

Genesis, 343 F.3d at 735.
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party involved reserved a right to demand reimbursement from each other. 736
Therefore, in light of Wausau's alleged "bad faith" breach of that agreement,
asked the district court to award contractual and
President and Genesis
73 7
punitive damages.
Wausau also moved for summary relief, maintaining that President and
Genesis voluntarily offered to pay $200,000 to help settle the Baker suit."'
Therefore, the primary insurer asked the district court to deny Genesis's and
President's petition of declaratory relief under the doctrine of voluntary
payment. 73 ' The district court granted Wausau's motion for summary
judgment. 7' The Southern District of Mississippi applied the voluntary
payment doctrine"' and concluded that President and Genesis relinquished all
claims against Wausau when they voluntarily contributed to the Baker
excess insurer-appealed
settlement. 742 President and Genesis -the alleged
7 43
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
First, the Fifth Circuit had to decide whether the parties contractually
agreed to litigate each party's proportionate responsibility after settling the
Baker case. 74 The district court concluded that the Baker settlement occurred
"in lieu" of an agreement to determine the parties' respective obligations
under their insurance contracts.74 However, the appellate court disagreed,
court improperly granted Wausau's motion for
finding that the district
746
summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit held that President and Genesis raised a fact issue:
"[W]hether Genesis's reservation of rights was indeed unilateral or whether
[the three parties] had agreed... to preserve the coverage issue for resolution
at a later date. 747 The court of appeals correctly observed that under
Mississippi's law, a finding that President, Wausau, and Genesis mutually
agreed to litigate their respective liabilities- after settling the third-party

736.

Id.

737.
738.
739.
740.

id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

741.

See McDaniel Bros. Constr. Co. v. Burk-Hallman Co., 175 So. 2d 603, 605 (Miss. 1965).

[A] voluntary paymentcan not be recovered back, and a voluntary payment within the meaning
of this rule is a payment made without compulsion, fraud, mistake of fact, or agreement to
repay a demand which the payor does not owe, and which is not enforceable against him,
instead of invoking the remedy or defense which the law affords against such demand.
Id.

742.

Genesis, 343 F.3d at 735.

743.
744.
745.

Id.
Id. at 736.
Id. ("The court premised its decision upon the legal rule that a payment under 'protest' or

accompanied by a unilateral reservation of rights will not escape the application of the volunteer
doctrine.") (citing Rowe v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 12 So. 2d 431, 433 (Miss. 1943); Home v. Time

Warner Operations, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 624, 629 (S.D. Miss. 1999)).
746.
747.

Id. at 737-38, 741.
Id. at 737.
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lawsuit- would preclude a court's application of the volunteer doctrine.748
appellate court fittingly remanded that issue to the district court
Therefore, the
749
for a trial.
The Fifth Circuit also agreed to declare whether President and Genesis's
combined $200,000 contribution to help settle the underlying dispute was
voluntary or involuntary.750 Among other assertions, Genesis and President
claimed that Wausau created compelling circumstances, which forced them
to contribute to the Baker settlement.' Specifically, they asserted that after
Wausau decided not to cover Baker's premises-liability claims, the primary
insurer waited less than two months before trial to inform President of that
decision.75 Consequently, Wausau's "bad faith" reduced President and
Genesis's ability to mount an adequate defense and forced them to contribute
to the settlement.753
Certainly, the district court disagreed; it held that Wausau's failure to
give a timely notice of its decision was insufficient to change an otherwise
voluntary payment into an involuntary contribution." 54 The Fifth Circuit
embraced the district court's conclusion, stating that "[n]ot all pressure for
'
and that "the law does not permit us to
payment amounts to compulsion"755
grant Genesis and President immunity from the volunteer doctrine on the
'
grounds that their settlement payments were compelled."756
The court of appeals acknowledged that "Wausau's questionable conduct
placed Genesis in an unenviable position. ' 75 7 But the Fifth Circuit found that
Genesis, in particular, had two arguably favorable options: (1) immediately
contribute to the settlement, or (2) agree to send the Baker case to trial and,
from that point, wait for a judgment. 7 8 From the Fifth Circuit's perspective,
the first option did not contain any adverse consequences for the excess
insurer.759 If Genesis had decided not to contribute $1,000,000 to settle the
case, the excess insurer would have faced only a first-party lawsuit for failing
to settle the case. 760 Further, if Genesis had waited and allowed the second

748. Id.; see, e.g., McDaniel Bros. Constr. Co. v. Burk-Hallman Co., 175 So. 2d 603, 605 (Miss.
1965); Presley v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 116 So. 2d 410, 416 (Miss. 1959); McLean v. Love,
157 So.361, 362 (Miss. 1934); see also Genesis, 343 F.3d at 736 ("Genesis contends that its reservation

of rights letter, combined with Wausau's internal e-mails, indicate the presence of an agreement.").
749. Genesis, 343 F.3d at 737-38.
750.
751.

Id. at 738.
Id.

752.

Id.

753.
754.

Id.
Id.

755.
756.
757.

Id. at 739.
Id. at740.
Id.

758.

Id. at739.

759. Id.
760. Id. ("[This option] lacks the sense of immediacy [which] often aecompanie[s] ... compelled
payments ....'It is well-established that it is not duress to institute or threaten to institute civil suits."')
(citing Glantz Contracting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 379 So. 2d 912, 917-18 (Miss.1980) (quoting Mobile

Teleeomm. Tech. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 962 F. Supp. 952, 955 (S.D. Miss. 1997))).
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option to run its course, Genesis still would not have experienced any liability
6
greater than its obligation under the CGL contract.1 1
But from this commentator's point of view, the Fifth Circuit clearly
minimized the risks and adverse consequences that Genesis would have
confronted if the CGL insurer had decided not to settle Baker's third-party
suit.762 Obviously, Genesis knew that the Mississippi jury could have returned
a verdict and judgment against President that greatly exceeded the policy
limits under the CGL policy. 763 After all, Baker's injuries were extensive,
severe, and even life-threatening. 7" Consequently, President would have been
exposed to excess liability that either it or Genesis would have had to
satisfy.765
So, Genesis took the more prudent and responsible course, and
Mississippi's law required such conduct. The law is quite clear: An insured

may sue an insurer for breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and for a bad-faith refusal to settle a claim in a timely manner.766 In
addition, the insured may request and receive punitive damages.767 More
important, a disgruntled insured-who has been exposed needlessly to excess
liability-may assign a bad-faith claim to the third-party victim.76 The

assignee may also ask a jury to award punitive damages for the insurer's badfaith refusal to settle in a timely manner.76 9

761. Id. at 739-40.
[Tihe stakes, in the event that President and Genesis refused to participate in the settlement,
were of an insufficiently dire magnitude to justify finding that their settlement contributions
were compelled.... Surely, the prospect of paying a maximum, as estimated by President and
Genesis, of $1,0w,000 between them after the jury returned its verdict... did not threaten to
have such 'a disastrous effect to business' that... Genesis... felt compelled to contribute to
the Baker settlement.
Id.
762. See generally, Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer
Protection-An EmipiricalAnalysis of State Supreme Courts' Breach-of-Contract,Bad-Faith,Covenant-ofGood-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 332-46 (1992)

(presenting a fairly thorough review of the bad-faith doctrine, excess liability and insureds and assignees'
rights under liability insurance contracts).
763. Genesis, 343 F.3d at 739.
764. See id. at 734.
765. See id. at 739.
766. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 265 (Miss.1988).
When a suit covered by a liability insurance policy is for a sum in excess of the policy limits,
and an offer of settlement is made within the policy limits, the insurer has a fiduciary duty to
look after the insured's interest at least to the same extent as its own, and also to make a
knowledgeable, honest and intelligent evaluation of the claim commensurate with its ability
to do so.
Id.

767. See, e.g., id. (stressing that an insurer's "[flailure to fulfill [its] fiduciary duty makes the
liability carrier liable for all damages resulting from the refusal to settle, which in this case is the excess
of the judgment").
768. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co., 716 So. 2d673,677 (Miss. App. 1998) ("We conclude
that bad faith claims are actions for the recovery of damages that under Mississippi statutes are
assignable.").
769. See, e.g., id. at 681-82 (concluding that "as assignee of the claim of an insured, Kaplan may
bring the same claim for punitive damages that the insured could have brought").
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The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "[tlhe meaning of compulsion
[under] the voluntary payment doctrine is not well-defined in Mississippi."770
Yet, it found that conditions did not compel Genesis and President to settle
involuntarily. 77 ' In light of Mississippi's bad-faith law, that conclusion is
obviously suspect. 77 Therefore, the court of appeals should have also
remanded this "compulsion" issue to the district court for a trier of fact's
deliberation because this issue773is so closely associated with Mississippi's
doctrine of volunteer payment.
3. Injury to Persons: Whether Under Texas's Law, a
Subcontractor'sCommercial GeneralLiability InsurerMay Recover
One Half of the Amounts Paidto Settle a Personal-InjurySuit
that the Subcontractor'sEmployee Commenced Against the
Subcontractorand Contractor
American Indemnity Lloyds v. Travelers Property& Casualty Insurance
Co. also presents a dispute between two insurers that were engaged in the
business of insurance in Texas."7 Once more, we find a conflict over whether
one or both insurers should pay to settle a third-party, personal-injury
lawsuit. 775 Truly, the central question in American Indemnity is not
complicated or novel. In fact, the dispute involves the same substantive
question appearing in Haspel and Genesis: whether an insurer may obtain
relief under Texas's, rather than Louisiana's, doctrine of equitable
contribution.776
In this case, however, the Fifth Circuit did not thoroughly research
Texas's law to find relevant cases. Instead, the court of appeals decided
highly inappropriately to treat this controversy as an "Erie-guess" case.777

770.

Genesis, 343 F.3d at 738.

There are only a handful of Mississippi state cases that discuss the voluntary payment doctrine
at any length, and neither the parties nor or (sic] independent research have revealed any that

have been decided within the past twenty years. There has been a trend toward expanding the
range of situations that are considered compelling that Mississippi has not yet had the
opportunity to pass upon. As in many other areas of the law, whether a payment was compelled
or made voluntarily is a highly factual determination, and none ofthe Mississippi cases address
the issue of compulsion issue [sic] apart from its particular factual context. Accordingly, we
enlist the assistance of cases from other jurisdictions and the legal literature....
Id. at 738-39 (citations omitted).
771. Seeid.at738-40.
772. See id. at741.
773. Id. at 738 (observing that an involuntary payment does not evolve from choice, that payments
-which are legal obligations, accidents or mistakes-are inherently involuntary, and that payments made
under compulsion are not voluntary, and therefore are not barred under the volunteer doctrine).
774. Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 335 F.3d 429,431 (5th Cir. June 2003).
775. Id.
776. See id. at 435-36.
777. Id. at 435. "[It is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest
court of the state would decide." Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th
Cir. 1992).
Without a Texas case resolving the issue ....the [c]ourt is required to follow the mle which it
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Consequently, in American Indemnity, the Fifth Circuit needlessly injected
otherjurisdictions' tangential rulings into its analysis, thereby clouding settled
principles of law in Texas.
The pertinent facts in the underlying personal-injury lawsuit are as
follows: Caddell Construction Company, Inc. (Caddell) is a general
contractor. 77 8 It secured a contract to construct a prison in Beaumont,
Texas.779 Elite Masonry, Inc. (Elite) is a subcontractor, which provides
masonry services.780 Caddell selected Elite to help construct the prison.'
The Caddell-Elite subcontract in general and the indemnity provision in
particular were extremely elaborate.782 More important, under the terms of the
indemnity clause, Elite assumed a heavier burden.7" 3 Arguably, such
generosity left the subcontractor more exposed to potential liabilities and
undermined its ability to prevail in this case.
Specifically, the subcontractor agreed to hold Caddell harmless from
"any and all [third-party] claims"-including attorney's fees-arising out of
the work described in the subcontract.784 Elite also agreed "to defend all
claims, suits, and actions" against Caddell, involving "any injury, death or
damage" and to reimburse Caddell for "all expenses, including reasonable
attorney fees. '785 Finally, the Caddell-Elite subcontract required Elite to
purchase various liability-insurance contracts before commencing work and
to keep those polices current during the life of the subcontract.786
During the course of the construction, Elite hired Mariano Alas (Alas),
who was severely injured while constructing the prison.787 Some months later,
Alas -individually and on behalf of his minor children-sued Elite and
Caddell, claiming that both were negligent and grossly negligent.78 8 When
Alas's injury occurred and when he sued the contractor and subcontractor,
American Indemnity Lloyds (American) insured Elite under a commercial

believes the Texas Supreme Court would adopt. In making this Erie "guess," the [clourt may
consider all available legal sources, including Restatements of Law, treatises, law review
commentaries, decisions from otherjurisdictions whose doctrinal approach is substantially the
same, and the "majority rule."
Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F. Supp. 398,406 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(citations omitted).
778. See Am. Indem. Lloyds, 335 F.3d at 431.

779.

Id.

780.

Id.

781.
782.
783.
784.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

785. Id.
786. Id. During the life of the Caddell-Elite contract, Elite had to purchase and keep current a
public-liability contract as well as an employer's liability ora workmen's compensation insurance contract.
Id. The Caddell-Elite subcontract did not require Caddell to purchase or maintain any insurance. Id.
787. Id.
788. Id.
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general liability (CGL) insurance policy. 89 The policy limit in the American
7
CGL policy was $1,000,000. 9
Additionally, the American CGL contract listed the general contractor
-Caddell-as an "additional named insured." 791 But during that period,
Travelers Property & Casualty Insurance Company -the successor to Aetna
Casualty & Surety Company-insured Caddell under a separate commercial
general liability insurance policy.792 The Travelers CGL contract also had a
policy limit of $1,000,000.2 9 Elite, however, was not listed as a named
insured under the Travelers CGL policy.7 94 More significant, both American's
and Travelers's CGL contracts contained identical "other insurance"
clauses.7 95 As discussed more thoroughly below, these two clauses, plus the
indemnity clause in the Caddell-Elite agreement, form the basis of this
controversy.796
Initially, Caddell's own CGL insurer- Travelers- defended the general
contractor against Alas's claims in the underlying lawsuit.7 97 Eventually,
Travelers withdrew after American complied with Travelers's demand and
assumed the defense. 798 Nearly four years after Alas's accident, Alas
nonsuited Elite, his employer; consequently, that left Caddell as the only
defendant.7 99 Presumably, acting in good faith, American constantly reported
its defense strategies and the status of the underlying lawsuit to Travelers."ro
Ultimately and without Travelers's participation, American settled the suit for
$625,000 and incurred $230,164 in attorney's fees." 1
But a few months after assuming Caddell's defense, American reminded
Travelers that both American and Travelers's respective CGL policies

789.
790.

Id. at 432.
Id.

791. Id. There is no universal definition of "named insured," because typically a policy will
identify the person or persons who are insured. See, e.g., W. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Am. Physicians Ins. Exch.,
950 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ) (defining "'additional insured" as a party

protected under an insurance policy, but not named therein, and defining additional named insured as one
specifically named in the policy subsequent to the policy's issuance); id. at 187 (observing that the policy

defined named insured as being "the Named Insured and any member, partner, officer, director, or
shareholder thereof while acting within the scope of their duties in providing Medical Professional

Services for the Named Insured").
792.

Am. Indem. Lloyds, 335 F.3d at 432 ("At some point after March 16,1998, [Traveler Property

& Casualty], pursuant to its purchase of some or all of Aetna Casualty lines of insurance, succeeded to all
of Aetna rights and obligations under the Aetna policy.").
793. Id.
794.

Id.

795.
796.
797.
798.

Id.
See id. at 435.
Id. at 433.
Id.

799. Id. at 433-34. Among other assertions, the plaintiffs alleged in their Fifth Amended Original
Petition that Caddell negligently supervised the work site, failed to monitor its contractors and
subcontractors' operations, and negligently hired, directed and maintained Elite as a subcontractor at the

work site. Id. at 434 n.6.
800.
801.

Id. at 434.
Id.
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provided "concurrent primary coverage" for Caddell's defense against the
third-party lawsuit. 80 2 At that time, American also informed Travelers that it
retained the right to seek an equitable contribution from Travelers for "all
amounts [American] has paid and will pay in defense and settlement of this
claim.""' 3 Significantly, Travelers did not respond. 0"
After settling Alas's lawsuit, American asked Travelers to reimburse
half of the $625,000 that American paid to settle the Alas suit and half of
American's attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with its defense
of Caddell."' 5 Again, Travelers did not respond.8"° Therefore, American filed
a declaratory-judgment action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.80 7 In the diversity action, American asked the
district court to declare that Travelers must reimburse American for one-half
the sums spent to defend Caddell and to settle the Alas lawsuit."' American
also asked the district court to award a money judgment against Travelers to
force the insurer to satisfy its debt. 0 9
At a pretrial conference, the district court decided to allow the insurers
to file motions for summary judgment after an initial discovery period." 0 The
lower court also agreed to resolve the dispute on the basis of those motions,
instead of performing a full-blown, declaratory-judgment hearing on the
merits."' American's motion relied upon the "other insurance" clause in the
respective insurance contracts."' From American's viewpoint, an identical
justified American's
other-insurance provision in Travelers's CGL policy
13
receiving an equitable contribution from Travelers."

802.

Id.

803.

Id.

804.

Id.

805.

Id.

806.

Id.

807.

Id.

808.

Id.

809.

Id.

810.

Id.

811.

Id.

812. Id. In both American and Travelers's CGL contracts, other identical insurance clauses
appeared. Id. Both clauses stated in relevant part:
a. Primary Insurance
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies. If this insurance is primary, our
obligations are not affected unless any of the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will
share with all that other insurance by the method described in c. below.
c. Method of Sharing
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, we will follow this method
also. Under this approach each insurer contributes equal amounts until it has paid its

applicable limit of insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first.
If any of the other insurance does not permit contributionby equal shares,we will contribute
by limits. Under this method, each insurer's share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit
of insurance to the total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers.
Id. at 432 n.2 (emphasis added).
813. See id. at 434.
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Travelers based its motion for summary judgment on the indemnity
provision appearing in the Caddell-Elite subcontract." 4 Travelers argued that
(1) there had been no adjudication or determination of fault in the underlying
lawsuit either before or after the settlement; (2) as a practical matter,
attempting to determine fault and proportionality in the declaratory-judgment
hearing was impossible; and (3) the various contractors and insurers' relative
liabilities or fault in the underlying case was not before the court because the
parties settled the underlying lawsuit."
The district court found that the indemnity provision controlled;" 6
therefore, it granted Travelers's motion for summary judgment. 81 7 American
appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals." 8 Before that judicial body,
American cited the identical other-insurance clauses in both CGL contracts
again and asserted that the district court's ruling was clearly erroneous.819
American maintained that equity required Travelers to reimburse American
for half of the funds used to settle and defend against the third-party suit.8 20
As mentioned earlier, the Fifth Circuit decided to make an Erie-guessof
the legal principles that the court of appeals believed the Texas Supreme
Court would employ to resolve the conflict in American Indemnity.12 ' After
all, even though both Travelers and American agreed that Texas's law
822
controlled, neither cited any case directly on point that applied Texas's law.
Even more amazing and a bit disturbing, the Fifth Circuit reported that "[n]or
has our independent research disclosed any such case."8 3 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit decided to apply the "'majority rule,"' after consulting various
treatises and reviewing "'decisions from other jurisdictions. "'824
After spending an inordinate amount of time and precious judicial
resources examining and writing about non-Texas cases, the Fifth Circuit cited
itself and stated what appeared to be the general rule: An insurer that pays
more than its fair share to settle a third-party claim may recover the excess
payment from the other insurer if (1) both insurers insured the same person
under two different liability insurance policies, (2) both liability contracts
provided "primary coverage [for] the same insured," (3) both liability

814.
815.

Id.
Id.

816.

Id. at 435 n.7 ("The district court ruled that the indemnity agreement was valid and enforceable

according to its terms under Texas law, which is concededly applicable, and met all the requirements of

the Texas express negligence and conspicuousness doctrines.").
817.
818.

Id. at 435.
Id.

819.

Id.

820.

Id.

821.

Id.

822.
823.
824.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Jackson v. John-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1986); Tex.

Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F. Supp. 398, 406 (S.D. Tex. 1993)).
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contracts covered the same third-party claim, and (4)
both policies contained
"mutually consistent 'other insurance' provisions.8''2 5
Also, citing an inferior federal district court case, the Fifth Circuit stated
that this rule "appears to be the general rule in Texas."'8 26 Yet, in the very next
sentence, the court of appeals wrote: "Under [Texas's] law such recovery is
not based on the theory that.., separate policies create[d a] contract between
the two insurance companies ... ,nor upon common law contribution, but
rather upon conventional or equitable subrogation to the rights of the common
insured against the nonpaying insurer." ' 7 But the conflict in American
Indemnity concerns the doctrine of contribution; therefore, this allegedly
general rule has no application in the present controversy. 28
Recognizing that the general rule was indeed flaccid under the present
facts, the Fifth Circuit observed that "an equally widely recognized exception"
exists for cases in which (1) an indemnity agreement binds two insureds,
(2) the insureds' activities are covered under separate liability insurance
contracts, and (3) the liability contracts contain identical other-insurance
clauses. 2 9 That exception states: "'[A]n indemnity agreement between the
insureds or a contract with an indemnification clause... may shift an entire
loss to a particular insurer notwithstanding
the existence of an 'other
830
insurance' clause in its policy.'
The Fifth Circuit then observed: "[T]he clear majority of jurisdictions
recognizes the foregoing exception and gives controlling effect to the
indemnity obligation of one insured to [another] insured [rather than to] 'other
insurance' or similar clauses ....
We believe Texas would follow this well
recognized exception to the general rule."8 '' Therefore, citing the indemnity
clause in the Caddell-Elite subcontract, the court of appeals declared that
Travelers, Caddell's CGL insurer, did not have to reimburse American
Indemnity, the Elite's CGL insurer. 32

825.

Id. (citing Employers Cas. Co. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 1215,1218

(5th Cir. 1980)).
826. Id. (citing Tex. Employers Ins., 836 F. Supp. at 404 n.5).
827. Id. at 435-36.
828. See id. at 434.
829. Id. at 436.
830. id. (quoting LEE. R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 15 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 19:1 (3d ed.
1999)).

831.
Id. The court discussed several cases from multiple jurisdictions that have embraced this
exception. Id. at 436-41 (citing Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 583, 588-94 (8th Cir.
2002); J. Walters Constr., Inc. v. Gilman Paper Co., 620 So. 2d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Rossmoor
Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1975); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 483 F.2d 471
(5th Cir. 1973); Chubb Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 982 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Reliance
Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
832. Id. at 445 (declaring that "[tihe district court correctly granted summary judgment denying
[American] any recovery from [Travelers]" and that the district court "is accordingly affirmed").
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To repeat a previous observation, however, the Fifth Circuit's elaborate
analysis in American Indemnity was unnecessary and an inefficient use of very
limited judicial resources. But more important, the appellate court's holding

needlessly introduced confusion into Texas's law. To support these
conclusions, consider the Supreme Court of Texas's analysis and rulings in
Traders & GeneralInsurance Co. v. Hicks Rubber Co. 833 Indeed, Traders &
General is "a case on point" because the facts and substantive question on
8 4
appeal are extraordinarily similar to those appearing in American Indemnity.
More specifically, in the early 1940s, Hicks Rubber Company was doing
business in Waco, Texas.835 On one occasion, one of Hicks's employees
unloaded tires from a truck allegedly negligently, throwing the tires from the

truck-across the sidewalk adjacent to Hicks's warehouse-into a chute
inside the warehouse. 836 One of the tires struck Mrs. J. W. Harper as she was
walking past the truck. 837 She was injured severely and later sued Hicks. 8
When the accident occurred, both Traders & General Insurance (Traders)
and Employers Casualty Company (Employers) insured Hicks under two
public-liability insurance contracts.83 9 Employers's policy covered third-party
claims originating in Hicks's building and on the adjacent sidewalks;
Traders's policy covered third-party injuries stemming from Hicks's operating
its trucks and other automobiles. 84° Both contracts required the insurers to
defend Hicks in underlying lawsuits, to pay and settle claims, and to
reimburse Hicks for out-of-pocket expenses in the event that Hicks settled a
third-party claim.841 But more important, Employers's and Traders's policies

contained other insurance provisions.842
833. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hicks Rubber Co., 169 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1943).
834. See id. at 143-47; Am. ndem. Uoyds, 335 F.3d at 431-35.
835. See Traders & Gen. Ins., 169 S.W.2d at 144.
836. Id.
837. Id.
838. Id. ("Mr. J. W. Harper, the husband of Mrs. J. W. Harper, filed [a suit against Hicks] in the
District Court of McLennan County, Texas .... [He sued] to recover damages resulting from [his wife's]
personal injuries ...
839. Id.
840. Id.
841. Id.
Both [insurance contracts] purported to protect or indemnify Hicks against liability on any
judgment against it for damages on account of bodily injuries to any one person, in the
respective sums already shown. [The] polices bound the above-named insurance companies
to pay on behalf of Hicks all sums which it should become obligated to pay, by reason of the
liability imposed upon it for damages, because of bodily injuries at any one time sustained by
any person, and arising out of the thing or event insured. Also, [thel policies obligated [the]
insurance companies to defend any suits against Hicks, alleging such injury and seeking
damages on account thereof, even though such suits should be groundless or fraudulent. [The]
policies also obligated these insurance companies to pay all premiums on appeal bonds
required in any such defended suit; to pay all costs taxed against Hicks in any such suits; to pay
all expenses incurred by Hicks in connection with such suits ....
Id.
842. Id. Employers's policy stated: "'If the Assured has other insurance covering a loss or expense
covered hereby, the Company shall be liable only for the proportion of such loss or expense which the sum
hereby insured bears to the whole amount of valid and collectible insurance."' Additionally, Traders's
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Given the manner in which Harper's injuries occurred, both liability
contracts covered her claims. 84 3 Initially, the various parties discussed settling
the lawsuit; however, for various reasons, a settlement never occurred. 8"
Instead, the case went to trial, where a jury awarded Harper a $10,000
judgment against Hicks.845 Ultimately, Traders and Employers satisfied
Harper's judgment, but in the process Traders paid more than its two-thirds
proportionate share.846 Therefore, Travelers sued Employers under the
doctrine of equitable contribution to recoup the excess payment. 47
To help decide this conflict, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed several
settled principles regarding insurers' right to receive contribution from
another or other insurers."ss First, the supreme court stated the general rule:
"[I]f two or more insurers bind themselves to pay the entire loss insured

against, and one insurer pays the whole loss, the [latter] has a right of action
against [the] coinsurer, or coinsurers, for a ratable proportion of the amount
paid... "849 And the reason is not complicated. The insurer's satisfying a
judgment against an insured has paid a debt for the other insurers which is
"equally and concurrently due."850

There is, however, another general rule: "[11f each of several insurers
contracts to pay such proportion of [a] loss ....[neither insurer has a right of]
contribution from the others, nor will the payment of the whole loss by any of

policy stated:
"If the Named Insured has other insurance against a loss covered by the policy, the Company,
as respects the Named Insured, shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of
such loss than the applicable limit of liability expressed in the Declarations bears to the total
applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss."
Id.
843. Id. at 144-45.
844. Id. at 145.
J. W. Harper offered to settle for $3,000 and court costs. Employers wanted to settle at the
amount offered, and so informed Traders and Hicks. . . Traders refused the offer of
settlement, and insisted on trying the case. Employers, [assuming that under the terms of the
respective other insurance provisions, both] companies were liable in proportion to their
maximum coverages, offered to pay to J.W. Harper one-third of the $3,000, and also offered
to pay one-third of all court costs then incurred. [Harper refused the latter offer.] Employers
then [decided to stop defending Harper] in any way....
..The only excuse for Employers' act in refusing to further defend was the failure or
refusal of Traders and Hicks to settle as above detailed. There is no showing that Harper would
have settled with one of these companies, his offer being to settle the entire suit.
Id.
845.
Id. The court of appeals later affirmed this judgment. Id.
846. Id. at 147-48.
847. See id. at 148.
When Employers refused to further assist in the defense of the Harper suit, Traders shouldered
the entire burden, including the appeals to the Court of Civil Appeals and to this court. In so
doing it paid out more than two-thirds of the costs and expenses incurred. Traders sues
Employers to make it pay its proportionate one-third of such costs and expenses.
Id.
848. See id.
849. Id. (emphasis added).
850. Id.
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them discharge the liability of the others."'8 5 The Texas Supreme Court
embraced this latter rule because, under the facts mentioned
above, "the
52
contracts are several, and independent of each other."
In Traders & General, the Supreme Court of Texas found that both
insurance contracts contained an other-insurance clause that required each
insurer to pay a proportion of the loss or injuries in the underlying personalinjury suit.853 Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court applied the second general
principle and decided against Traders. 4 Without doubt, in American
Indemnity, the Fifth Circuit should have considered these very principles
instead of making a highly unwarranted Erie guess of what the Texas Supreme
Court might rule and muddling settled principles of insurance law in Texas.
4. Injury to Persons: Whether Under Texas's Law a
Commercial ProfessionalLiability Insurer Has a Duty to
Defend andIndemnify Its Insured Where the Insured's Employee
- "A Nanny" -Murdered an Infant
The dispute in NorthfieldInsurance Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc. also
concerns whether a liability insurer has a duty to defend insureds in Texas
against a third-party lawsuit.855 Sheila and Ronnie Daniels (Daniels) owned
and operated Loving Home Care, Inc. (LHC), which provided nannies for inhome childcare.856 LHC employed Celia Giral (Giral), and she worked as a
nanny for William and Catherine Barrows (Barrows).857 On an eventful day
in mid-October 1997, Giral was babysitting the Barrows' daughter, Bianca." 8
Unexpectedly, Bianca received deadly injuries; the next day, Bianca died at
a hospital. 5 9
The Harris County coroner determined that Bianca's death was a
homicide.8' The autopsy found that Bianca's injuries included "multiple skull
fractures, brain hemorrhages, and blood behind the eyes. '8 6' The cause 8of
62
death was "cranio-cerebral injuries due to blunt force trauma of the head."
Less than a year after the child's death, a jury convicted Giral of first-degree

851. Id.
852. Id. (emphasis added).
853. Id.
854. Id. at 148-49 ("This rule will preclude any recovery by Traders against Employers. Also, since
these contracts are independent and several, Traders will not be liable to Employers for any negligence

on the part of Traders in refusing to settle the Harper suit.").
855.

Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. Mar. 2004).

856.

Id. at 525.

857.

Id.

858.

Id.

859.

Id.

860.

Id. at 525-26.

861.

Id. at 526.

862.

Id.
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felonious injury to a child in a Texas state court. 63 The court sent Giral to
prison for seven years. 8"
The Barrows filed a personal-injury suit, naming LHC and the Daniels
as two of several defendants.865 Significantly and curiously, the Barrows
amended their complaint three times. 8 "s The original complaint alleged that
Giral was guilty of criminal conduct and that she intentionally injured
Bianca.867 But the Barrows' third-amended petition stated the following:
(1) The six-month service agreement between Cathy Barrows and LHC
provided that $377.00 per week would be paid by the Barrows for services;
(2) Bianca was 3-1/2 months old when she died; and (3) Giral, a Class-A
nanny, negligently dropped Bianca and/or negligently shook Bianca, thereby
causing severe head injuries that proximately caused the infant's death.868
On the day of Bianca's death, Northfield Insurance Co. (Northfield)
insured LHC under a two-part, liability-insurance contract- coverage for both
commercial general liability (CGL) and commercial professional liability
(CPL). 69 Citing the duty-to-defend clause in the insurance contract, LHC and
the Daniels - LHC' s owners and operators- asked Northfield to defend them
against the Barrows' underlying lawsuit. 870 The Daniels and LHC also asked
Northfield to indemnify LHC and its owners for any and all out-of-pocket
"
'
expenditures associated with the third-party lawsuit.87
Northfield commenced a legal defense under a reservation of rights.872
But the insurer also filed a declaratory-judgment action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 73 There, Northfield
petitioned the district court to declare that the insurer had no duty to defend
and no duty to indemnify LHC and the Daniels.874 In its motion for summary
judgment, Northfield argued that the CGL part of the policy applied because
the "designated professional services exclusion" clause barred coverage for

863.

Id.

864.

Id.

865.

Id.

866.

Id.

867.

Id. ("In the alternative, Plaintiffs would show that Giral was reckless and/or criminally

negligent as defined [under the] Texas Penal Code Sec. 6.03.").
868.

Id.

Giral [admitted] that she had accidently [sic] dropped the infant, then shook [the infant] in an
attempt to revive her. Giral therefore admitted conduct that failed to meet the standard of care
of an ordinarily prudent person acting under the same or similar circumstances .... [Giral's
conduct constituted] negligence, and was the proximate cause of... Bianca's bodily injury and

death.
Id.

869.

Id. at 526-27.

870.
871.
872.

Id. at 527.
Id.
Id.

873.

Id.

874.

Id.
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damages stemming from "the rendering [of] or failure to render any
'8
professional scrvice. 11
In addition, Northfield claimed that the CPL portion of the policy did not
obligate it to defend LHC and the Daniels. 76 Certainly, that part of the policy
covered injuries and accidents, which occurred "because of a negligent act,
error or omission in the rendering of or failure to render professional
services.8 7 7 However, the CPL excluded from coverage "criminal acts and
physical/sexual abuse. 8 78 More specifically, the exclusion for physical/sexual
abuse denied coverage for "any damages arising out of" the following
occurrences:
1.
2.

3.

The actual, alleged, or threatened physical abuse, sexual abuse or
molestation by anyone.
The investigation, hiring, training, placement, supervision, or
retention of anyone who engages or has engaged in physical abuse,
sexual abuse or molestation. This endorsement applies whether
damages arise from an act orfailure to act.
The reporting of or failure to report to authorities any physical abuse,
sexual abuse, or molestation. 879

In due course, the district court granted Northfield's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the
insureds under the CGL part of the contract.8 On the other hand, the district
court found that the exclusions for criminal acts and physical/sexual abuse
were not applicable."8 ' Therefore, under the CPL section of the contract,
Northfield had a duty to defend the insureds.8 2 The district court dismissed
the duty-to-indemnify issue without prejudice and entered a final declaratory

875.

Id.

The district court initially granted Northfield's motion for summary judgment in its entirety,
ruling that the professional services exclusion applied [and therefore] preclude[d] coverage
under both parts
of the policy. LHC, the Daniels, and the Barrows then filed motions for
reconsideration of the summary judgment, pointing out that the professional services exclusion
only applied to the CGL part of the policy.
Id.
876.

Id.

877.

Id.

878. Id. ("The criminal acts exclusion stated that coverage would not apply to '[any damages
arising out of any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission of any insured or
"employee.",").
879. Id. (emphasis added).
880. Id.
881. Id.
882. Id.
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judgment.883 After Northfield made a timely appeal, the Barrows then crossappealed.884

At the outset, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly noted
that, under Texas's law, the duty to defend is distinct from the duty to
indemnify. 885 Actually, "the duty to defend is broader than the duty to

indemnify."886 In Texas, courts apply the "eight comers" or "complaint
'
Put simply, the allegations in the third-party victim's
allegation rule."887
pleadings coupled with the language in the liability insurance policy
determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend. 888 "'Ifa petition does not
allege facts within the scope of coverage, an insurer is not legally required to
defend a suit against its insured.' 889 But Texas's courts "'resolve all doubts

regarding the duty to defend in favor of the duty.","8'e
In addition, Texas's courts determine whether insurers have a duty to
defend by examining the third-party complainant's latest amended pleading. 9 '

Furthermore, courts must focus their inquiry on the alleged facts as opposed
to the asserted legal theories.892 And if there is doubt over whether the thirdparty victim's allegations state a cause of action under the liability policy's
coverage provision, courts resolve all doubt regarding the duty to defend in
favor of the insured.893 Contrarily, if the third-party complaint only alleges
exclusion clause, the liability insurer does
excluded facts under the policy's
8 94
not have a duty to defend.

883. Id. ("The Barrows ... filed a motion to amend the judgment, requesting the district court
delete the phrase 'This is a final judgment' because the duty-to-indemnify issue was still before the court.
The district court denied the motion and dismissed the duty-to-indemnify issue without prejudice.").
884. Id.
885. Id. at 527-28.
886. Id. at 528 (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 1998)).
887. Id. (quoting King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002)).
888. See id. "[T]he duty to defend arises only when the facts alleged in the complaint, if taken as
true, would potentially state a cause of action falling within the terms of the policy." Id. (citing Canutillo
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1996)).
889. Id. (quoting King, 85 S.W.3d at 187).
890. Id. (quoting King, 85 S.W.3d at 187).
Id.; see also Rhodes v. Chicago Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116, 119(5th Cir. 1983) (holding that "the
891.
duty to defend is determined by examining the latest.., amended pleadings" upon which the insurer based
its refusal to defend the action). Furthermore, the insured has the initial burden to show that the alleged
facts in the third-party petition state a potential claim against him. NorthfieldIns., 363 F.3d at 528. To
defeat the duty-to-defend claim, "the insurer bears the burden of showing that the plain language of a
policy exclusion or limitation allows the insurer to avoid coverage of all claims, also within the confines
of the eight comers rule." Id. (citations omitted).
892. Northfield Ins., 363 F.3d at 528 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp. -Tex., 249 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2001)).
893. /d. (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchant's Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139,
141 (Tex. 1997)).
894. Id. (citing Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.
1982)). "[F]acts ascertained before [a] suit, developed in the process of litigation, or determined by the
ultimate outcome of the suit do not affect the duty to defend." Id. (citing Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v.
Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 829 (Tex. 1997)).
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Once again, an insurer's duty to indemnify is a distinct and separate duty
from the duty to defend.8 95 First, the duty to indemnify is not based on the
allegations appearing in a third-party complaint.896 Second, although an
insurer often litigates the duty-to-indemnify issue after an insured establishes
that she is liable in the underlying third-party suit, an insurer can resolve the
indemnity issue before the establishment of liability by proving that the policy
does not cover the third-party claims case. s9 7 But the general rule is clear: No
duty to indemnify arises unless the underlying litigation establishes liability
for damages, which the liability-insurance contract covers.898
After reviewing those principles, the Fifth Circuit addressed a
preliminary question: whether Texas's law permits courts to consider
extrinsic evidence and deviate from a strict application of the eight comers
rule to resolve duty-to-defend controversies.8 99 To repeat, in the underlying
third-party suit, the Barrows amended their petition three times to remove all
allegations involving the nanny's intentional acts and criminal conviction.'
On appeal, Northfield called those numerous amendments "artful pleadings"
to remove all reference to Giral' s intentional conduct and influence the district
court's duty-to-defend ruling. 9" From the insurer's viewpoint, the district
court should have
made an exception and read the nanny's criminal and intentional conduct into
9 2
the pleadings to help determine whether Northfield had a duty to defend. 0
But the Fifth Circuit found that "[t]he Texas Supreme Court has never
recognized any exception to the strict eight comers rule that would allow
courts to examine extrinsic evidence when determining an insurer's duty to
defend."9 3 Nevertheless, Texas's appellate courts, the Fifth Circuit, and
particular federal district courts in the Fifth Circuit have recognized a narrow
exception to the eight comers doctrine.9°4 But the court of appeals declared
895.

Id. at 527-28.

896.

Id. at 528-29; see also, e.g., Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d

118, 125 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (declaring that "[flacts, [rather than]
allegations, determine an indemnitor's duty to indemnify").
897. See Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. 1997).

898. See Northfield Ins., 363 F.3d at 529 (holding that the duty-to-indemnify question is only
has been established in the underlying suit, unless "'the same
justiciable under Texas law after liability
reasons that negate the duty to defend likewise negate any possibility the insurer will ever have a duty to
indemnify"' (quoting Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84)); Comsys Info. Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins.
Co., 130 S.W.3d 181, 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet. h.); Collier v.Allstate County
Mut. Ins. Co., 64 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (declaring that "the duty to

indemnify only arises after an insured has been adjudicated, whether by judgment or settlement, to be
legally responsible for damages in a lawsuit").
899. Northfield Ins., 363 F.3d at 529.
900.

Id. at526.

901.

Id.

902. See id. at 532-33.
903. Id. at 529 (citing Landmark Chevrolet Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 121 S.W.3d
886, 890 (Tex. App. -Houston [list Dist.] 2003, pet. filed)).

904.

Id. The Fifth Circuit stated:
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that the district court's ruling was proper because no narrow exception applied

in this case.' °5 Furthermore, after making yet another Erie-guess, 90 6 the Fifth
Circuit concluded: "IT]he current Texas Supreme Court would not recognize
any exception to the strict eight comers rule.""
The central appellate question was whether the district court committed
reversible error by declaring that Northfield had a duty to defend LHC and the
Daniels in the underlying suit."° On appeal, Northfield stressed more
fervently that it had no duty to defend LHC and the Daniels because Bianca's
injuries arose from Giral's criminal and abusive acts.9" 9 According to

[Ciertain Texas appellate courts, this Court, and district courts in this Circuit have appeared to
recognize a narrow exception [to the eight comers rule]. See, e.g., W. Heritage Ins. Co. v.
River Entm't,998 F.2d 311,313 (5th Cir. 1993) ("However, when the petition does not contain
sufficient facts to enable the court to determine if coverage exists, itis proper to look to
extrinsic evidence in order to adequately address the issue."); McLaren v. Imperial Cas. &
Indem. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1364, 1374 (ND. Tex. 1991), affd, 968 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1992)
("[T]here appears to be a more general rule that the true facts always can be used to establish
non-existence of a defense obligation, no matter what the plaintiff might allege in her damage
suit complaint."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wade, 827 S.W.2d 448, 452-53 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (concluding that extrinsic evidence could be admitted
in deciding the duty to defend when the facts alleged are insufficient to determine coverage and
"when doing so does not question the truth or falsity of any facts alleged in the underlying
petition"); Gonzales v. Am. States Ins. Co., 628 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1982, no writ) (holding that facts extrinsic to the petition relating only to coverage, not
liability, may be considered to determine a duty to defend, where such evidence does not
contradict any allegation in the petition); Cook v.Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 418 S.W.2d 712, 715-16
(Tex.Civ. App. -Texarkana 1967, no writ) ("[Tihe [Texas] Supreme Court draws a distinction
between cases in which the merit of the claim is the issue and those where the coverage of the
insurance policy is in question. In the first instance the allegation of the petition controls, and
in the second the known or ascertainable facts are to be allowed to prevail."); Int'l Serv. Ins.
Co. v. Boll, 392 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(considering extrinsic evidence of identity of driver of insured boat by stipulation to conclude
no duty to defend or indemnify arose).
Id. at 529 & n. 1;see also Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v.Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied) (holding that an exception to the eight corners rule applies when the
underlying suit's petition does not allege facts sufficient to determine if the duty to defend is invoked).
Butsee Tri-Coastal Contractors, Inc. v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 981 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (apparently declining to follow State FarmFire & CasualtyCo. v.
Wade).
905. Northfield Ins., 363 F.3d at 531.
906. See supra note 485 and accompanying text.
907. NorthfieldIns., 363 F.3d at 531.
[tin the unlikely situation that the Texas Supreme Court were to recognize an exception to the
strict eight corners rule, we conclude any exception would only apply in very limited
circumstances: when it is initially impossible to discern whether coverage is potentially
implicated and when the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage
which does not overlap with the merits of or engage the truth or falsity of any facts alleged in
the underlying case.
Id.
908. Id. at 532.
909. Id. at 535.
Although Northfield makes arguments that stress the artful pleading by the Barrows to keep
the criminal and intentional allegations out, the latest pronouncement on the eight corners rule
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Northfield, if the district court had deviated from the strict application of the
eight corners rule and considered the nanny's intentional acts, the district
court would have found that the insurer had no duty to defend. 910 But that was
extrinsic evidence.9 ' Consequently, the Fifth Circuit correctly embraced the
district court's rulings and declared that Northfield had a duty to defend the
Daniels and LHC.912
5. Injury to Persons: Whether Under New York's Law a Liability
InsurerHas a Duty to Defend and Indemnify Its Insured-aRussian
Orthodox Church-in an UnderlyingPersonal-InjurySuit Where the
Insured'sMonk-PriestsAllegedly Molested a Minor in Texas
The facts in American States Insurance Co. v. Synod of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia are fairly brief, and the decision is
extremely short.91 3 However, like Northfield, the central question in Russian
Orthodox concerns whether an insurer has a duty to defend and a duty to
indemnify a church." 4 But in the present case, the Fifth Circuit outlined and
applied New York's rather than Texas's law to resolve a controversy that
originated in Texas.9 15
These are the limited facts in the underlying lawsuit. The Synod of the
Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (Church) has a monastery in
Blanco County, Texas.9" 6 Two priest-monks-Sam Greene and Jonathan
Hitt-are affiliated with the monastery.9" 7 In August 2000, a minor accused
Greene and Hitt of sexually molesting him on six occasions. 9 8 The minor

by the Texas Supreme Court ... reemphasized the strictness of the rule. Once the Barrows
alleged facts that stated a cause of action that potentially fell within the scope of CPL coverage,

no matter what facts the previous versions of their petition alleged, the burden shifted to
Northfield to show that the plain language ofthe policy exclusions when compared against the
facts alleged in the underlying petition precluded coverage. Northfield did not meet this

burden under the duty to defend[,] eight corners inquiry.
Id.
910.

Id. at 532.

911.

Id.

912. Id. at 537.
Here, the district court correctly looked to the strict eight comers rule to determine the duty to

defend. It properly focused on the alleged facts in the Barrows' petition about Bianca and
Giral's behavior toward her, not legal theories, and [concluded] that they should be construed

in the insured's favor.
Id. at 534.

913.

Am. States Ins. Co. v. Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russ., 335 F.3d 493

(5th Cir. July 2003).

914.

Id. at495.

915.

Id.

916.

Id. at 494.

917.
918.

Id.
Id.
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sued the Church. 919 When the alleged molestation occurred, American
Economy Insurance Company and American States Insurance Company
insured the Church under separate liabilities insurance contracts.92 Therefore,
before the minor filed his lawsuit, the Church notified American Economy of
the claim.921
American Economy agreed to defend the Church against the claim,
subject to a reservation of rights.9 22 American Economy stressed in its
reservation-of-rights letter that its insurance contract excluded from the
923
standpoint of the insured an "expected or intended" occurrence.
Additionally, American Economy suggested its contract might exclude the
minor's claim.924 After hearing the chilly news, the Church commenced a
declaratory-judgment action in a Texas trial court.925 The Church asked the
state court to declare that both American Economy and American States had
a contractual duty to defend and indemnify the Church up to the policy limits
of the respective insurance contracts.92 6
Later, the two insurers removed the declaratory-judgment action to the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, where the
Church moved for partial summary judgment, and the insurers moved for
summary judgment. 927 However, before the district court's ruling, the Church
dismissed American States as a defendant.92 The district court granted the
Church's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that "American
Economy had a duty to defend and indemnify. 9 29 The district court denied
American Economy's motion."

919.

Id.

920.
921.
922.

Id.
Id.
Id.

923.

Id.

924. Id.
The questions of whether the alleged sexual assault was an "accident" and therefore an

"occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and whether it was excluded from coverage as
an act "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured" are both controlled by Agoado
In Agoado, the issue was whether the insurer was required to indemnify its insureds, the
landlords of a building, against a claim brought by the estate of a tenant who had been
murdered in the building by an unknown assailant. We held that the murder, though obviously

"[Wie said that: "in deciding
intended from the murderer's point of view, was an "accident ....
whether a loss is the result of an accident, it must be determined,from the point of view ofthe
insured,whether the loss was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."
RIC Realty Holding Corp. v. Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 1263, 1265 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting

Agoado Realty Corp. v. United Intern. Ins. Co., 733 N.E.2d 213,215 (N.Y. 2000)).
925.

Am.States, 335 F.3d at 494.

926.

Id.

927.

Id.

928.
929.
930.

Id.
Id. at 494-95.
Id. at 495.
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Shortly thereafter, the Church and American Economy reached a
settlement agreement, thereby effectively ending the litigation and quieting
the duty-to-defend controversy. 93' But both parties reserved their rights to
litigate whether the other party adhered to the terms of the settlement
agreement. 932 Given the latter reservation of rights, the issue of whether
American Economy had a duty to indemnify the Church remained very much
alive.933 Even after the settlement, American Economy maintained that the
district court's adverse duty-to-indemnify ruling was erroneous. 934 From
American Economy's perspective, the Church did not meet its burden of proof
because the Church's summary-judgment evidence was insufficient. 935
Therefore, American Economy appealed the district court's ruling.936
Before the Fifth Circuit, American Economy asserted that the district
court failed to apply the correct standard for determining whether the insurer
had a duty to indemnify the Church.937 The district court declared: American
Economy had a duty to indemnify the Church after finding that the insurer had
a duty to defend the Church.938 But American Economy argued that the
district court erred by incorrectly assuming that a duty to indemnify and a
duty to defend are inexorably linked. 93 9 The parties agreed the Fifth Circuit
should apply New York's law to resolve this conflict. 94°
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reviewed Servidone Construction Corp. v.
Security Insurance Co. of Hartford, the leading duty-to-indemnify case in
New York. 94 ' In Servidone, the insured and insurer settled a claim after the
trial court found the insurer liable for failing to defend the insured in an
underlying lawsuit.942 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling.943 New York's highest court declared that lower courts must
base a duty-to-indemnify ruling on an independent factual finding. 9" More
specifically, trial courts must determine whether an insured's liability
falls
945
within the coverage provision of the liability-insurance contract.

931.

Id.

932.
933.

Id.
Id.

934.

Id.

935.
936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.

Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 496 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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In Servidone, the New York Court of Appeals observed that the duty to
defend and the duty to indemnify are not synonymous.946 Courts must
determine the duty to defend by examining the allegations of the third-party
pleadings.947 On the other hand, "'an insurer's breach of duty to defend does
not create coverage [in New York], even in cases of negotiated settlements
....
"948 Therefore, "'there can be no duty to indemnify unless there is first
a covered loss." 9 ' Citing the principles from Servidone, American Economy
argued that the Church was required to prove actual liability before receiving
reimbursements from an insurer.95 The Church countered, asserting that
Servidone only requires an insured to prove a settled claim is a covered loss
"
under a liability policy.95
'
The Fifth Circuit, however, could not reach a sound and intelligible
resolution of this conflict. 95 2 The appellate court was "unable to determine
whether the settled claim was a covered loss under the policy;" and the district
court should have clearly determined that issue. 953 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
vacated the district court's duty-to-indemnify summary judgment and
remanded the case to the district court.954
B. Third-PartyLiability Claims: Injury to Property
1. Injury to Property: Whether Under Louisiana'sLaw a Co-Insurer
Has a Duty to Indemnify a Primary Insurer that Spent Funds to
Settle Environmental-PollutionClaims and PaidClean-up Costs
in an Underlying Third-PartyLawsuit
American InternationalSpecialty Lines Ins. Co. v. CanalIndemnity Co.
also presents a dispute between two insurers that were engaged in the business
of insurance in Louisiana. 955 Again, the conflict involved whether one or both
insurers should pay to settle a third-party lawsuit. 956 Actually, the dispute

946. Id. (citation omitted).
947. Id. (citation omitted).
948. Id. (quoting Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co., 477 N.E.2d 441,444 (N.Y. 1985)).
949. Id. (quoting Servidone Constr., 477 N.E.2d at 444).
950. Id.
American Economy asserts that Judge Brown's dissent in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co. supports this reading of Servidone. American Economy highlights Judge
Brown's emphasis on the following language from Servidone: "the duty to defend is measured
against the allegationsof pleadings but the duty to pay is determined by the actual basis for
the insured's liability to a third person."
Id. (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865, 878 (5th Cir. 1990)).

951.
952.
953.
954.
955.
956.

Id.
Id. at496-97.
Id.
Id. at 497.
Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal Indem. Co., 352 F.3d 254,257 (5th Cir. Dec. 2003).
Id.
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involves the same substantive question that appears in Haspel, Genesis, and
American Indemnity: whether an insurer may obtain relief under Louisiana's
doctrine of equitable contribution.957
Furthermore, like the litigants in Haspel, the insurers in American
Internationalfought over whether an other insurance clause should determine
the outcome of the conflict.95 8 But more important, embracing the
methodology employed in Haspel to resolve a substantive question, the Fifth
Circuit decided to treat American Internationalas another Erie-guess case.959
For reasons appearing below, deciding to make yet another Erie guess rather
than certifying this case to the Supreme Court of Louisiana was an error of
judgment.
But first, a review of the pertinent and undisputed facts in the underlying
case would be helpful. Among its various business activities, Travis Fixed
Based Operation and Service Corporation (Travis) delivers petroleum
products and fuels throughout the Southwest. 9" In December 1998, one of
Travis's employees fell asleep while driving a Travis truck in Comal County,
9 62
Texas.9 6' The truck flipped over, spilling hundreds of gallons of diesel fuel.
The accident caused extensive pollution and generated huge clean-up costs
(Comal Claims).963
Six months later, while traveling through Bexar County, Texas, another
Travis employee accidentally discharged diesel fuel, causing environmental
pollution, property-injury claims, clean-up costs, and damages (Bexar
Claims). 9 4 When both accidents occurred, Canal Indemnity Company-the
primary carrier-and American International Specialty Lines Insurance
Company (AISLIC) insured Travis under a "Basic Automobile Liability"
contract and a "Supplemental Environmental Automobile Liability" policy,
respectively.965 Canal's primary policy had "a combined single limit of
$1,000,000," and the AISLIC supplemental policy had "a per occurrence and
aggregate limit of $2,000,000 for any claims presented during the policy
9
period." 66
Both the primary and supplemental liability-insurance contracts
contained clauses that allegedly reduced or eliminated the respective insurers'
liabilities if Travis was liable for third-party injuries, losses, or damages.967

957.
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.

Id.
Id.
See id.; see also supra note 485 and accompanying text (explaining the Erie-guess concept).
See Am. Int'l, 352 F.3d at 257 (discussing deliveries to Cornal and Bexar Counties in Texas).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257-58.

966.

Id. at 258.

967.

See id.
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969

Although the clauses had different titles -"pro-rata" and "escape"- each was
essentially an other-insurance provision.968
To illustrate the pro-rata coverage, Canal's other-insurance provision
stated:
Other Insurance: The insurance [in] this policy is primary insurance,
except when stated to apply in excess of or contingent upon the absence of
other insurance. When this insurance is primary and the insured has other
insurance which [applies] to the loss on an excess or contingent basis, the
amount of [Canal's] liability under the policy shall not be reduced by the
existence of such other insurance.
When both this insurance and other insurance apply on the same basis,
whether primary, excess, or contingent, the company shall not be liable under
this policy for a greater proportion of the loss than that stated in the
applicable contribution provision below.969
On the other hand, the escape clause in AISLIC's policy read: "Section
II-EXCLUSIONS: This insurance does not apply to any of the following:
...bodily injury, property damages, cleanup costs, or claims expenses
covered by any other valid and collectible insurance."97
Canal gave Travis $23,058.54, as a reimbursement for cleaning up the
diesel spill in Comal County.97 ' In February 1999, Canal demanded that
AISLIC contribute $11,529.95 to help remove the pollution.972 Unable to
determine whether the company had a duty to help pay for the cleanup cost,
an AISLIC adjuster sent a check to Canal for the entire amount of
$11,529.35. 973 Travis later submitted the Bexar Claim to both AISLIC and
Canal, just as it had done with the Comal Claim,
requesting that both insurers
9 74
pay for pollution-related clean up costs.
By this time, AISLIC had a change of heart regarding whether it had a
975
contractual duty to indemnify Travis even for the Comal payments.

968. See id. The following are three categories that other insurance clauses will generally fall into:
(1) pro-rata clauses, which apportion responsibility for coverage among the insurers, "usually either in
proportion to their respective policy limits or in equal shares up to the limits of each policy"; (2) excess
clauses, which provide excess coverage only after insurance proceeds have been exhausted under a primary
if the insured has other insurance
policy; and (3) escape clauses, which release the insurer from all liability
coverage. Id. at 258 n. I (citation omitted). Actually, under this latter category a policy's coverage is
contingent upon the insured's having no coverage under any other insurance contract. Id. (citation
omitted). Insurers generally design other insurance clauses to reduce an insured's temptation to over
insure property or inflict self injury when attempting to defraud insurance companies. Id. (quoting St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 78 F3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1996)).
969. Id. at 258.

970.

Id.

971.

Id.

972.

Id.

973.
974.

Id.
Id. at 259.

975.

Id. at 258-59.
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Therefore, after carefully reviewing the escape clause in its policy, a different
adjuster concluded that AISLIC had no duty to indemnify Travis for using
out-of-pocket dollars to clean up the Comal and Bexar County pollution
sites."' From the second adjuster's perspective, the escape clause in
AISLIC's policy released the insurer from all liability when another liabilityinsurance contract covered Travis's losses.977
Accordingly, AISLIC rejected the Bexar Claim.978 In November 2000,
AISLIC filed a declaratory-judgment action, in the United State District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking a ruling that it had no duty to
indemnify Travis for using out-of-pocket funds to remove the pollution from
Bexar County.979 Later, AISLIC amended its complaint, seeking a
reimbursement of the $11,529.35 it paid to Canal as contribution for cleaning
up the Comal County pollution site. 980 AISLIC argued that Canal was the
primary insurer and was totally responsible-up to its policy's limits-for
reimbursing Travis for removal of the pollution from both sites.98' AISLIC
expressly excluded all claims covered under
strongly argued its escape clause
982
policy.
insurance
another
Canal answered and asserted that according to Louisiana's law, other
insurance clauses in respective liability policies are mutually repugnant. 983
Consequently, courts must disregard such clauses and force insurers to pay a
pro-rata share when it becomes obvious that insurers are liable for the same
property loss under their respective polices. 9s ' Granting AISLIC's motion for
summary judgment, the district court concluded that (1) Canal had primary
responsibility for covering the loss in Bexar County and was not entitled to
contribution from AISLIC until Canal's policy limits were reached, and
(2) AISLIC did not waive its right to contest its good-faith contribution of
$11,529.35 to help clean up the Comal County pollution.985 After a bench
trial, the district court declared that AISLIC could not recoup the $11,529.35,
citing a Louisiana statute rather than Louisiana's common law. 986 Both
insurers appealed the district court's rulings. 987

976.

977.

Id. at 259.
Id. "[AISLIC's adjuster] also obtained a copy of the Canal policy and determined that its

pollution exclusion did not apply to sudden and accidental pollution occurrences [like] the Bexar County

loss." Id.
978.
979.
980.

Id.
See id.
Id.

981.

Id.

982.

Id.

983.

Id.

984.

Id.

985.

Id.

986.

Id.

987.

See id.
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Curiously, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first concluded that it had
to make an Erie-guess to decide these questions because "there is no
Louisiana Civil Code provision or statute specifically directed at the
prioritization of coverage responsibilities among co-insurers.""9 ' But after
spending an extraordinary amount of time combing and discussing various
Louisiana statutes, the appellate court correctly observed that Louisiana has
adopted a blanket, judge-made rule: Co-insurers' other insurance clauses are
"mutually repugnant and ... null," requiring each carrier to pay a pro-rata
share of a common insured's loss once the loss is reported and a claim is
filed.989

Therefore, applying Louisiana's general rule of contract construction"'
and the rule cited above, the Fifth Circuit adopted AISLIC's position that
Canal's policy provided primary coverage even though the latter policy
contained a pro-rata clause. 99' The court of appeals also declared that AISLIC
had no duty to pay pollution-related damages if Canal's contract covered
those expenses."9 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit ruled AISLIC did not waive
its right to challenge Canal's claim that AISLIC had a duty to help clean up
the Bexar County pollution, despite AISLIC's good-faith contribution to help
clean up the pollution in Comal County.993
Once more, declaring that it was "Erie-bound," the Fifth Circuit began
by reviewing the Louisiana Civil Code and Louisiana Supreme Court's
decisions to determine whether Canal had a duty to return the $11,529.35 to
AISLIC. 994 The court of appeals eventually concluded that Canal had to
return the money because "the Louisiana Supreme Court would agree with
[the Fifth Circuit's] interpretation of article 2299" of the Louisiana Civil
Code. 995 But the language in article 2299 is exceedingly clear and needs no
interpretation: "'A person who has received a payment or a thing not owed
' 99 6
to him is bound to restore it to the person from whom he received it.'
Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently decided Gootee
Construction, Inc. v. Amwest Surety Insurance Co., a case of first

988.
989.

Id. at 262.
Id. at 261-62.

990.

Id. at 262. "[Ijf 'the policy wording... is clear and unambiguously expresses the parties'

intent, the insurance contract must be enforced as written."' Id. (quoting Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
4

02-1637, p. (La. 6/27103), 848 So. 2d 577, 580). "'The rules of construction do not authorize a
perversion of the words or the exercise of inventive powers to create an ambiguity where none exists or
the making of a new contract when the terms express with sufficient clearness the parties' intent.' Id.
(quoting Cadwallader,02-1637 at p.3-4, 848 So. 2d at 580).

991.
992.

Id.
Id.

993. Id. at 271 ("[L]ike the district court, we reject the contention that AISLIC waived the right to
rely on its 'other insurance' clause to contest liability for the Bexar County loss by having paid the prior

Comal County claim.").
994. Id. at 272-73.
995. Id. at 273.
996. Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2299 (West 1997)).

972
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impression.997 In Gootee, the supreme court held that a party had a right to
recoup funds it paid to satisfy an adverse ruling if a subsequent ruling reverses
the original ruling. 998 To reach that conclusion, the Louisiana Supreme Court
cited and applied article 2299. 999 Without doubt, the Fifth Circuit's painting
its Erie-guess rulings in this case is quite bewildering. The Fifth Circuit even
admitted that the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling and the Louisiana Civil
Code clearly have addressed the questions appearing in this diversity
action 000 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's perceived need to conduct
inappropriate Erie guesses is somewhat problematic.
2. Injury to Property: Whether Under Louisiana'sLaw a
Commercial Liability InsurerMust Indemnify Its Insured After the
Insured Retained an Independent Attorney to Represent the Insured
in an Underlying Property-InjuryLawsuit
Trinity Universal InsuranceCo. v. Stevens ForestryService, Inc. is also
a duty-to-defend and duty-to-indemnify case that originated in Louisiana."'
This case presents an extremely important insurance-defense question, one
that occurs frequently among insurers and their insured.t O' But the Fifth
Circuit reported very few facts. 10 0 3 Even more critical, among the reported4
facts, the court of appeals cited a number of allegedly important dates.'0
However, the sequence of those dates is confusing at best and completely
erroneous at worst. °°5
More disquieting, the Fifth Circuit did not cite a single Louisiana case in
its analysis." 6 In fact, the appellate court only cited one case in the
analysis. ° °7 Yet, there is a large body of settled law that addresses the very
question presented in Trinity.10 8 As discussed and established below, the

997. Gootee Constr., Inc. v. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 856 So. 2d 1203 (La. 2003).
998. Id. at 1207.
999. Id. at 1205-06.
1000. Am. Int'l, 352 F.3d at 269.
We conclude that neither the Code articles governing contractual interpretation nor their
interpretation by the Louisiana Supreme Court leaves any room for the approach advocated by
Canal, which ignores the clear legal precept under Louisiana law .... Canal asks that we
disregard the policies' plain contractual language and effectively legislate mandatory pro rata
clauses from the bench for insurance contracts containing "other insurance" provisions. We
find ... that request [greatly exceeding] any conceivable bounds of our Erie-mandate,and
decline the invitation.
Id. (emphasis added).
1001. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Stevens Forestry Serv., Inc., 335 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. June 2003).
1002. See id. at 354-55.
1003. Id.
1004. Id.
1005. See id.
1006. Id. at 356. The court did distinguish two Louisiana appellate court decisions being relied upon
by Stevens, the defendant, as not on point in this proceeding. Id. at 356 n.3.
1007. Id. at 356.
1008. See infra note 1037 and accompanying text.
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Fifth Circuit's failure to carefully research and apply settled Louisiana
principles seriously clouds one's understanding of, and substantially decreases
one's esteem for, the appellate court's findings, analysis, and decision in
Trinity.
To repeat, the facts in Trinity are extremely sparse.' ° 9 The defendantconsulting firm, Stevens Forestry Service (Stevens), bases its operations in
Arkansas; but it has a registered agent in Louisiana."" Abe Mitchell is a
landowner in Louisiana."°1 Stevens managed Mitchell's timberland for a
number of years.""1 2 In March 1999, Mitchell's attorney wrote a letter to
Stevens, accusing the forestry-consulting firm of mismanaging Mitchell's
insured
timberland."1 3 At this time, Trinity Universal Insurance0 Company
14
Stevens under a commercial-liability insurance contract.
But immediately after receiving the letter from Mitchell's attorney,
Stevens hired attorney Michael Percy to help Stevens respond to the
accusations and prepare to meet with Mitchell.' 15 Evidently, the meeting
between Stevens and Mitchell soured.10 1 6 In September 1999, Mitchell
insisted on $1,120,634.70 in compensatory damages from Stevens. 1017 At that
point, Stevens notified Trinity, disclosed the conflict, and "tendered the claim
to Trinity, its liability insurer."" ' 1 The record does not disclose whether
Stevens asked Trinity to defend
the firm against Mitchell's accusations or to
01 9
pay the alleged damages.
On October 20, 1999, Trinity mailed a reservation-of-rights letter to
Stevens (1999 ROR Letter). 0 20 In the letter, the liability insurer agreed to hire
an insurance-defense lawyer and to start investigating Mitchell's complaint
against Stevens.10 2 1 On the other hand, Trinity expressly reserved its right
10 22
"[to] deny coverage and to deny a defense [under] the policy's provisions.
Most curiously, Trinity's 1999 ROR Letter stated: "We have noted that you
are represented by counsel in this matter. Because ...the policy provisions
[may limit or remove our duty to defend and/or indemnify], we encourage you

1009.
1010.
1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.
1016.
1017.
1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.

See Trinity Universal,335 F.3d at 354-55.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
id,
Id.
d.
Id.
Id.
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to continue to employ [attorney Michael Percy to help you with] this
3
claim.

102

On October 22, 1999, Mitchell filed a suit against Stevens in a Louisiana
state court, claiming that Stevens negligently mismanaged Mitchell's
timberland. 24 Very significantly, Mitchell commenced the underlying action
just two days after Trinity wrote the 1999 ROR Letter." 25 Later, the parties
removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District
of Louisiana.' 26 Among the scanty reported facts, the Fifth Circuit inserted
the following confusing sentence: "Within three weeks [ofOctober22, 1999],

on January 10, 2000, Trinity [sent a second reservation-of-rights letter to]
Stevens, informing Stevens that it had received a copy of the [u]nderlying
[a]ction."' 27
But there is a major-problem: The actual date-within three weeks of
October 22, 1999-would have been November 12, 1999. Assuming that the
Fifth Circuit intended to write "within three months of October 22, 1999," the
problem remains. The correct date would have been January22, 2000. So we
ask: When did Trinity write the second letter of reservation? As discussed
below, securing the precise date of the second letter is quite important. In
Trinity's second letter to Stevens, the insurer wrote:
Trinity will continue to investigate Mr. Mitchell's claims and will
continue to provide Stevens with an attorney, at Trinity's expense. However,
Trinity's continued investigation and defense is subject to the reservation of
Trinity's right to deny coverage for Mr. Mitchell's claim and to withdraw
from Stevens' defense....
* . . [Y]ou may wish to continue to retain an attorney at Stevens'
expense to protect the company's interest in this litigation.
.. . [Trinity] encourage[s] you to continue to employ counsel at
Stevens' expense with regardto this claim. Mr. Caldwell Roberts, who has

been appointed by Trinity to defend Stevens, will cooperate with your
personaldefense attorney and will continue to defend Stevens, but subject to

the reservations of right discussed herein and in [the 1999 ROR Letter ].1021
On January 28, 2000, Trinity filed a declaratory-judgment action in the
district court claiming that it had no duty to defend Stevens in the underlying
suit.l°29 Trinity also claimed that it had no contractual duty to indemnify
Stevens after Trinity encouraged the firm to spend out-of-pocket dollars to

1023.
1024.

Id.
Id.

1025.
1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.

Id.
Id. at 354 n.2.
Id. at 354-55 (emphasis added).
Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
Id.
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retain an independent attorney."" Stevens filed a counteraction, asking the

court to declare that Trinity had a duty to reimburse Stevens for spending
$105,000 to retain Michael Percy's legal services.' ° 3'
The district court failed to appreciate and apply a settled rule in
Louisiana: "The duty to indemnify and the duty to defend clearly are separate
and distinct duties."'' 32 Therefore, the district court declared that because
Trinity had no duty to defend Stevens in the underlying, property injury suit,
the insurer had no duty to indemnify Stevens034for expenditures associated with
1033 Stevens appealed. 1
that third-party suit.
At the outset, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly
identified the substantive question on appeal: "[Wihether Trinity ...must
reimburse Stevens" for spending $105,000 to retain an independent
attorney. 1""3 To be sure, that is a duty-to-indemnify rather than a duty-todefend question. Yet, the Fifth Circuit concluded: "Neither the Louisiana
legislature nor the Louisiana Supreme Court has spoken on this issue."1036
That is an incredible statement because it is untrue. Louisiana's cases are
replete with examples of courts' forcing various insurers to reimburse
insureds after the latter filed claims and employed independent counsel."137

1030. Id.
Id. ("Stevens then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking recovery ofPercy's attorneys'
1031.
fees and expenses, which totaled approximately $105,000.").
1032. Fed. Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d 1132, 1137 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
1033. See Trinity Universal, 335 F.3d at355.
The district court, assuming that Trinity had a duty to defend Stevens in the [u]nderlying
[a]ction, granted Trinity's [summary judgment] motion, holding that "even when the insurer
reserves the right todeny coverage, it is not obligated to pay for an attorney that the insured
unilaterally decides to hire as an extra defense counsel."
Id.
1034. Id.
1035. Id.
1036. Id. at 356.
1037. See Moody v. Arabie, 498 So. 2d 1081, 1085-86 (La. 1986) (concluding that if an insured
employee relieves an employer or workers' compensation insurer of probable future liability for
compensation, the employer or insurer should pay for this benefit by contributing additional recovery costs
proportionate to the present value of probable future compensation liability), modified, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23:1103 (West 1998); Thompson v. Gray & Co., 590 So. 2d 1318, 1321 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(embracing Moody and declaring that:
[A workers'] compensation carrier should pay a proportionateshare of the attorneys'fees...
where the worker's attorney effects recovery without filing suit .... [T]he compensation
carier, who is a co-owner with the employee of the right to recover damages from the
negligent third party, should not be unjustly enrichedat the expense of the employee when the
efforts of the latter's attorney resulted in benefits accruing to the compensation carrier,
especially where the carrierhas tacitly consented to the acts of the employee's attorney.)
(emphasis added); Wood v. StateFarm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 1266, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Moody and ordering the insurer to pay reasonable attorney's fees); see also Shaffer v. Stewart
Const. Co., 865 So. 2d 213, 215-16 (La. Ct. App. 2004) ("The trial court ruled in favorof ICE... finding
that ICE was an additional insured under Pacific's CGL policy, thus ... ordering Pacific to reimburse
ICE's defense costs.... [W]e find no error in the trial court's ruling requiring Pacific to reimburse ICE
for attorney's fees ...").
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Also, as stated earlier, it is truly remarkable and unsettling that the Fifth
Circuit did not cite a single Louisiana case-including duty-to-indemnify
decisions-to reach this highly questionable conclusion: "[W]e find that
Trinity is not required to reimburse Stevens for the fees or costs associated
with Stevens' hiring of additional counsel [since] Trinity ... provided Stevens
with competent defense counsel in the [u]nderlying [a]ction."'' 3 8 To reach
that conclusion, the Fifth Court, wittingly or unwittingly, overlooked some
important principles of law in Louisiana.
First, like the district court judge, the Fifth Circuit substantially polluted
its duty-to-indemnify analysis with an unwarranted discussion of a duty to
defend.'03 9 Trinity gladly defended Stevens after reviewing Mitchell's
pleadings, and that behavior comported precisely with the insurer's duty to
defend under the contract."° In addition, a jury heard the case, deliberated,
and entered a judgment in favor of Stevens, finding that Stevens did not owe
Mitchell $1.12 million dollars.'" 4 The debate is over who should pay the
independent counsel's fees for service rendered before and after Mitchell
filed his complaint. 11 2 This is the central question because the evidence is
undisputed: "Stevens retained an attorney, Michael Percy, to assist Stevens
in responding [to Mitchell] and preparing for a meeting with Mitchell." 1° 3
Without doubt, Trinity encouraged the client-attorney relationship
between its insured and the independent counsel. 44 Trinity continued to
encourage Stevens to retain the independent attorney from October 20, 1999
until Trinity sent the second reservation-of-rights letter (2000 ROR Letter),
just a few days before Trinity filed the declaratory-judgment action.15
Assuming January 22nd was the correct date of the 2000 ROR Letter, the
insurer nurtured that client-attorney relationship, at Stevens's expense, for
46
more than three months.'1
Arguably, the independent counsel's assistance significantly reduced the
amount that Trinity would have had to pay in attorney's fees to its appointed
insurance-defense attorney. Therefore, in light of Trinity's encouraging
Stevens to retain independent counsel, the Fifth Circuit should have decided

1038. Trinity Universal, 335 F.3d at 356.
1039. See id. at 355-56.
1040. See id.; Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So. 2d 833, 838 (La. 1987) (holding that a court must
determine an insurer's duty to defend its insured against a third-party suit by examining the allegations

in the third party's petition and comparing what appears there with the insurer's unambiguous obligation
under the insurance contract).
1041. Trinity Universal, 335 F.3d at 355.
1042. Id. at 354.

1043.

Id.

1044. Id. at 355 ("[Wle encourage you to continue to employ Iyour independent] counsel at
Stevens's expense ....
[We have appointed] Mr. Caldwell Roberts, who.., will cooperate with your
personal defense attorney and will continue to defend Stevens.").
1045. Id. at 354-55.
1046. See id.
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the duty-to-indemnify question in favor of Stevens. Arguably that would have
been the just outcome, for Louisiana's law is clear: When an insurer chooses
to rely on the efforts of its insured's independent counsel, the insurer must pay
attorney's fees for retained counsel's services."4 7
3. Injury to Property: Whether Under Mississippi'sLaw a
Commercial General Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Indemnify
an Insured ContractorWho PaidMoney to Correcta
Subcontractor'sDefective Repairs on a Third Party'sProperty
Under many liability-insurance contracts, the coverage clause states in
pertinent part: "This Company agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
1 48
of bodily injury or property damage . . . caused by an occurrence." 0
Generally the coverage section defines an "occurrence" as an "accident,"
which produces "bodily injury or property damage."' 49 But a definition
section, a proviso, or an exclusion clause states that the accident must be
"neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."1 50
Amazingly, for more than a half century, insurers have pitched and
otherwise-sophisticated businesses have purchased contracts that contain such
confusing and nearly indecipherable language.1051 But more astounding, both

1047. See Barreca v. Cobb, 668 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that "an insurer who
has notice of the insured's claim but fails to bring its own action or to intervene in plaintiff's action will
be assessed a proportionate share of the recovery costs incurred by the insured, including reasonable
attorney fees").
1048. See Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 889 (Me. 1981) (emphasis omitted).
1049. See, e.g., Dennis Cain Motor Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 275, 276

(Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
[The insurer] issued a policy of insurance providing "Garage Liability" coverage ... [that]
provided in part: "The company will pay on behalf of the INSURED all sums which the
INSURED shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... BODILY INJURY
or... PROPERTY DAMAGE... caused by an OCCURRENCE and arising out of GARAGE
OPERATIONS."
...Occurrence in the policy "means an accident ..
Id.

1050. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 494 N.E.2d 634,638 (111.App.
Ct. 1986). The definitions section stated: "'Occurrence' means an accident, including injurious exposure
to conditions, which results in bodily injury during the policy period neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured." Id.
1051. See generallyFarm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793,796 (4th Cir. 1949).
[The insured argued] that even though the insured deliberately drove his truck into the car, the
resulting injuries were "caused by accident" within the meaning of the policy. [The insured
also argued] that the test of what is an accident in such event should be determined not from
the standpoint of the insured but from the standpoint of the injured parties .... [Furthermore,
the insured maintained] that the term "accident" has been interpreted [this way when] the injury
was caused by the intentional act of some one other than the insured ....
It is obvious,
however, that this rule may not be applied to a policy like [the one in this] suit in which [the
insured's] intentional injuries ...are expressly excluded from the coverage.
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state and federal courts continue to spend an awful amount of time and
valuable judicial resources attempting to decipher the meanings of an
occurrence, an accident, and the phrase "neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured."'' l 2 Liability-insurance contracts, however,
rarely define or even attempt to define this latter phrase.
Arguably, courts' willingness to spend judicial resources this way is a
gross mismanagement of funds. But for sure, such judicial exercises are
puzzling, for the doctrine of ambiguity is still a useful tool to help courts
interpret insurance contracts generally and to resolve disagreements about the
meaning of archaic and poorly defined words and phrases, like the three
appearing above. The ambiguity doctrine simply states that courts must
words and phrases against
construe insurance contracts' allegedly 0ambiguous
53
the insurer and in favor of the insured.
More important, nearly every state has adopted the doctrine of
ambiguity,1054 including Mississippi. 055 Yet, cases and controversies about

Id.
1052. For example, on September 4, 2004, even a cursory search of WESTLAW'S database -MIN1285 cases. The author used the following query: "(EXPECT! INTEN!) IP
CS -produced
(STANDPOINT /6 ASSURED INSURED)."
1053. See Romero v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 595 So. 2d 402, 404 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(reaffirming that "any ambiguity will be construed against the insurer").
1054. See Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Magic City Trucking Serv., Inc., 547 So. 2d 849,855 (Ala. 1989)
(declaring that "ambiguities are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer, in
order to provide the maximum coverage for the insured"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 26
P.3d 1074, 1080 (Alaska 2001) ("We interpret ambiguities in insurance contracts in favorofthe insured.");
Samsel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 P.3d 281,284 (Ariz. 2002) (stating that to determine "whether... ambiguity
... should be construed against the insurer, the language should be examined from the viewpoint of one
not trained in law or the insurance business"); Smith v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 10 S.W.3d 846,
850 (Ark. 2000) ("It is... a cardinal rule of insurance law that a policy of insurance is to be construed
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer....") Ensign v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 306
P.2d 448, 450 (Cal. 1957) (concluding that ""in insurance law that any ambiguity or uncertainty in an
insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer"') (citation omitted); Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co.,
842 P.2d 236, 239 (Colo. 1992) (holding that ambiguity in the policy language must be "construed against
the insurer and in favor of coverage to the insured"); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 524 A.2d 641, 643
(Conn. 1987) (holding that "ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer" when the contract language
is unclear); Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992)
(declaring that to the extent an ambiguity exists, courts must employ the doctrine of contra proferentum
and construe policy language most strongly against the insurer who drafted it); Chase v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. 2001) (reaffirming that "ambiguities in an insurance policy are
construed against the insurer"); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cartmel, 100 So. 802, 803 (Fla. 1924) (holding
that ambiguities in insurance contracts "'must be liberally construed in favor of the insured"') (citation
omitted); Richards v. HanoverIns. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561,563 (Ga. 1983) (reiterating that "[any ambiguities
in the contract are strictly construed against the insurer as drafter of the document"); Sturla, Inc. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 684 P.2d 960, 964 (Haw. 1984) (restating that ambiguities in insurance contracts
are resolved against the insurer); Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 242,245 (Idaho 2003)
(reasserting that ambiguities in insurance contracts "must be construed most strongly against the insurer");
Healey v. Mut. Accident Ass'n, 25 N.E. 52, 53 (11. 1890) (holding that 'in all cases [ambiguities] must
be liberally construed in favor of the insured') (citation omitted); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d
945, 947 (Ind. 1996) (holding that "[w]here there is ambiguity, insurance policies are to be construed
strictly against the insurer" and the policy language is viewed from the standpoint of the insured); Gen. Cas.
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Co. v. Hines, 156 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1968) (holding that ambiguous terms in insurance contracts "will
be accorded [a] construction most favorable to the insured"); Nat'l Inspection & Repair, Inc. v. Valley
Forge Life Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 807, 817 (Kan. 2002) (declaring that "ambiguities must be decided in favor
of the insured') (citation omitted); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Powell-Walton-Milward, Inc., 870
S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky. 1994) (holding that all ambiguities in insurance policies must be construed against
the insurer); Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1134,11 38 (La. 2002) (repeating that "ambiguous
contractual provision[s are] construed against the insurer who furnished the contract's text and in favor of
the insured"); Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981) (declaring that any
ambiguity in an insurance contract is construed "strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the
insured"); Cody v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 439 N.E.2d 234, 237 (Mass. 1982) (holding that ambiguous
words in insurance contracts must be resolved against the insurance company that employed them and in
favor of the insured); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Enter. Leasing Co., 549 N.W.2d 345, 351 (Mich.
1996) (reaffirming that courts must construe ambiguities against the insurer); Columbia Heights Motors,
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 1979) (reiterating that ambiguities in insurance
contracts must be resolved against the insurer); Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 422 S.W.2d
617, 623 (Mo. 1968) (embracing that the ambiguity in an insurance contract should be resolved against the
insurer); Bauer Ranch, Inc. v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 695 P.2d 1307,1309 (Mont. 1985)
(reaffirming that contractual ambiguities are construed against the insurer); Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v.
Martinsen, 659 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Neb. 2003) (repeating that "an ambiguous insurance policy will be
construed in favor of the insured"); Rubin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 43 P.3d 1018, 1020 (Nev.
2002) (reaffirming that any ambiguity in an insurance contract "must be construed against the insurer and
in favor of coverage for the insured"); Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 423 A.2d 980,985 (N.H. 1980)
(adopting the proposition that "an ambiguous insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured and
against the insurer," but only where there is ambiguity in the contract); Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co.
of Winterthur, Switz., 170 A.2d 800, 803 (N.J. 1961) (concluding that "[i]f the controlling language will
support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to the insured, the interpretation
sustaining coverage must be applied"); Lopez v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 646 P.2d 1230, 1232 (N.M. 1982)
(reemphasizing that courts must construe ambiguous language in insurance contracts against the insurers);
Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that "ambiguities
in an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer"); Williams v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152
S.E.2d 102, 107 (N.C. 1967) (holding that uncertainty or ambiguous language in an insurance policy must
be resolved in the insured's favor); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671 (N.D. 1977)
(reasserting that ambiguous policies are construed most strongly against the insurers and in favor of
providing insurance coverage); Faruque v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 508 N.E.2d 949,952 (Ohio
1987) (reiterating that doubtful, uncertain, or ambiguous language in insurance contracts must be construed
strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 129 P.2d 71,
73 (Okla. 1942) (holding that ambiguous terms in an insurance contract must be resolved against the
insurer); N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 22 P.3d 739, 741 (Or. 2001) (restating that courts must resolve an
ambiguous term in an insurance contract "by construing the term against the drafter of the policy");
Bateman v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1991) (reiterating that courts must construe
ambiguous provisions in insurance contracts against the insurer and in favor of the insured); Sjogren v.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d 608, 612 (R.I. 1997) (reasserting that courts must construe
ambiguous language in insurance contracts against insurers and in favor of the insureds); Spinx Oil Co. v.
Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 427 S.E.2d 649, 651 (S.C. 1993) (reiterating that "[aimbiguous or conflicting
terms in an insurance contract should be construed in favor of the insured and strictly construed against the
insurer"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vostad, 520 N.W.2d 273, 275 (S.D. 1994) (reiterating that
courts must choose an interpretation most favorable to the insured if provisions in an insurance policy are
"fairly susceptible" to different interpretations); Palmer v. State Farm Mut, Auto. Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 788,
789 (Tenn. 1981) (reiterating thatcourts must resolve any ambiguity and doubt in favor of the insured when
interpreting insurance contracts); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555
(Tex. 1991) (reemphasizing that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be construed in favor
of the insured); Gressler v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 163 P.2d 324,330 (Utah 1945) (endorsing the principle that
ambiguous insurance policies should be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer); Noyes
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 215 A.2d 495,497 (Vt. 1965) (declaring that ambiguous
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the meaning of "expected or intended results" and about whether such results

eliminate an insurer's duty to defend, pay, or indemnify continue to flood

state and federal courts. 0 6 ACS Construction Co. of Mississippi v. CGU is
one of those cases.'05 7 And as explained more fully before, the Fifth Circuit's

Erie-boundanalysis raises more questions and generates more confusion than
it resolves.
ACS Construction Company is a general contractor whose principle
place of business is located in Mississippi.0 8 In May 1996, ACS and the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers entered into a contract.

59

ACS agreed to construct

munitions bunkers at Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina (Pope
Project). ' Later that year, ACS hired Chamberlin Co., Inc. - a subcontractor
to install waterproofing membranes on the roofs of the bunkers.' ° ' Shortly

thereafter, Chamberlin and Southern Commercial Waterproofing Co. of
Alabama merged.0 62 The new company, Chamberlin/Southern, accepted full
0 63
responsibility for the work performed under the subcontract.
After ChamberlinlSouthem installed the waterproofing membranes, the

roofs on some of the bunkers developed leaks. ' °

ACS asked Chamberlin/

Southern to correct the leaks.1065 The subcontractor refused. 066 Therefore, as
the Pope Project's general contractor, ACS had to spend their own funds to
repair the subcontractor's allegedly negligent installations. 1 67 ACS spent

language in insurance contracts will be strictly construed against the insurer); Vadheim v. Cont'l Ins. Co.,
734 P.2d 17, 20 (Wash. 1987) (declaring that ambiguous clauses must be construed in favor of the insured,
regardless of whether the insurer may have intended a different meaning); Thompson v. State Auto. Ins.
Co., I I S.E.2d 849, 850 (W. Va. 1940) (adopting "a cardinal rule of construction that clauses in insurance
contracts should be construed liberally [in favor of] the insured"); Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002
WI 98, 647 N.W.2d 223, 234 (reiterating that courts construe ambiguous terms in insurance contracts
against the insurer); T.M. ex rel. Cox v. Executive Risk Indem. Inc., 59 P.3d 721, 725 (Wyo. 2002)
(reemphasizing that courts must construe ambiguous terms in insurance contracts against the insurer).
Maryland is the only state that has not embraced the doctrine of ambiguity. See Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 1989) (declaring that "Maryland does not follow the [ambiguity] rule,
adopted in many jurisdictions, that an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the
insurer").
1055. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994) (reaffirming that
"[alny ambiguities in an insurance contract must be construed against the insurer and in favor of the
insured and a finding of coverage").
1056. ACS Constr. Co. v. CGU, 332 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. June 2003).
1057, Id.
1058. See id. at 887.
1059. Id.
1060. Id.
1061. Id.
1062. Id.
1063. Id.
1064. Id.
1065. Id.
1066. Id.
1067. Id.
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more than $190,000 to correct the problems. 1 68 At that time, General
Accident Insurance Company (CGU) insured ACS under a commercial
general liability (CGL) insurance contract. 6 9 The relevant portions of the
contract read as follows: "[CGU] will pay those sums that [ACS] becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . 'property damage' to
which this insurance applies ....
The insurance applies to . . . 'property
damage' only if... [the] 'property damage' [was] caused by an 'occurrence.
'"11070

The contract's definitions section defined an occurrence as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful
conditions.' 0 ' But, from its inception, the CGL contract provided no
coverage for any ""'property damage" expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured."" 72 Arguably, a fair reading of those definitions,
words, and phrases would lead a fairly intelligent, reasonable person to the
conclusion that CGU would gladly reimburse ACS's Pope-Project
expenditures if the general contractor establishes (1) that an accident caused
the leaks in the roofs - property damage -on the base and (2) that ACS did
10 73
not want, intend, or expect the leaks to occur.
But given that an occurrence and an accident are synonymous under the
CGL policy, several questions go unanswered. 74 For instance, what was the
cause-in-fact of the neither expected nor intended water leaks-the property
damages? Surely, the leaks were the results or consequences of something.
Thus, a reasonable person would want to know: Was an intentional act or an
act of God the cause-in-fact of those leaks, or was someone's negligence
-either action or inaction-the cause-in-fact of the property damages?"7 5
Certainly, a reasonable person would admit that CGU has no duty to
indemnify if some intentional conduct produced those leaks. After all, from
a reasonable layperson's perspective, the definition of an accident does not
turn on whether an unfavorable outcome stems from an "accidental means" or

1068.

Id.

1069.

Id.

1070.
1071.
1072.
1073.
1074.
1075.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at 888.
See id. at 891.
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is an "accidental result." 11 76 Instead, the layperson only 0knows
that accidents
1 77
and unintended or unexpected results are synonymous.
Now, let us return to the controversy in this case. When ACS asked its
liability insurer for a reimbursement of over $190,000, CGU denied the
claim."78 According to CGU, from the very inception of the contract there
was no coverage for ACS's claim.' 07 9 The insurer added that because "an
occurrence/accident," as defined in the policy, was not the cause-in-factof the
property damage on Pope Air Force Base. 0 0 Stated another way, the insurer
asserted that an accident did not occur on the base; therefore, an accident was
not the cause-in-factof the leaking roofs on the bunkers."08'
ACS filed suit in a Mississippi court; but CGU removed it to the District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, claiming diversity of
jurisdiction. 82 Subsequently, each party filed a motion for summary
judgment regarding whether the liability contract covered the Pope-Project
property damage." 83 The district court granted CGU's motion after the court
found no evidence of an accidentthat would allow ACS to recover under the
policy. 84 Since ACS did not establish coverage-the existence of a valid
accident-under the contract, the district court found
no need to address the
086
0 85
ACS appealed.1
cause-in-factof the accident.

1076. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934). The Court held that
death resulting from sunstroke was not death caused by external, violent, and accidental means. Id. at 497.
In his dissent, Justice Cardozo stated:
The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge this
branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog. "Probably it is true to say that in the strictest sense and
dealing with the region of physical nature there is no such thing as an accident." On the other
hand, the average man is convinced that there is, and so certainly is the man who takes out a
policy of accident insurance. It is his reading of the policy that is to be accepted as our guide,
with the help of the established rule that ambiguities and uncertainties are to be resolved
against the company.
Id. at 499 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Texas courts have waded through Justice Cardozo's Serbonian bog, and we are now convinced
that the terms "accidental death" and "death by accidental means," as those terms are used in
insurance policies, must be regarded as legally synonymous unless there is a definition in the
insurance contract itself which requires a different construction. These terms in an insurance
contract should be given their ordinary and popular meaning according to the understanding
of the average man; the court's guide should not be the technical meaning of the words used,
but rather the intention of the parties as inferred from the contract as a whole. A fine
distinction between means and results would never occur to an average policyholder....
Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1976) (emphasis added).
1077. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d at 577.
1078. ACS Constr., 332 F.3d at 887.
1079. Id.

1080.

Id.

1081.
1082.
1083.
1084.
1085.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

1086.

Id.
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Although the district court ruled on a very narrow question of fact, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit chose to frame the question
considerably more broadly. Undeniably, that was an exceedingly poor
decision because it unnecessarily generated more unanswered questions, an
excruciatingly unintelligible analysis, and a highly questionable conclusion.
For example, at the outset, the Fifth Circuit stated: "We must ...determine
whether, under [Mississippi's] law, an 'accident' refers to the unintended
an
consequences of installing the waterproofing membrane or 0 whether
7
'accident' refers to the underlying act of the installation itself." 1
Certainly, the first prong of that broad appellate question concerns and
requires an inquiry about "causation."'' 8 In particular, it requires one to
determine whether the poor installation of membranes was the cause-in-fact
of an accident.'08 9 But we must note that CGU never claimed that a faulty
installation was the cause-in-fact or even the "proximate cause" of an
accident.0"" Instead, the insurer argued that an accident was not the cause-infact of an unintendedconsequence (property damage evidenced by the leaking
roofs). 1091

To enhance the confusion, the Fifth Circuit succinctly stated that "[t]he
core of this dispute is . . .whether the installation of the waterproofing

membrane or whether the consequentialleaks constitute an 'occurrence' under

1087. Id. at 888 (emphasis added).
1088. See id.
1089. See id.; Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (Miss. 1987) (A "'plaintiff must introduce
evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct
of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough.')
(quoting W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984)).
1090. See ACS Constr., 332 F.3d at 887. Under Mississippi law, there are two theories of proximate
cause. The first one is often called "legal cause" and it requires a plaintiff to prove that an injuryintentional tort, negligence, breach of contract, or some other violation or breach under civil common law
or a statute- was "foreseeable" or was the "natural and probable" outcome of some violation. See, e.g.,
Delahoussaye v. Mary Mahoney's, Inc., 783 So.2d 666, 671 (Miss. 2001) (declaring that the proximate
cause of an injury is an act which produces an injury in a natural and continuous sequence without the
influence of an efficient intervening variable or event). On the other hand, under a property insurance
contract or contracts that cover property losses or property damages, proximate cause has a different
meaning. To recover from an insurer for a property loss, Mississippi law requires the insured to prove that
"a peril insured against" was the "proximate," "nearest," or "most immediate" cause of the loss, in either
time or space. A foreseeable consequence is not the focus of interest. See, e.g., Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Boamer, 254 So. 2d 765, 766 (Miss. 1971) (embracing the view that
[a plaintiff does not have to prove a] loss or injury sustained beyond a reasonable doubt; but
it is sufficient to warrant a recovery if he show by a fair preponderance of evidence that the loss
or injury was.., covered [under] the policy, [or] that it was.., a risk or cause insured against
....Evidence is not sufficient, however, which merely creates a suspicion or speculation as
to the cause of the loss or injury ....
(quoting 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1356 (1946)); Evana Plantation, Inc. v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 58 So. 2d 797,
798 (Miss. 1952) (reaffirming that "[t]he general rule [states] that, if the cause designated in the policy is
the dominant and efficient cause of the loss the right of the insurer to recover will not be defeated by the
fact that there were contributing causes").
1091.
ACS Constr., 332 F.3d at 887 ("CGU determined that.., no 'property damage' caused by an
'occurrence' took place and therefore, denied ACS's claim.") (emphasis added).
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the CGL insurance policy.""'92 It is important to note that the appellate court
0 93
did not include causation or fault as a part of this core dispute.
Nevertheless, to resolve the dispute the Fifth Circuit cited Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Moulton, insisting that "the Moulton test is dispositive of the dispute
over the interpretation of an 'occurrence' in the CGL policy."'0 94
In Moulton, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that 'the term
accident refers to [the insured's]action and not whatever unintendeddamages
flowed from that act.""

1 95
0

But the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:

"An accident is anything that happens or is the result of that which is
unanticipated and takes place without the insured's foresight or anticipation.
...

As used in insurancepolicies it is simply an undersigned, sudden, and

unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often
accompanied by a manifestation of force, but it does not mean the natural
and ordinary consequences of a negligent act."
With this focus on the expectability of the event or its consequences we
can avoid the need to consider [the insured's] subjective state of mind....
The only relevant consideration is whether•., the chainof events leading to
the injuries complained of was set in motion and followed a course
consciously devised and controlled by [the insured] without the unexpected
intervention of any third person or extrinsic force."9
Even the most conservative reading of that language reveals: Under
Mississippi's law, one cannot discuss or define an accident without discussing
causation. To help support this point of view, one needs only to review the
Fifth Circuit's reason for affirming the district court's ruling against ASC.
Applying Moulton, the court of appeals stated: "[Tihe faulty workmanship of
the waterproofing membrane resulting in the leaks does not constitute an
'occurrence' under the policy.... ACS intended to hire Chamberlin/Southem
to install the membrane but did not intend for the work to befaulty or result
in a leak."'10 97 Thus, we must ask: Which is the accident-the "faulty
workmanship" or the "resulting leaks"? Once more, the Fifth Circuit's
analysis or explanation is exceedingly unintelligible.
Regrettably, there is more confusion. In Southern FarmBureau Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Allard, the Mississippi Supreme Court suggested that "an
'accident' refers to the unintended consequences of the initial act."' 0 98 But
when ACS raised this point, the Fifth Circuit simply dismissed it as being

1092.
1093.
1094.
1095.
464 So. 2d
1096.
1097.
1098.
1992)).

Id. at 888.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 888-89 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moulton,
507, 510 (Miss. 1985)).
Moulton, 464 So. 2d at 509 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
ACS Constr., 332 F.3d at 889 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added) (citing S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allard, 611 So. 2d 966 (Miss.
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irrelevant.' 099 Later, however, the appellate court acknowledged that tension
did exist between Moulton and Allard, but the appellate court insisted that the
the conflict in United States Fidelity
Supreme Court of Mississippi resolved
00
& Guaranty Co. v. Omnibank. 1
Of course, that was an overstatement because the ruling in Omnibank
only exacerbated the confusion. In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court
held: "' [E]ven if an insured acts in a negligent manner, that action must still
be accidentaland unintended in order to implicate policy language.""'° So,
after Omnibank are negligent acts also occurrences under CGL policies in
Mississippi? It appears they are.
However, stressing that it was Erie-bound to apply the rulings in Moulton
and Omnibank, the Fifth Circuit held: "[If] a CGL [contract]... defines an
'occurrence' as an 'accident,' coverage is triggeredif the underlying act [is]
intentionaland deliberate. These cases also make clear that an 'occurrence'
defined as an 'accident' in a CGL insurance policy does not refer to the
unintendedconsequences of the act."" 2 Therefore, from the Fifth Circuit's
point of view, "the district court did not err when it applied Moulton and
Omnibank and concluded that ACS's intent to subcontractwith Chamberlin!
Southern and its intent to install the waterproofing membrane to the bunker
roofs did not constitute an 'occurrence' under its CGL insurance policy with
CGUCGU1103
....
,t10
The analysis and the conclusion are remarkably incomprehensible. On
the one hand, the court of appeals declares that underlying intentionaland
deliberate acts-occurrences or accidents- trigger coverage under CGU's
contract." l 4 On the other hand, intent to subcontract and intent to install
waterproofing membranes were not occurrences. 1""J Well, why not? More
significantly, the Fifth Circuit's holding does not even attempt to address the
central issue: whether ACS's decision to repair the leaking roofs-the
undisputedpropertydamage- required the insurer to reimburse ACS."106 The
CGL policy clearly stated: "[CGU would] pay those sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of

. .

. 'property

1099. Id. "We are not persuaded that Allard has changed the law." Id. The Fifth Circuit explained
that the Allard court relied on Coleman v. Sanford, which held that "'an act is intentional if the actor
desires to cause the consequences of his act, or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it."' Id. (quoting Coleman v. Sanford, 521 So. 2d 876, 878 (Miss. 1988)).
1100. Id. at 890 ("Notwithstanding the apparent conflict that Allardcreated when it was decided, the
Mississippi Supreme Court very recently reaffirmed its holding in Moulton and resolved the tension
between Allard and Moulton.") (citing United States Fid. & Guar.Co. v. Omnibank, 812 So. 2d 196 (Miss.
2002)).
1101. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
1102. Id. at 892 (emphasis added).
1103. Id. at 892-93 (emphasis added).
1104. Id. at 892.
1105. Id. at 892-93.
1106. See id.
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damage'... only if... [t]he... 'property damage'
... [was not] expected or
' 07
intended from the standpoint of the insured."
At this point, it would be beneficial to reiterate some earlier points. First,
courts should strive to preserve precious judicial resources and to issue
intelligible and fairly consistent rulings. To help achieve these ends, federal
and state courts, in general, and the Fifth Circuit, in particular, should simply
refuse to decide controversies surrounding the meaning and purported
significance of terms like expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured.
Actually, it would be useful for courts to consider and embrace what the
Texas Supreme Court so appropriately observed years ago regarding a
somewhat related matter:
A fine distinction between means and results would never occur to an
average policyholder ....
If [an] insurer wishes to distinguish between
accidental results and injuries caused by accidental means, [the insurer]
should do so expressly, so as to give the policyholder clear notice of any
limitations of liability which the insurer wishes to impose by use of the latter

term. 1108

Alternatively, if requiring insurers to insert more precise terms in their
contracts seems a bit too intrusive, the author suggests: In these types of
disputes, courts should routinely employ the doctrine of ambiguity to avoid
issuing disappointing and nearly indecipherable opinions. This approach
would save time and preserve very limited judicial resources.
4. Injury to Property: Whether Under Texas's Law a Commercial
General Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Pay Damages to a Judgment
CreditorAfter the CreditorSuccessfully Secured a Judgment
Against the Insuredfor Negligently Misrepresenting the Quality
of Certain Construction Materials
Valmont Energy Steel, Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. also
presents a disagreement over the meaning of an occurrence, property damage,
and other questionable phrases appearing in two general-liability insurance
contracts." 09 But unlike the nearly impossible to comprehend analysis in ACS
Construction, the Fifth Circuit's presentation in Valmont is lucid and rather
meticulous. Furthermore, the court of appeals based its holding on a careful
review and application of settled law in Texas.

1107.
1108.
1109.

Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549,557 (Tex. 1976) (emphasis added).
Valmont Energy Steel, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. Feb. 2004).
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More important, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Valmont is impressive,
partly because the appellate court employed the very methodology that the
author suggested in the immediately preceding section.'" 0 The court of
appeals cautiously and intelligibly applied the doctrine of ambiguity. In the
process, the learned justices arguably avoided spending valuable judicial
resources irrationally. But for sure, the Fifth Circuit did not sink, this time,
into a veritable "Serbonian bog," attempting unsuccessfully to give precise
meanings to virtually undecipherable, awkwardly constructed, and outmoded
words and phrases in insurance contracts."" 1 '
Consider the relevant facts in the underlying case. Valmont Corporation
is an extremely diverse company."' 2 Although its principal place of business3
is located in Nebraska, the corporation sells goods and services worldwide.'
Valmont Energy Steel, Inc. and Valmont Microflect, Inc. (collectively
Valmont) are consolidated subsidiaries and current divisions of Valmont
Corporation." 4 One division of the corporation- Valmont Structuresdesigns, manufactures, and erects various types of structures and microwave
towers for the telecommunications industry and others. " 5 Another division
-Valmont Tubing-sells a wide range of tubular steel products and services
to an assortment of consumers." '16

1110. See supra text following note 1108.
1111. See Mamsi Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995, 1001 n.2 (Md. 2003).
"Serbonian bog is derived judicially from Justice Cardozo's dissenting opinion" in Landress v. Phoenix
Mutual Life InsuranceCo., 291 U.S. 491,499 (1934) (Cardozo, J, dissenting). Id. "He explained therein
that, in an insurance case, attempting to distinguish 'between accidental results and accidental means will
plunge this branch of law into a Serbonian bog."' Id. (quoting Landress, 291 U.S. at 499 (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting)). "Although the reference is perhaps more obscure today than it was in Justice Cardozo's time,
the message is clear in context. It refers to a 'mess from which there is no way of extricating oneself"'
Id. (quoting E. COBHAM BREWER, DICIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE, 1121-22 (1898)) (emphasis added).
See also O'Toole v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1982). "In granting recovery under
the double indemnity clause of the insurance agreement, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the
postulate that if the means of triggering an injury is intended then the result cannot be accidental." Id.
"The error inherent in this semantical confusion was highlighted earlier by Justice Cardozo's inimitable
prose: 'The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge this branch
of the law into a Serbonian bog."' Id. at 914 n. 1 (citation omitted).
1112. See VALMONT, at http://www.valmont.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
1113. See VALMONT, HISTORY, at http:l/www.valmont.comlasplcompany/companyl lasp (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
1114. See VALMONT,DIvISIONS, athttp://www.valmont.com/asp/divisions/default.asp (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005).
1115. See VALMONT, STRUCTURES, at http://www.valmont.com/asp/structures/default.asp (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
1116. See VALMONTCAPABILITrEs&PRODUcrsathttp://www.valmont.conmasp/tubing/tubing8.asp
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
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Continental Manufacturing, Inc. manufacturers steel flanges and has
offices in Nacogdoches, Texas."'1 7 A variety of industries, including the
telecommunications industry, use welded, stainless steel tubes and pipes.' 1 8
To increase safety and efficiency, companies either make or purchase flanges
and other fittings to secure the stainless steel tubes and pipes."' 9 Valmont
needed flanges to complete the construction of microwave towers; therefore,
Valmont agreed to purchase the flanges from Continental (ValCon
20
Contract). 11
The terms of the ValCon Contract were specific: (1) Each steel flange
had to have a 50,000-pound yield and tensile strength, and (2) Continental had
to include a Material Test Report (MTR) with each shipment that would verify
the grade and quality of the steel Continental used to produce the flanges."'"
As an alternative to the second requirement, Continental could certify that' 22it
had the original MTR on file in their Nacogdoches, Texas's office.
Continental shipped the flanges to Valmont; the latter company used the
flanges to construct a microwave tower." 123 Continental also assured Valmont
an MTR was on file verifying that each steel flanges satisfied the strength and
2 4
quality specifications.'
Later, one of Valmont's customer-service representatives discovered
inconsistencies in Continental's verification papers and asked Continental to
send the MTRs."' 25 After reviewing the MTRs, Valmont contacted U.S. Steel
Corporation, the steel manufacturer listed in Continental's verification
documents. ' 126 U.S. Steel reported that someone had substantially altered the
MTRs; therefore, U.S. Steel could not certify that Continental used U.S.
Steel's products to make the flanges. 1127 In addition, U.S.28 Steel could not
verify the quality and strength of the steel in the flanges. 11
To arrest the uncertain and obtain sound measurements, Valmont hired
29
an independent company to test the tensile strength of the flanges.'1
Valmont gave the independent evaluator six flanges to test.' 13° To secure

1117. Valmont Energy Steel, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 770, 771 (5th Cir. Feb.
2004).
1118. See, e.g., Outokupmu Group, at http://www.outokumpu.compages/Page
5778.aspx (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
1119. See, e.g., id.
1120. Valmont Energy, 359 F.3d at 771.
1121.
Id.
1122. Id.
1123.
Id. at 772.
1124. Id. at771-72.
1125. Id. at 772.
1126. Id.
1127. Id.
1128. Id.
1129. Id.
1130. Id.
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accurate results, the tester had to destroy each flange." 3' Ultimately, the tests
revealed that the flanges did not conform to the specifications outlined in the
ValCon Contract." 131 Shortly thereafter, Valmont filed a breach-of-contract
diversity action against Continental
in the United States District Court for the
1 33
Eastern District of Texas.
The district court conducted a bench trial and found that Continental was
liable for making negligent misrepresentations to Valmont.' 1 34 The district
court awarded Valmont $118,519.47 in damages, which represented "the
difference between the purchase price of the flanges and the value received,
. As a bona-fide-judgment creditor, however,
plus pecuniary loss. '' 35
Valmont's victory was bittersweet. l 3 6 Shortly after the district court entered3
the final judgment in favor of Valmont, Continental filed for bankruptcy." 1
When Continental made the material misrepresentations, CU Lloyd's of
Texas (CLloyd's)-the primary carrier-and Commercial Union Insurance
Company (Commercial)-the excess carrier-insured Continental under3 a
general liability contract and under an umbrella policy, respectively." 1
Under both insurance contracts, the insurers agreed to "pay those sums that
the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ...
'property damage' to which the insurance applies."' 139 Also, the primary and
excess insurance contracts covered property damage only if an occurrence
caused the damage." 40 Additoinally, both defined an occurrence as "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions."' 141

1131. Id.
1132. Id.
1133. Id.
1134. Id. The district court found that (1)Continental communicated false information to Valmont
about the quality and strength of the steel in the flanges, (2) Continental failed to keep the original,
certified MTRs on file, (3) Continental failed to exercise reasonable care by not delivering the
certifications to Valmont, and (4) the tests precluded Valmont's using the flanges because the necessary
evaluations destroyed the flanges. Id.
1135. Id.
1136. See id. at 772-73. "A judgment creditor is one to whom a money judgment is payable, while
a judgment debtor is one obligated to pay a money judgment." Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard
Energy Co., 113 S.W.3d 400,413 n.12 (Tex. App. -Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (citing TEX. FIN. CODE ANN.
§§ 301.002(a)(5)-(6) (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
[A] bonafide judgment creditor, without any notice of the equities of other parties, may sell
the land levied on; and if his judgment is rendered in another county from that in which the
land is situated, the lien attaches by the levy of the execution, and ...a purchaser with notice,
at a sale under said execution, would acquire a good title.
Cavanaugh v. Peterson, 47 Tex. 197, 207 (Tex. 1877) (citation omitted).
1137. Valmont Energy, 359 F.3d at 772.
1138. Id. "The umbrella policy ... provided similar coverage on an excess basis." Id.
1139. Id. "The general policy defined 'property damage' either as '[p]hysical injury to tangible
property, including all resulting loss of use of that property,' or as '[Iloss of use of tangible property that
is not physically injured."' Id.
1140. Id.
1141. Id.
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Furthermore, Commercial and CLloyd's policies contained an identical
exclusion clause, stating that the respective contracts would not cover
damages to "'your product' arising out of it or any part of it."' 142 The
definitions section of the general policy defined "your product" as "[a]ny
goods or products.., manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed of
by" the insured. 43 The "your product" definition also expressly included the
insured's "[w]arranties or representations [that were] made at any time...
[respecting] the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of 'your
product........4
As mentioned earlier, Continental filed for bankruptcy, and its two
insurers refused to indemnify Continental and pay the $118,519.47 third-party
damages because the litigated underlying claims were beyond the scope of
coverage in the two insurance contracts. 45 Therefore, as a judgment creditor,
Valmont filed a diversity suit against CLloyd's and Commercial in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging that the
insurers had a duty to pay the awarded damages and satisfy the judgment in
the underlying suit." 46
The insurers moved for summary judgment, citing three grounds to
justify a favorable ruling.1 47 First, CLloyd's and Commercial argued that
Continental's negligent misrepresentation was neither the cause-in-fact nor
the proximate cause of any property damage."1 48 They stressed that the district
court awarded only economic damages-rather than property damages-to
Valmont in the underlying suit." 49 Second, the insurers insisted that the
negligent misrepresentation was not an occurrence under the liability
insurance contracts."" And finally, the carriers asserted that the "your
product" exclusion clauses barred Valmont's recovering any damages under
the contracts." 5'
The district court refused to grant summary relief in light of the following
three findings: (1) Valmont's inability to use the flanges was property
damage; (2) Continental's negligent misrepresentation was an occurrence; and
(3) the "your product" exclusion did not bar coverage because that clause
conflicted with two other provisions in the policies. 15 2 Specifically, the
language in the exclusion clause conflicted with the definition of "products-

1142. Id. "The umbrella policy also contained an identical 'your product' exclusion and [a similar
definition ofl 'your product."' Id.
1143. Id. (alteration in original).
1144. Id.
1145. Id, at 772-73.
1146. Id. at 773.
1147. Id.
1148. Id.
1149. Id.
1150. ld.
1151. Id.
1152. ld.
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completed operations hazard" and with the "Products-Completed Operations
53
In light of
Aggregate Limit" clauses, which arguably provided coverage."
these latter conflicts, the district court applied the doctrine of ambiguity and
favor of Valmont."' CLloyd's and Commercial timely
decided in
1 15 5
appealed.
Although the district court gave three reasons for ruling against the
insurers, the Fifth Circuit quickly and correctly determined that the dispute
involved only one question: whether the district court improperly declared
that the "your product" exclusion clauses in the respective insurance policies
were ambiguous and, therefore, unenforceable." 56 To repeat, both insurers
insisted that the unambiguous "your product" exclusion provisions barred
Valmont's receiving any compensation for the defective flanges, which were
allegedly property damage under the contracts." 7
The parties agreed that the court should apply Texas's law to decide the
outcome of this controversy." 5 8 And those principles are very clear regarding
the interpretation of insurance contracts. 1 5 9 First, under Texas's law, courts
must evaluate an insurance contract as a whole, giving each part of the
contract "effect and meaning.""' 60 Second, "[t]he terms of an insurance policy
are unambiguous as a matter of law if [a court can give disputed words and
phrases a] definite or certain legal meaning."" 6 And, if a court finds no
ambiguity in the policy, the court must enforce the insurance contract
according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language." 62
On the other hand, ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be
construed in favor of the insured." 63 But a disagreement between an insurer
and its insured over the meaning of language in a coverage clause "'does not
create an ambiguity' necessarily, and courts must not consider "'extrinsic
evidence.., for the purpose of creating an ambiguity."" 64 Furthermore, if

Id.
1153.
1154. Id. "Valmont [also] moved for summary judgment .... The district court relied on its
findings from its order denying [CLloyd's and Commercial's] motion for summary judgment and granted

Valmont's motion for summary judgment .. " Id.
1155. Id.
1156. Id.at 774.
1157. Id. Commercial and CLloyd's argued that "the district court's refusal to enforce the 'your
product' exclusion tclause was] legal error." Id. They also claimed that any physical damage to the
flanges and Continental's misrepresentations, which made the flanges unusable, constituted property
damages to and arising out of Continental's product. Id.
1158. Id. at 773.
1159. Seeid.

1160.

Id. (citing Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 695,700 (5th Cir.

1996)); Forbau v.Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994).
1161.
Valmont Energy, 359 F.3d at 773 (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907
SW.2d 517, 520 (Tex.1995)).
1162. Id. (citing Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984)).
1163. Id, at 774; see also Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (rex.

1991) (reemphasizing that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the
insured). An insurance contract is ambiguous if language in a policy or contract generates 'two or more
reasonable interpretations."' Valmont Energy,359 F.3d at 774 (quoting CBIIndus., 907 S.W.2d at 520)).
1164. Valmont Energy, 359 F.3d at 773-74 (quoting Sharp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 115
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a court finds ambiguity in an insurance policy's exclusion clause, Texas's law
requires the court to construe the ambiguous language strictly against the
insurer." 65
To reach its conclusion, the district court compared the language in the
your-product-exclusion clause with that appearing in the policies' definitions
sections and in two other provisions. 1 66 In particular, both insurance
contracts defined "products-completed operations hazard" as "all . . .
'propertydamage' occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising
out of 'your product' ... except... [p]roducts that are still in your physical
possession."11 67 Under both policies, however, another provision-a "Limits
of Insurance" clause -qualified the amount the insurers were willing to pay
for property damage under the products-completed operations hazard
clause."168 From the district court's perspective, those sections created too
much ambiguity because they were too difficult to harmonize." 69
But the Fifth Circuit disagreed."70 Put simply, the court of appeals found
that the district court had misconstrued the significance of the language
appearing in the insurance contracts' respective definitions sections." 7
Consequently, comparing those alleged "coverage" clauses with the respective
contracts' exclusion provisions, the district court found ambiguity where there
72
was none.11

F.3d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir. 1997)).
1165. Id. at 774. The Fifth Circuit cited Balandranv. Safeco InsuranceCo. ofAmerica, 972 S.W.2d
738, 741 (Tex. 1998), which emphasized that courts should adopt the insured's interpretation of disputed
language in a policy as long as it is reasonable, even if the insurer presents a more reasonable
interpretation. Id.
1166. Id.
1167. Id. at 774-75 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
1168. Id.at 775. In the general policy, the Limits of Insurance section stated as follows:
2.
The General Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay for the sum of:
b.

3.

Damages under Coverage A, except damages because of... "property damage"
included in the "products-completed operations hazard";

The Products-Completed Operations Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay under
Coverage A for damages because of... "property damage" included in the "productscompleted operations hazard."
Id. (alterations in original). "The umbrella policy contained similar provisions laying out that policy's
'General Aggregate Limit' and 'Products-Completed Operations Aggregate Limit,' also located in its
'Section Ill-Limits of Insurance."' Id.
1169. Id. "[Tjhe district court refused to apply the 'your product' exclusion because [the court]
determined that other provisions in the policies -the provisions relating to 'products-completed operations
hazard'- appeared to grant coverage and thus rendered the 'your product' exclusion ambiguous." Id. at
774.
1170. Id.at775.
1171. Id. at 775-76.
1172. Id. at 776 ("Therefore, because the 'Products-Completed Operations Aggregate Limit'
provision did not separately grant 'products-completed operations hazard' coverage, there is no discord
with the 'your product' exclusion. The three clauses can easily be read together without conflict.").
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Applying Texas's plain-meaning rule,1173 the Fifth Circuit appropriately
held that the district court erred when it declared that CLloyd's and
Commercial had a duty to pay Continental's judgment creditor, Valmont,
$118,519.47 in damages." 7 4 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's summary-judgment award in favor of Valmont and rendered a
judgment in favor of the primary and excess insurers instead." 75
C. Third-Party Liability Claims: Injury to Businesses and Professions
Collectively, the conflicts in the remaining three cases concern whether
liability insurers have a duty to defend or indemnify business associations,
officers and directors, and professionals. 176 Certainly, the issues in the
underlying lawsuits are easy to comprehend as they primarily concern breachof-contract and securities-fraud claims. Determining the Fifth Circuit's
methodology for reaching its conclusion in at least one of these cases,
however, is a bit problematic.
Put simply, the court of appeals correctly identified the relevant and
settled duty-to-defend and duty-to-indemnify principles in Mississippi and
Texas to resolve these remaining disputes. Moreover, even the conclusions
in the majority of these latter cases are arguably correct. But the manner in
which the Fifth Circuit applied settled Mississippi's and Texas's law to
resolve this category of cases was less than ideal.
1. Injury to Business: Whether Under Texas's Law a Business
Liability InsurerHas a Duty to Indemnify an Insured Business
that PaidMonies to Defend Itself in an Underlying Third-Party,
Trademark-InfringementLawsuit
To support the assertion that the Fifth Circuit's analysis was less than
stellar, consider the underlying facts and the court's conclusion in Sport
Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co.177 MacMark Corporation is a
Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Chicago,
Illinois."" MacMark owns and licenses the well-known trademark,

1173. Id. ("[O]ur duty is to enforce the policy according to its plain meaning."); see also Transp. Ins.
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 337 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex, 1960) (reiterating that courts must give words
appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when there is no ambiguity).
1174. Valmont Energy, 359 F.3d at 776 ("Because we find that the 'your product' exclusion is
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and can be given definite meaning within each policy as
a whole, such exclusion is unambiguous as a matter of law.").
1175. Id.at777.
1176. See discussion infra Part V.C.1-3.
1177. Sport Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. July 2003).
1178. TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS & REGISTRATIONS RETRIEVAL, at http:/ltarr.uspto.gov/servletltarr

?regser=serial&entry=71634945 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
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"Macgregor."" 79 On the other hand, Sport Supply Group, Inc. is a Texasbased corporation, and its principal place of business is located in Dallas,
Texas." 8" Sport Supply is "the nation's largest institutional direct marketer
of sports equipment and supplies." I'" It markets and sells institutional-quality
products through targeted catalogs with the assistance of an outside-sales
82

force." 1

MacMark formed a licensing agreement with Sport Supply, which
allowed Sport Supply to attach the Macgregor trademark to certain sporting
goods." 3 Sometime thereafter, MacMark accused Sport Supply of breaching
the licensing agreement,'"' MacMark believed Sport Supply was trying to
sell products over the Internet that bore the Macgregor trademark." 1 5 To stop
the illegitimate use of its trademark, MacMark sent a letter to Sport
that MacMark was preparing to terminate the
Supply." 6 The letter8 stated
7
1
agreement."
licensing
Sport Supply responded to the unexpected announcement by
conmencing a declaratory-judgment action in a Texas state court." 8 8 Sport
Supply asked the Texas court to declare that Sport Supply did not breach the
licensing contract. "89 In response, MacMark filed a cause of action for breach
of contract, "alleg[ing] in relevant part that Sport Supply ... breached the

licensing agreement by advertising, offering to sell, and selling products with
the Macgregor trademark [over] the Internet.""'

1179. Id.
1180. SPORT SUPPLY GROUPINC., FINANCIAL INFORMATION, at http:/Iwww.sportsupplygroup.com/
gym/New%20Pages/financel.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
1181. SPORT SUPPLY GROUP INC., CORPORATE INFO, at http://www.sportsupplygroup.comngym
index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
1182. Id.
1183. Sport Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. July 2003).
1184. Id.
1185. Id.
1186. Id.
1187. Id.

1188.

Id.

1189. Id.
1190. Id.
According to MacMark, Sport Supply's Internet sales violated the agreement "in numerous
ways." First of all, the licensing agreement did not give Sport Supply the authority to use the
Macgregor trademark on the Internet. Second, the agreement permitted Sport Supply to
advertise and sell Macgregor products only in the United States, Canada, and Mexico (and
Internet sales are necessarily worldwide). Third, the licensing agreement permitted Sport

Supply to sell products with the Macgregor label only to institutional customers and, by
advertising and selling Macgregor products on the Internet, Sport Supply was offering those
products to non-institutional customers.
Id. at 456 n.l.
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When the alleged breach of contract occurred, Columbia Casualty
Company (Columbia) insured Sport Supply under a liability-insurance
policy. 9 1 The policy covered an "' [a]dvertising injury' caused by an offense
' 92
committed in the course of advertising... goods, products, or services[.]" 1
Among other definitions, the liability contract defined an "advertising injury"
as an injury "arising out of' a "[mlisappropriation of advertising ideas or style
of doing business. ' 1 93 However, the insurance contract explicitly excluded
from coverage any "' [a]dvertising injury' arising out of [a] . .. [b]reach of
contract, other than misappropriation of advertising ideas under an implied
contract.""119 4
More relevant, during the period when the liability-insurance contract
was in effect, Sport Supply hired RSKCo Claims Service, Inc. (RSKCo)." 95
RSKCo is a "loss adjusting" company." 96 Stated briefly, Sport Supply
employed RSKCo to help file insurance claims with Columbia.1197 Among its
other responsibilities, RSKCo had a contractual duty to notify the insurer
about newly filed suits and about the status of pending lawsuits against Sport
Supply." 98 For unexplained reasons, RSKCo did not give Columbia timely
notice about MacMark's breach-of-contract action against Sport Supply. 199
Ultimately, Sport Supply and MacMark settled the trademark-use
dispute. 2 0 Under the settlement agreement, MacMark did not force Sport
Supply to pay any damages.12" Sport Supply alleged, however, that it had
spent a considerable amount of money defending itself against MacMark's
breach-of-contract counterclaim. 20 2 As a result, Sport Supply contacted
the insurer pay a part of the defense costs. 1213
Columbia and demanded that
2 4
claim.1
the
denied
Columbia

1191.

See id. at 456.

1192.

Id. at 457 (alterations in original).

1193. Id.
1194. Id. at 458 (alterations in original).
1195. Id. at 455.
1196. Id.; see also, e.g., Am. Union Ins. Co. v. Stull Bros. Co., 7 A.2d 866, 867 (N.J. Ch. 1939). The
court explained that
[t]he bill does not charge that [the expert] has any pecuniary interest or concern whatever in
the award, or that he has manifested bias. If the widest inferences are allowed, the bill charges

that he is engaged in a business, namely, loss adjuster, which brings him into frequent conflict
with insurance companies and in which as an intermediary he seeks to obtain for his employers

the full amount of their losses, or ... in which he seeks to obtain more than the companies
[want to pay].

Id.
1197.
1198.

Sport Supply, 335 F.3d at 465.
See id.

1199.
1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.

Id.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In response, Sport Supply filed a lawsuit against Columbia in a Texas
state court, seeking to recoup the expenditures that the company used to retain
independent legal representation in the underlying lawsuit.""0 5 At that time,
Sport Supply also brought numerous state law claims against RSKCo.2 0 6
Later, the Texas court removed the lawsuits to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas. 2t °7 The district court had diversity
jurisdiction over the disputes. 2 " The district court granted Columbia and
RSKCo's motions for summary judgment.20 9 Sport Supply appealed the
adverse rulings.""
From the very outset, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seriously
mischaracterized the essence of the appellate question. The appellate court
stated: "[T]his case involves the 'duty to defend."""' Then, the court of
appeals concluded that it had to apply Texas's "eight corners rule"'2 1 to
determine whether Columbia indeed had a contractual duty to defend Sport
Supply. 2 3 As the Fifth Circuit has observed on many occasions, the duty to
defend and the duty to indemnify in Texas are distinct and separate duties. 2 4
Furthermore, an insurer's duty to defend is substantially broader than the
insurer's duty to indemnify. 25

1205. Id.
1206. Id.
1207. Id.
1208. Id.
1209. Id.
1210. Id.
1211.
Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
1212. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast MotorLines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141
(Tex. 1997).
If a petition does not allege facts within the scope of coverage, an insurer is not legally required
to defend a suit against its insured. An insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations
in the pleadings and the language of the insurance policy. This is sometimes referred to as the
"eight corners" rule.
When applying the eight comers rule, we give the allegations in the petition a liberal
interpretation.
Id. (citations omitted).
1213. Sport Supply, 335 F,3d at 457 & n.2. "Thus, in determining whether Columbia must reimburse
Sport Supply for its defense costs, we consider the factual allegations in MacMark's counterclaim and the
terms of the policy issued by Columbia." Id. at 457. "Because a court can examine only the four comers
of the complaint and the four corners of the insurance policy, this approach is often described as 'the eight
corners rule."' Id. at 457 n.2 (citations omitted).
1214. See, e.g.,Northfieldlns. Co. v. Loving HomeCare, Inc.,363 F.3d523,527-28(5thCir. Mar.
2004); Quorum Health Res., L.L.C. v. Maverick County Hosp. Dist., 308 F.3d 451,468 (5th Cir. 2002);
King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002).
1215. See, e.g., Quorum Health, 308 F.3d at 468 (citations omitted) (applying Texas law and
reaffirming that "[t]he duty to indemnify arises from the actual facts that are developed to establish liability
in the underlying suit. An insurer may have a duty to defend but, eventually, not to indemnify."); Am. Nat'l
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 274 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) ("The duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify; if the insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured, then the insurer also
does not have a duty to indemnify."); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify), St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Tex. Dep't
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Based on the reported facts in Sport Supply, the proper question on
review was whether Columbia had a duty to indemnify its insured. We should
remember that Sport Supply sued RSKCo under two theories of recovery - for
breaching a contractual duty "to notify Columbia about MacMark's
counterclaim" and for negligently "failing to report the . . . counterclaim to
Columbia in a timely manner."'2 6 Apparently, those material facts did not
impress the Fifth Circuit. 1217 More likely, the court of appeals simply
overlooked them.
But it is more difficult to explain how the appellate court could
inadvertently overlook two additional important facts: (1)Columbia never
received a duty-to-defend request or a notice-of-loss claim from Sport Supply
until after the insured secured independent legal counsel, which explains the
company's decision to sue its risk adjuster; and (2) Sport Supply settled the
underlying third-party suit without the insurer's consent and participation,
which surely violates Texas's law and arguably prevents the insured from
later complaining about Columbia's failure to either defend or indemnify.1 2 18
Perhaps the best evidence that Sport Supply presented a duty-toindemnify, instead of a duty-to-defend question, controversy comes from the
Fifth Circuit itself. The appellate court tells us: "Sport Supply filed [this] suit
against Columbia, alleging that the insurer [failed] to reimburse Sport Supply
for part of the cost of defending [MacMark's counterclaim].""t 2 9 Still, the
Fifth Circuit insisted that "[i]n order to complete the analysis required in duty
to defend cases, we examine whether this exception to the breach-of-contract
exclusion could apply in this case."t2 °

of Transp., 999 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied) (citations omitted) (concluding
that an insurance company's "duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify").

1216.

Sport Supply, 335 F.3d at 465-66.

1217. Id. Conceivably, the Fifth Circuit overlooked the relevance of these two bits of information
and mischaracterized the substantive question for appellate review because the court of appeals affirmed
the district court's summary judgment ruling in favor of RSKCo. The trial court ruled that Sport Supply
failed to present sufficient primafacie evidence to support a breach of contract or a negligence action
against RSKCo, the loss adjuster. See id.
1218. See id. at 456,465; G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544,547 (Tex.
Comm'n App.1929, holding approved). The court concluded that although the insurer had a duty to
defend its insured:

[T]he indemnity company had the right to take complete and exclusive control of the suit
against the assured, and the assured was absolutelyprohibitedfrom making any settlement,
except at his own expense, or tointerferein any negotiationsfor settlement or legalproceeding
without the consent of the company; the company reserved the right to settle any such claim
or suit brought against the assured.
Id. (emphasis added).
1219. Sport Supply, 335 F.3d at 455 (emphasis added).
1220. Id. at 459.
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As stated earlier, under the terms of the exclusion clause, Columbia had
no third-party responsibilities if Sport Supply breached a contract and an
advertising injury arose out of that breach. 2 But, there was an exception to
the exception: Columbia would be liable if Sport Supply misappropriated
advertising ideas under an implied contract. 222 After carefully researching
federal and Texas's law, 223 the Fifth Circuit issued the following findings and
conclusion:
Sport Supply's alleged infringement of the Macgregor trademark does not
constitute the "misappropriation of [an] advertising [idea]." As a result, the
exception to the [exception]... does not apply. In other words, the breach
of contract exclusion does apply in this case. Therefore, Sport Supply is not
entitled to reimbursement for any of its defense costs. The district court
properly granted Columbia's motion for summary judgment.'224
On the basis of the reported facts and in light of the language in the
exclusion clause, one might readily conclude that the Fifth Circuit reached the
correct decision in Sport Supply by ruling in favor of the insurance company.
Regardless of whether the appellate question involved Columbia's duty to
defend or duty to indemnify, it is likely the court made the proper decision.
But there are several troublesome sentences in one of the footnotes, and the
Fifth Circuit's response to what appears there only exacerbates the author's
concern.
The Fifth Circuit stated:
Sport Supply contends that we need not reach the merits of this case.
According to Sport Supply, we can reverse the district court's judgment in
favor of Columbia based on the insurancecompany's failure to offer valid
summary judgment evidence. Sport Supply argues that the insurancepolicy

1221. Id.at458.
1222. Id.
1223. Id-at 464-65.
Under Texas law, it appears that the term "advertising" in an insurance policy is used in a
conventional sense: to refer to a public announcement (such as on a billboard, in a newspaper,
on a signpost, or in a television or radio commercial) that "induce[s] the public to patronize"
a particular establishment or to buy a particularproduct. In other words, the term "advertising"
refers to a common device for soliciting business .... Texas law does not appear to view a
trademark as a marketing device. Texas law has adopted the more conventional understanding
of a trademark as a label that serves primarily to identify and distinguishproducts. Thus, under
Texas law, the Macgregor trademark would not appear to be "advertising." It follows that the
idea for the Macgregor trademark is not an "advertising idea," and that the infringement of the
Macgregor trademark [is not a] "misappropriation of [an] advertising idea[ I."
Id. (alterations in original except [is not a]) (citations omitted).
1224. Id. at 465 (alteration in original).
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that Columbia presented to the district court constituted invalid evidence
a complete copy of the policy. Sport
because Columbia did not provide
22
Supply's argument lacks merit.1 1

From the author's perspective, the court of appeals's response is flaccid
at best and unconvincing at worst. A careful search of the case reveals that
the Fifth Circuit never described the insurance contract between Sport Supply
and Columbia in its opinion."" We do not know whether the agreement was
a comprehensive general liability (CGL), a general liability, a commercial
property, or a commercial professional liability (CPL) contract. 227 In fact, we
do not know whether the Columbia policy was even a liability contract.,2 8 It
could have been an indemnity contract. 229 We only know that the agreement
policy," and the courts of appeals reported that fact twenty
was an "insurance
230
times.
Most definitely, Sport Supply's concern about Columbia's insufficient
summary-judgment evidence was legitimate. 231 If the Columbia contract was
a "true" liability-insurance contract, one would have found either a right-to12
settle or a duty-to-settle clause, along with a duty-to-defend provision.

11

However, those provisions are not present in a true indemnity insurance
contract. Instead, under the latter policy the insurer only agrees to indemnify
-to reimburse the insured after the insured spends funds to secure
independent legal counsel or to settle a third-party lawsuit without the

1225. Id. at 457 n.3 (emphasis added).
1226. See id. at 457.
1227. See id.
1228. See id.
1229. Seeid.
1230. See id. at 455-65.
1231. See id. at 456-58.
1232. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance ContractsandJudicialDiscord Over Whether Liability Insurers
Must Defend Insureds'Allegedly Intentionaland Immoral Conduct: A Historicaland EmpiricalReview
of Federaland State Courts' DeclaratoryJudgments-1900-1997,47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1145-1146
(1998).
In most instances, insurance consumers purchase third-party insurance to help pay third-party
victims' claims in the event of a loss of property, bodily injuries, or death .... More
significantly, third-party insurance falls into two very broad categories- liability contracts and
indemnity contracts.
Liability contracts have several common features: (1) a coverage clause that outlines the
types of risks the insurer is willing to assume; (2) a broad exclusion provision that highlights
various types of risks or behaviors that the insurance company is unwilling to assume; (3) a
narrower "intentional acts" provision stating that injuries or acts "expected or intended" from
the insured's perspective are excluded; (4) a right-to-settle clause that gives the insurer the
exclusive right to settle all third-party claims filed against the insured; (5) a duty-to-defend
provision that compels the company to hire legal counsel for the insured and pay defense costs;
and (6) a duty-to-pay clause that outlines the conditions under which the insurer will pay once
liability has been established.
Id. (citations omitted).
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insurer's input or consent, or both.1 3 Put simply, there are major12 34legal
differences between true liability and indemnity insurance contracts.
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Sport Supply certainly would
have been more enlightening if the court had given the industry-wide name for
the Columbia contract and had described other relevant provisions in the
contract. But more important, the analysis would have been more convincing
if the court would have discussed whether the Columbia contract was an
indemnity or a liability contract-one with a duty-to-defend clause.
Arguably, assuming that the Columbia contract was an indemnity
agreement, Sport Supply might have prevailed even though the contract
contained a breach-of-contract exclusion. Again, the reported facts revealed
that MacMark and Sport Supply settled their disagreement. 2 35 There was no
finding, by a trier of fact, that Sport Supply actually breached the MacMark
contract. 236 There was only an allegation.2 37 Very likely, under the terms of
an indemnity contract, that allegation of a breach of contract would have had
no relevance. To repeat, in Texas the complaint allegation rule or the eight
comers rule does not apply to duty-to-indemnify cases. 2 38 Certainly, Texas's
1233. Id. at 1146-47.
A major purpose of liability insurance is to help shield the insured from having to pay damages
to a third-party victim. In addition, "[ulnder a liability policy ...the insurer's obligation to
pay arises as soon as the insured incurs liability for [a] loss .. " Under an indemnity contract,
however, the insurer is only required to make whole the insured after he has sustained an actual
loss after the insured has paid or been compelled to make a payment toa third-party claimant.
In comparison, an insurer incurs an obligation to the insured whereupon the insured has paid,
or is obligated to pay a third-party claimant. Although both liability and indemnity insurance
contracts exclude coverage formalicious, dishonest, and fraudulent conduct and for claims
involving libel or slander, indemnity agreements generally do not contain a duty-to-defend
provision. Therefore, with indemnity agreements, control of the legal defense resides
exclusively with the policyholder and with the legal counsel chosen to defend the policyholder
against the third-party allegations.
Insurers sell several types of so-called indemnity contracts: Professional indemnity plans,
hospital indemnity insurance, workers compensation indemnity plans, excess employers
indemnity policies, and industrial indemnity insurance. Directors' and officers' policies
("D&O"), however, appear to be the most widely distributed and well-known type of indemnity
contracts.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
1234. See id.
1235. Sport Supply, 335 F.3d at 456.
1236. See id.
1237. Id.
1238. See King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002).
The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are distinct and separate duties. An insurer's
duty to defend is determined solely by the allegations in the pleadings and the language of the
insurance policy. This is the "eight comers" or "complaint allegation rule." "Ifa petition does
not allege facts within the scope of coverage, an insurer is not legally required to defend a suit
against its insured."
Id. (citations omitted). See also Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819,821-22 (Tex. 1997).
[U]nder the "complaint allegation rule," factual allegations in the pleadings and the policy
language determine an insurer's duty to defend. "If a petition does not allege facts within the
scope of coverage, an insurer is not legally required to defend a suit against its insured." The
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settled principles are not foreign to the Fifth Circuit. As we will see in the
and emphasized the
next subsection, the court of appeals acknowledged
1239
difference between these two doctrines.
2. Injury to Shareholders: Whether Under Texas's Law a Directors'
and Officers' Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Indemnify Corporate
Directorsand Officers Who PaidCertain Monies to Settle an
Underlying Securities-Fraud,Shareholders' Class-Action Lawsuit
Although the reported facts in Medical Care America, Inc. v. National
Union FireInsuranceCo. ofPittsburgh,Pennsylvaniaare fairly extensive, the
essence of the dispute between the insured and insurer is easy to
comprehend. 24 The Fifth Circuit's analysis is an uncomplicated reading, and
it represents a genuine effort to apply Texas's law intelligibly and to reach a
sound and fair result. At the outset, it certainly appeared that the court of
appeals achieved the latter goals. After a keen examination of the reported
facts and of what the court did not mention or discuss, however, the author left
the Fifth Circuit's presentation feeling that the appellate court simply did not
fully appreciate the importance of several facts-and consequently several
legal arguments -that the insureds raised on appeal.
Unlike prior cases appearing in this Survey, the underlying litigation in
Medical Care involves a lot of dates.124 In fact, the outcome in this
controversy turns on the importance or weight that both federal courts
assigned to certain dates. Therefore, the author encourages the reader to
carefully observe the various time periods outlined in the underlying lawsuit,
along with the other pertinent facts. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit did not
carefully scrutinize or fully incorporate all relevant evidence - identified and
discussed below-into its discussion. The analysis would likely have been
more stellar and less troublesome if the appellate court discussed the highly
pertinent, excluded evidence.
The underlying litigation in Medical Care is quite interesting and very
familiar. Medical Care International, Inc. (MCI) and Critical Care America

duty to indemnify is triggered by the actual facts establishing liability in the underlying suit.
Thus, the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify by an insurer are distinct and separate duties.
Id. (citations omitted).
1239. See Med. Care Am., Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire ins. Co., 341F.3d 415,424(5th Cir. Aug. 2003).
First, it is not true, as Medical Care contends, that the coverage issue must be resolved by
looking at the allegationsof the underlying shareholders suit. Under well-established Texas
law, an insurer's duty to defend its insured is determined by considering the allegations in the
underlying litigation in the light of the policy provisions.... Instead we must look to the rule
governing an insurer's duty to indemnify its insured. Under Texas law, this duty depends on
the actual facts of the underlying litigation.
Id (citations omitted).
1240. See id. at 415.
1241. Seeid. at417-20.
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(CCA) announced plans for a merger in the summer of 1992.1242 They
reported that MCI and CCA would become wholly-owned subsidiaries of
Medical Care America, Inc., a new company.1243 MCI and CCA then issued
statements that painted a rosy picture regarding the future success of the new
company.12" Their pronouncements generated high expectations regarding
Medical Care's future earnings. 124 Before the merger was official, Medical
Care's would-be "new directors" filed a joint-proxy prospectus with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 1 246 The directors sent a copy of
this prospectus to each shareholder of both companies."247
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. is a large conglomerate that sells
risk and insurance services. 124 Larry Waldie is an insurance broker,
soliciting agent, and employee at Marsh & McLennan (collectively MarshWaldie). 124 9 Also before the merger was completed, Medical Care's newly
selected director of risk management, Theresa Major-Gable, contacted Larry
Waldie and reported that the new company wanted to "purchas[e] directors
and officers ('D&O') liability insurance for Medical Care 'going forward'
Acting on Medical Care's behalf, [Marshfrom the date of the merger ....
]Waldie solicited quotes from several insurance companies, including
National Union Fire Insurance Company ... ."120 After considering various
policies and quotes, Major-Gable instructed Marsh-Waldie "to bind National
Union's quote.' 25'
On September 4, 1992, National Union sent a letter to Waldie. 125 2 That
1253
document served as the temporary conditional binder (Original Binder).

1242.
1243.
1244.
1245.
1246.
1247.
1248.

Id. at417-18.
Id.
See id. at 418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See MMC,ABourMMC, athttp://www.mmc.com/frameset.php?embed=aboutlindex.php (last

visited Feb. 27, 2005).
[Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.] is a global professional services firm with annual
revenues exceeding $11 billion....
In 2003, revenues from MMC's risk and insurance services businesses totaled $6.9
billion. [MarshInc.] is the world leader in delivering risk and insurance services and solutions
to clients. It has approximately 38,000 employees, more than 400 offices, and serves clients

in over 100 countries.
[Marsh] provides global risk management, risk consulting, insurance broking, financial

solutions, and insurance program management services for businesses, public entities,
associations, professional services organizations, and private clients.
Operations within Marsh Inc. also perform underwriting management and wholesale
broking services for a wide range of clients.
Id.
1249.
1250.
1251.
1252.
1253.

Medical Care Am., 341 F.3d at418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Under the agreement in the Original Binder, National Union promised "to
provide Medical Care with $10 million worth of D&O coverage from
September 9, 1992 to September 9, 1993. ''1254 Significantly, the official date
of the merger was September 9, 1992; this was also the date MCI and CCA's
"old directors" became the new directors of Medical Care.255 The Original
Binder declared that coverage would commence after Medical Care submitted
the application
a completed application and after National Union reviewed
256
and other relevant information about the new company.
More important, National Union stated unambiguously in the Original
Binder that it would deliver a D&O contract to Medical Care outlining the
terms, conditions, and exclusions of coverage.1 257 The Original Binder also
stated that the insurer would ultimately deliver "ten endorsements, including
one for 'prior acts as of September 9, 1992. ' ' "'58 From the author's
perspective, however, Marsh-Waldie performed an exceedingly astonishing
and arguably illegal act under Texas's law. On September 15, 1992-nearly
two weeks after sending the Original Binder-Waldie read the contents of
National Union's temporary-insurance contract, summarized what appeared
in the original temporary binder, and wrote a completely new, independent,
and modified temporary conditional binder (Modified Binder).1259 Curiously,
the Fifth Circuit neither mentioned nor discussed this very pertinent fact in its
opinion.
Unlike the Original Binder, the Modified Binder stated that the final
D&O insurance contract "would exclude 'all prior acts prior to [the]
policy['s] inception date.""', 260 On September 15, 1992, Marsh-Waldie sent
the Modified Binder to Medical Care's director of risk management, and on
September 28, 1992, Medical Care unconditionally satisfied all of the
conditions precedent to coverage outlined in the Original Binder. 1261 ' But
strangely, National Union did not deliver the D&O contract to Medical Care
until January 30, 1993.262
Remarkably, the delivery date was nearly five months after Medical Care
completed the application for D&O liability insurance, four months after the
company had satisfied all of the conditions precedent, and four months after
shareholders commenced a lawsuit against Medical Care, on or about

1254. Id.
1255. Id.
1256. td.
1257. See id.
1258. Id. (emphasis added).
1259. See id. ("Waldie summarized the temporary conditional binder in a separate binder.., he sent
to [Theresa] Major-Gable on September 15, 1992.").
1260. Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
1261.
1262. Id.
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September 25, 1992.1263 Yet, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit either
deliberately or inadvertently overlooked this highly pertinent evidence, or
perhaps the court considered and then cavalierly dismissed that information.
Even more relevant and disturbing, when Medical Care received the
D&O insurance contract, the final "prior acts" endorsement (Endorsement #7)
contained language that deviated appreciably from the terms in the Original
Binder and Modified Binder.12 6 In relevant part, Endorsement #7 stated:
In consideration of the premium charged, it is... understood and agreed that
this policy only provides coverage for Loss arising from claims for alleged
Wrongful Acts occurring on or after September 9, 1992 and prior to the end
of the Policy Period ....
Loss(es) arising out of the same or related
Wrongful Act(s) shall be deemed to arisefrom the first such same or related
265
Wrongful Act.1

Unmistakably, the italicized sentence in Endorsement #72 66was an unexpected
1
addition and certainly proved fateful for Medical Care.
After Medical Care announced flat earnings on September 25, 1992, the
value of the new company's stock dropped more than fifty percent in one
day. 267 In response, the New York Stock Exchange suspended the trading of
Medical Care's stock.1 68 Shortly thereafter, disgruntled shareholders filed at
least fifteen class-action lawsuits against Medical Care, CCA, MCI, and their
directors and officers in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas. 2 69 Later, the district court consolidated the lawsuits. 1270
The shareholders claimed that the defendants made material misrepresentations and failed to disclose material information in their public statements
and filings with the SEC.12 7 ' Those acts and omissions allegedly violated
sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934127 and SEC
Rule lOb-5. 27 3 Medical Care immediately notified National Union about the
underlying lawsuit. 127 4 However, on two occasions-January 27th and May
21 st of 1993- the D&O insurer denied the claim. 275 National Union asserted

1263.
1264.
1265.
1266.
1267.
1268.
1269.
1270.
1271.
1272.
1273.
1274.
1275.

See id.
See id. at 418-19.
Id. (alterations in original).
See id. at 418-21, 425.
Id. at418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (2000)).
Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.0 Ob-5 (2004)).
See id. at 418-19.
Id. at 419.
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#7 did not
that the italicized "related wrongful acts" language in Endorsement
2 76
cover the alleged securities-fraud claims in the underlying Suit.
Medical Care, MCI, CCA, and the various officers and directors
ultimately settled the lawsuit for $60 million. 2 77 As consideration, the
shareholders gave the defendants a full release of all liability27 Once more,
Medical Care contacted National Union and disclosed the terms of the
settlement agreement. 279 The company also asked the insurer to reconsider
its denial of coverage.' 8 National Union refused.'2 8' Therefore, in
November 1996, Medical Care filed a lawsuit against National Union in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 282 The
complaint listed several claims against the insurer 211- abreach of an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing, 28 4 "bad faith, ' ,1 285 and violations under the
Texas Insurance Code. 286 However, the company only listed one theory of
recovery - a cause of action for breach of contract.12 17 Each party filed a
motion for summary judgment. 2 Significantly, the district court ruled in

1276. Id.
1277. Id.
1278. Id.
1279. Id. "The revised agreement allocated [liability] as follows: MCI, $10 million; the directors
of MCI, $10 million; CCA, S10 million; the directors of CCA, $10 million; Medical Care, $10 million;
and the directors of Medical Care, $10 million." Id. at 419 n.6.
1280. Id.
at 419.
1281.
Id.
1282. Id.
1283. Id,
1284. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1995) (reaffirming that an
"insurer's failure to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured [allows the insured to commence] a cause
of action that sounds in fort, [whichl is distinct from the contract cause of action for the breach of the
terms of an underlying insurance policy") (emphasis added).
1285, See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. Dec. 2003)
(reaffirming that "[uinder Texas law, a plaintiff's cause of action for bad-faith breach of a first-party
insurance contract accrues at the time the insurer denies the insured's claim").
1286. Medical CareAm., 341 F,3d at 419; TEX. [NS.CoDE ANN. § 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
See alsoMed. Care Am., 341 F.3d at 426 (stating that:
Medical Care's statutory claims arise under article 21.21 § 16(a) ofthe Texas Insurance Code,
which allows an individual who has been damaged by "unfair methods of competition or unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance" to bring a statutory cause of action.
Medical Care alleged that National Union engaged in four unfair or deceptive practices:
(a)National Union misrepresented the benefits of the Policy to Medical Care and its
officers and directors in violation of [Texas Insurance Code] Art. 21,21 § 4(1).
(b) National Union made untrue and misleading statements regarding the coverage it
would provide pursuant tothe Policy, in violation of [Texas Insurance Code] Art. 21.21 § 4(2).
(c) National Union engaged in unfair settlement practices in violation of (Texas
Insurance Code] Art. 21.21 § 4(10).
(d) National Union misrepresented the Policy by making untrue statement of material
fact, failing to state material facts, or making misleading statements to Medical Care and its
officers and directors in violation of [Texas Insurance Code] Art. 21.21 § 4(11).)
(alterations in original) (quoting TEx. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 16(a)).
1287. Med. Care Am., 341 F.3d at 420.
1288. Id. at 419.
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favor of Medical Care and held that "'the binder[s] [were] the controlling
contractsof insurance' in this dispute."'21 9 But the district court ruled against
Medical Care and dismissed the company's bad-faith, extra-contractual
liability claims with prejudice.'290
12
More important, Medical Care cited the doctrine of equitable estoppel 91
and encouraged the district court to estop National Union from employing the
related wrongful acts language in Endorsement #7 as an affirmative
defense. 29 2 The company argued that National Union concealed the true
scope of Endorsement #7 by intentionally deleting any reference to related
wrongful acts from the Original Binder and Modified Binder. 1293 After
reviewing pertinent facts and applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the
lower federal court decided that National Union was not estopped from raising
294
the related wrongful-acts exclusion as an affirmative defense.
A jury decided Medical Care's claim for breach of contract.1 2 95 The jury
found that (1) Medical Care established that its directors and officers incurred
losses arising from the shareholders' securities-fraud allegations, (2) the
alleged wrongful acts of the directors and officers occurred on or after
September 9, 1992, and (3) Medical Care lost money by settling the
underlying lawsuit on behalf of its directors and officers. 296 But National
Union established that the directors and officers' post-September 9, 1992
wrongful acts were "the same as or related to" their pre-September 9, 1992
wrongful acts. 297 Therefore, the jury returned a take-nothing verdict for

1289.

Id. (emphasis added).

1290.

Id. "Medical Care contends that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment

for National Union and dismissing its extracontractual claims alleging breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing and violation of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code." Id. at 425.
1291. See id. at 422 (reaffirming that Texas law requires a plaintiff who relies on the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to show that (1) the defendant made a false representation or concealed material facts,
(2) the defendant misrepresented or concealed material facts with actual or constructive knowledge of
those facts, (3) the defendant engaged in such conduct expecting the misrepresentation or concealment to
influence another party's action, (4) the defendant's misrepresentation or concealment affected a party who
does not have knowledge of the facts or the means to obtain the truth surrounding the matter, and (5) the
plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the plaintiffs detriment) (quoting Johnson &

Higgins, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex. 1998)).
1292.

Id. at 422-23.

1293.

Id. at 423.

1294.

Id. at 420.

At the close of the evidence, both parties filed motions for judgment as a matter of law
("JMOL"). The court denied Medical Care's motion in toto.... [The district court] held that
Medical Care had not shown that it was due coverage as a matter of law. The court granted

National Union's motion in part, ruling that the insurance contract included a "related acts"
exclusion and that National Union was not equitably estopped from relying on that "related
acts" exclusion.

Id.
1295.
1296.

Id.
Id.

1297.

Id. (emphasis added).
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Medical Care, 12 98 and after the district court denied Medical Care's motions
for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), 129 9 the company
appealed. 30
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit framed the appellate question
as follows: "[Wihether the ordinaryform of prior acts endorsement used in
D&O policies contains language excluding coverage of subsequent related
acts."''" Under Texas's law, "an insurance binder provides coverage
according to the terms and provisions of the ordinary form of the
contemplated policy."' 3 2 Applying this principle and examining Waldie's
Modified Binder that contained the exclusionary language-which did not
appear in Marsh's Original Binder-the Fifth Circuit supported the district
court's rulings. 130 3 National Union did not have to indemnify Medical
Care. 1304
But the Fifth Circuit reached that conclusion after considering Medical
Care's argument: The court should equitably estop National Union from
citing and using, as an affirmative defense, the exclusionary and "the same as
or related to" language in Endorsement #7.1305 Regarding this issue, the Fifth

Circuit found that the district court's JMOL ruling and the jury's findings
were proper because Medical Care did not establish all of the essential
elements to prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 30 6 In particular,
the Fifth Circuit found "no positive evidence" to support Medical Care's
allegation that National Union misrepresented or concealed coverage terms for
nearly five months and until after Medical Care settled the underlying
lawsuit.1307
1298. Id.
1299. Id.
JMOL is appropriatewhen "a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is
no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with
respect to that issue." In reviewing the record, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmovant, make no credibility determinations, and do not weigh the evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).
1300. Id.
1301.
Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
1302. Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit cited Ranger County MutualInsurance Co.
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 501 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex. t973), which declared that "'[a]s
long as a binder is
in effect, the insured may look to the form of the contemplated policy for coverage, duration, cancellation,
and other terms." Id. at 421 n.15.
1303. Id. at 422.
1304. Id.
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence and inferences point so
strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of a finding that National Union's standard prior acts
endorsement normally or ordinarily used in its D&O liability policies contained related acts
language that JMOL in National Union's favor is warranted.
Id.
1305. Id. at 422-23.
1306. Id. at 423.
1307. Id.
Because the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of National Union, we
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The court of appeals also observed that under Texas's law, '[a] party
claiming an estoppel must have used due diligence to ascertain the truth of the
matters upon which he relies in acting to his detriment."1 30 8 Evaluating the
facts in light of this principle, the Fifth Circuit concluded that neither Medical
Care nor its representatives contacted Marsh or National Union to determine
"the scope or effect of the prior acts endorsement. "1309 The court of appeals
stated additionally that Medical Care presented no positive evidence
establishing that the company had insufficient means to make the necessary
inquiry or that extraneous factors prevented Medical Care from conducting
1310
such an investigation.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis, findings, and ultimate conclusion present
several major problems. First, the court of appeals mischaracterized, and
therefore, failed to appreciate Lawrence Waldie's true legal status in this
litigation. Waldie was an insurance broker and agent; he was not "Medical
Care's agent" as the court represented. 3
The Fifth Circuit stated that
Medical Care selected Marsh and Waldie-the soliciting agent-as "its
exclusive agent of record."'3 "2 But, soliciting agents are regarded as agents for
insurers rather than for insureds when legal disputes evolve between insurers
and their insured under Texas's law."3 3 Therefore, Marsh and Waldie were
agents for National Union Fire Insurance Company and not for Medical Care
3 14
as a matter of law.

conclude that a jury could not reasonably infer that National Union had anything to conceal,
intended to conceal anything, or in fact concealed anything from Medical Care. Because
Medical Care failed to establish the first element of equitable estoppel, summaiy judgment was
appropriate.
Id.
1308. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Barfield v. Howard M. Smith Co., 426 S.W.2d 834, 838
(Tex. 1968)).
1309. Id.
1310. Id.
1311.
Id. at 421.
1312. Id.at 418 (emphasis added).
1313. TEX.INS. CODE ANN. § 21.04 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). This provision of the Texas Insurance
Code states inrelevant part:

Any person who solicits an application for life, accident, or health insurance, or property or
casualty insurance, shall, in any controversy between the insured.., and the company issuing
any policy upon such application ... be regarded as the agent of the company, and not the
agent of the insured, but such agent shall not have the power to waive, change or alter any of

the terms or conditions of the application or policy.
Id. (emphasis added).
1314. See Med. Care Am., 341 F.3dat418.
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Second, a soliciting agent's conduct may prevent an insurer from raising
an otherwise effective affirmative defense under Texas's doctrine of equitable
estoppel. 13t" Remember, the court of appeals declared that Medical Care did
not try diligently to determine the true "scope or effect of the [prior-acts]
endorsement."' 3 t6 But Medical Care did try when it relied on Waldie's
input." 7 Furthermore, a significant part of Waldie's conduct-modifying a
temporary binding receipt without authority and disclosing that information
to Medical Care-involved at best a material misrepresentation and at worst
31
fraud. 1 8
Even worse, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the insured's equitable estoppel
argument largely because of Waldie's testimony at trial.13 9 Characterizing
Waldie as one of "[t]wo disinterested witnesses," the court of appeals wrote:
"Lawrence Waldie, the insurance broker .... testified that Endorsement # 7
was in a form that was the 'customary and normal form of a prior acts
endorsement issued by National Union' and other carriers writing D&O
policies under similar circumstances. Hence, he was not surprised that it
contained related acts language."32
Finally, the Fifth Circuit either failed to appreciate or completely
overlooked that neither the Original nor the Modified Binder contained any
related wrongful-acts language like that appearing in Endorsement # 7V"'
Although the Modified Binder mentioned "excluded prior acts," the Original
Binder just mentioned "prior acts."'132 2 A reasonable person could have

1315. See Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co.v. Rabun, 561 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1978, writdism'd).
The doctrine of waiver and the often associated and resultant doctrine of estoppel have been
applied in the situation where an agent agreed orally to renew an insurance policy, but
thereafter for some reason failed to do so. Generally the insurerhas been estopped to deny
renewal of a policy, or [prevented from arguing that the agent had no] authority... to make
such agreement, or [found] to have waived the renewal conditions of the policy, particularly
with respect to payment of the renewal premium. In such cases, the waiver by, or an estoppel
against, an insurer arose from the act, conduct, or knowledge of a duly authorized
representative, acting within the scope of actual or apparent authority.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
1316. Med. Care Am., 341 F3d at423.
1317. Seeid. at41S.
1318. See id.
1319. Seeid. at 421-23.
1320. Id.at421.
[Waldie] agreed that Endorsement # 7 was the type of prior acts endorsement that he had
anticipated when he wrote out the Binder in September 1992. He testified that he had no
recollection of ever negotiating a prior acts endorsement that did not contain related acts
language on behalf of any client with either National Union or any other insurer. Furthermore,
he could not recall ever seeing a D&O policy with a prior acts endorsement that did not contain
related acts language. Indeed, he was not aware that any such policy was available in the
industry.
Id.
1321. Seeid.at418-19.
1322. See id. at 418.
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concluded, after evaluating the latter binder, that the drafter meant either
"coverage for" or "exclusion of" prior acts.1323 In other words, the following
statement is ambiguous: "[National Union will issue a policy] with' 324ten
endorsements, including one for 'prioracts as of September 9, 1992."
The law in Texas is clear: "[W]hen the language of an insurance contract
is ambiguous [and] is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, then
32 5
that construction which affords coverage will be the one adopted."'
Additionally, in Texas "[ilt is well-established law that where an ambiguity
exists in a contract, the contract language will be construed strictly against the
13 26
party who drafted it since the drafter is responsible for the language used.'
But more important, when insurers draft poorly written and confusing
endorsements or temporary binders, Texas's law requires courts to construe
ambiguous words and phrases in favor of the insureds.'31 7 To be sure, the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Medical CareAmerica would have been stellar if the
court had addressed this and other relevant issues."328
3. Injury to Business Interests: Whether Under Mississippi'sLaw
a Title InsurerHas a Duty to Defend and Indemnify an Indenture
Trustee Who Paid CertainMonies to Settle an Underlying
Breach-of-ContractLawsuit
The final decision, In re Biloxi Casino Belle Inc., did not present any
unfamiliar questions of law, and the surrounding facts and various parties in
the underlying lawsuit were fairly interesting. 32 9 But, the legal conflict in
1323.

See id. at 418-21. Of course, the yet-to-be-issued prior acts endorsement could have been a

"prior acts exclusion endorsement" rather than a "prior acts coverage endorsement." See id. At a
minimum, the binder was ambiguous and required a court of law to construe its meaning in favor of
Medical Care. Id. But see Matthews v. Home Ins. Co., 916 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st

Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
Matthews contends that the contract consists solely of the declarations page ...and nothing
else because he never received anything else from Home. He contends that even the
endorsements listed there do not bind him because Home never furnished them to him on or
after June 14, 1990, the "issue date" of the policy.
Matthews cannot prevail because 1)he signeda prioracts exclusion endorsementon June

8, 1990, that excludes this claim from coverage, 2) that endorsement is part of the policy
because it is listed on the declarations page, and 3) such endorsements arevalid even though
they limit broader statements of coverage elsewhere in the policy.
Id. (emphasis added).
1324. Med. Care Am., 341 F.3d at 418 (emphasis added).
1325. Glover v. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters, 545 S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex. 1977).
1326. Gonzalez v. Mission Am. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. 1990) (citation omitted).
1327. See Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 761.
1328.

See Med. Care Am., 341 F.3d at 415; see, e.g., Gonzalez, 795 S.W.2d at 737 (concluding that

the insurer's "interpretation requires the reader to conclude that either [the] Endorsement [was] ambiguous
or that Mission's policy construction [required rewriting]" and stressing that if the insurer had intended
to limit its liability under the endorsement, it could have easily drafted the policy to limit liability for all
damages).
1329. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Trust Nat'l Ass'n (lnre Biloxi Casino Belle Inc.), 368 F.3d 491
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Biloxi Casino is somewhat novel because it concerns whether a title insurer
has a duty to defend as well as a duty to indemnify an insured under a title
insurance contract.' 3 Title insurers generally do not have a contractual
obligation to defend their insureds in an underlying lawsuit, unlike liability
insurers in Mississippi and in other Fifth-Circuit states. Instead, they only
have a duty
to indemnify insureds when a defective title causes some financial
1
13 3

loss.

The facts in the underlying lawsuit are brief. Commencing in the early
1990s, Mississippi permitted gambling on riverboat casinos. 332 The law
allowed persons in the gaming industry to operate and moor riverboats on the
Mississippi River and on the coastal waters just south of the state's three
southern-most counties. 3 Biloxi Casino Belle, Inc. (BCBI), a wholly-owned
two casinos-one
subsidiary of Belle Casinos, Inc. (BCI), planned to operate
133 4
in Tunica and the other along the waterfront in Biloxi.
BCBI selected Charles N. White Construction Company (White
Construction) as the general contractor for the project. 335 The generalcontractor agreement required White Construction to construct the Tunica
casino boat on-site. 336 But the general contractor had to build the Biloxi
Belle 11 casino in Gulfport and transport the boat to Biloxi, where additional
improvements and supporting structures were made on leased land along the
waterfront. 33 7 BCI issued, and Bear Stearns & Company underwrote, $75
million in mortgage notes to finance the casinos.""
BCI and First Trust National Association (First Trust), the indenture
trustee for note holders, issued the mortgage notes according to the terms of
an indenture agreement. 33 9 Additionally, BCI loaned the proceeds from the
sale of the mortgage notes to its subsidiary, BCBI.' 31 In exchange, BCBI
gave BCI a promissory note. 34' BCBI executed a leasehold deed of trust and

(5th Cir. Apr. 2004).
1330. See id.

1331.

See, e.g., Rancher's Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 190 So. 2d 897, 899

(Miss. 1966) (embracing the principle that "[a] title insurance contract . .. insures that the title to the
property described... in the policy [has] a good title" and that a total loss of the property's value is the
measure of damages); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 875 S.W.2d 310,311 (Tex. 1994) (holding that
"the only duty imposed by a title insurance policy is the duty to indemnify the insured against losses
caused by defects in title"); Crews v. Griffith, 856 So. 2d 1229, 1232-33 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that

requiring a title insurer to provide a legal defense "is not the purpose of title insurance").
1332. In re Biloxi Casino, 368 F.3d at 493.
1333. Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 19-3-79, 75-76-1, 87-1-5, 97-33-1 (2003)).
1334. Id.
1335. Id. at 495.
1336. See id. at 493.
1337, See id.
1338. Id.
1339. Id.
1340. Id.
1341. Id.
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various other security instruments in favor of BCI to secure the loan. 134 2 The
deed of trust "gave BCI security interests in most of the realty (including
fixtures) and personalty
associated with the casino project[s], including
'ships' and 'boats." 1343
BCI assigned its interests in the deed of trust and other security
instruments to First Trust to satisfy one of BCI's obligations under the
indenture agreement."' After BCBI secured the loan from BCI, the
subsidiary deposited the funds into two escrow accounts at First National
Bank of Commerce. 345 A Disbursement and Escrow Agreement identified
BCI, BCBI, and First National Bank as the lender, borrower, and escrow
agent, respectively. 1346 Under the terms of the Disbursement and Escrow
Agreement, BCI had to assign its rights to the indenture trustee, First Trust. 347
As noted earlier, the "[d]eed of [t]rust and other security instruments
gave First Trust a security interest in almost all of the property, both real and
personal, associated with the Biloxi casino project."'34 To protect First
Trust's interests and ultimately that of the mortgage-notes holders, the
indenture agreement required First Trust to secure title insurance from First
American Title Insurance Company (American Title)."349 The title insurance
contract covered some of the property interests that BCBI used to secure the
3 0
loan to finance the project. 5
The construction of the riverboat casinos proceeded according to plans,
but the expenditures were exceeding the allocated revenues. 35 More
troubling, White Construction "continued to receive payments from the
[escrow] accounts at First National Bank despite the overruns.' 352 First Trust
eventually terminated the payments and sued First National Bank, the
disbursement and escrow agent, alleging that the agent negligently disbursed
funds to the construction company.133
White Construction, however, had not received full compensation for its
work. 3 4 Therefore, the general contractor filed a Mississippi statutory
watercraft lien in June of 1994 on Biloxi Belle II, which was yet to be
completed. 355 "One paragraph of White Construction's watercraft-lien

1342.
1343.
1344.
1345.
1346.
1347.
1348.
1349.
1350.
1351.
1352.
1353.
1354.
1355.

Id.

Id.
Id,
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at494.
Id. at 493.
See id. at 493-94.
Id. at495.
Id.
Id.; First Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 220 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2000).
In re Biloxi Casino, 368 F.3d at 495.
Id.
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complaint against BCI listed First Trust as a party [with] a potentially
competing interest in the BILOXI BELLE 1I. ",1356 Shortly thereafter, White
Construction brought suit to enforce its lien against BCI in a Mississippi state
court, which subsequently357caused both BCI and BCBI to file separate Chapter
11 bankruptcy petitions.1
First Trust sent a letter to American Title notifying the insurer of White
Construction's lawsuit in October 1994.1358 American Title responded by
acknowledging that it had received the letter and reporting that it understood
that First Trust was not requesting American Title to provide a legal defense
in November 1994.""59 It took First Trust two years to respond. 136 By then,
the underlying White Construction litigation had been removed to federal
court, and the case was later referred to bankruptcy court.' 361 White
Construction ultimately settled its disputes with BCI and BCBI for $1.7
million. 1362
The indenture trustee asked American Title for a legal defense in
December 1996.1363 American Title agreed to defend First Trust in the
underlying lawsuit, but the insurer sent a reservation-of-rights letter to the
indenture trustee. 13 ' First Trust then rejected American Title's proffered
counsel, asserting that the insurer's reservation of rights created a conflict of
interest. 1161 Put simply, First Trust wanted to retain its own legal
the indenture trustee wanted American Title to pay for that
representation, but
13 6 6
representation.
Therefore, in March 1997, American Title filed a declaratory-judgment
action in the bankruptcy court, petitioning the court to declare that American
Title had no duty to defend First Trust in, and no duty to indemnify the
indenture trustee for expenditures associated with, the White Construction
lawsuit. 1367 First Trust filed a counterclaim asking the court to declare that the
title insurer had a duty to reimburse the trustee for retaining independent legal
representation. 1368 In addition, the indenture trustee asked the bankruptcy
court to declare that American Title had a duty to reimburse First Trust for

1356. Id.
1357. Id. BCI, BCBI, First Trust, White Construction, and various principals commenced a number
of lawsuits among themselves in the years following, naming one or the other as defendant. Id.
1358.

Id.

1359.
1360.

Id.
Id.

1361.

Id.

1362. Id. ("Most of the litigation stemming from the failed casino projects came to a close in July
1997 with... the bankruptcy court's approval of the BCIIBCBI Amended Joint Liquidating Plan ....
Under the Plan, White Construction received $1.7 million for its claims,").
1363. Id.
1364. Id.
1365. Id.
1366. Id.
1367. Id.
1368. Id.
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any losses if White Construction's lien primed, 3 69 or took priority over, the
security interest First Trust had in the Biloxi Belle 1.1370
The bankruptcy court granted American Title's motion for partial
summary judgment in August 1999.1"71 This ruling absolved the title insurer
of any liability for First Trust's pre-December 1996 litigation expenses. 372
In March 2000, both parties moved for summary judgment concerning
American Title's "liability for First Trust's post-December 1996 defense
expenses and the $1.7 million [that BCI/BCBI] paid to White Construction,
money that otherwise would have gone to First Trust's noteholders."' 3 73 After
denying American Title's motion and granting First Trust's motion, the
bankruptcy court awarded First Trust over $1.4 million. 37 4 American Title
appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi. 3 75 The district court found the
bankruptcy court's decision was correct
in all respects. 1376 American Title
3 77
appealed the district court's holding.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asserted jurisdiction over the
controversy.137' The central question on review was whether the title
1369. Id. Compare Abemethy v. Savage, 141 So. 329, 330 (Miss. 1932) (finding:
The law in this state has long been settled that an attorney has a prime and paramount lien on
the funds which his services as an attorney has produced for his client, and that this lien applies
alike to exempt as well as nonexempt funds. This lien applies so long as the attorney has the
funds in his possession and is superior to any other claim.), with Ball, Brown & Co. v. Sledge,
35 So. 447, 449 (Miss. 1903) (finding: It is well settled that the landlord has a prime lien on
all the agricultural products raised on the leased premises, to secure his rent and supplies for
the current year; and this lien may be successfully asserted, not only on the products
themselves, but against the purchaser thereof .... whether with or without notice of the
existence of the lien.).
1370. In re Biloxi Casino, 368 F.3d at 495.
1371.
Id.
1372. Id. at 495-96.
1373. Id. at 496.
1374. Id. "This amount [comprised] the $1.7 million that White Construction received under the
Plan, plus interest of approximately $300,000, plus $222,000 in post-December 1996 litigation expenses,
[and] less $800,000 that First Trust received from Chicago Title Insurance Company for certain claims
related to the Tunica project." Id. at 496 n.3.
1375. Id. at 496.
1376. Id.
1377. Id.
1378. Id. at 496 n.4.
Bankruptcy jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) in this case because White
Construction settled its lien priority litigation against First Trust in exchange for First Trust's
assignment of any recovery in this case to the BCI/BCBI liquidating trust (of which First Trust
is liquidating trustee) for the benefit of unsecured creditors. See Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Case (In re Case), 937 F.2d 1014, 1016-20 (5th Cir. 199 !) (upholding bankruptcy jurisdiction
over a suit on a note that the debtor executed as part of the bankruptcy plan's settlement of
existing debts). The suit thus "pertain[s] to the implementation or execution of the plan," Bank
of La. v. Craig'sStores of Tex., Inc. (In re Craig'sStores of Tex., Inc.), 266 F.3d 388, 390 (5th
Cir. 2001). Jurisdiction does not exist merely by virtue of the fact that an asset of the
bankruptcy estate (namely the BILOXI BELLE 11) is the subject of this insurance coverage
dispute.

2005]

INSURANCE DECISIONS

1015

insurance contract covered First Trust's security interest in the realty
component of the casino projects, as well as its security interest in the Biloxi
Belle 11, while White Construction Company was constructing that riverboat
casino. 1379 First Trust maintained that the policy's seventh insuring clause
covered its security interests. 38" The relevant section of the title insurance
contract stated:
First American Title Insurance Company . . . insures . . . against loss or
damage... incurred by reason of:
7. Lack of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage over any statutory
lien for services, labor or material... arising from an improvement or work
related to the land ....
The title insurance contract contained a customized, bargained-for
Schedule A. 382 Part 4 of that schedule stated in pertinent part: "The
instruments creating the [insured] estate or the interest in real estate" are the
executed Leasehold Deed of Trust between BCI and BCBI, which First Trust
received under an assignment contract, and several financing statements,
which gave First Trust a security interest in various BCBI's
properties,
383
including the Biloxi Belle II and the Biloxi parcels of land.
The major point of contention in this case concerned whether White
Construction Company's lien against the Biloxi Belle 11 arose from
improvements or work "related to the land."' 384 First Trust argued that
construction of the riverboat casino, which the company planned to moor
indefinitely next to land in Biloxi, was related to the land. 385 From First
Trust's perspective, "the Leasehold Deed of Trust [gave the indenture trustee]
a security interest in the casino boat . . . as well as in the land."' 386 But
American Title strongly asserted that the unfinished riverboat casino never
left Gulfport, Mississippi. 3 7 Moreover, the insurer argued that the owners
of the Biloxi Belle II never intended for the boat to be a fixture; therefore, it
was not related to the land.3 8

Id. (alteration in original).
1379.

1380.
1381.
1382.
1383.
1384.
1385.
1386.
1387.
1388.
an interest

See id. at 497,

Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 498.
Id. at 497.
Id. "First American Title argues that First Trust's security interest in the casino boat.., is not
in land [and] is not covered under either version of the policy." Id. at 498.
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To resolve this conflict, the Fifth Circuit correctly and thoroughly
examined Mississippi's settled legal principles for interpreting insurance
contracts. 1389 Under Mississippi's law, courts must enforce the plain and
ordinary meaning of the terms in an insurance contract as written and
according to the parties' intention. 3 9' If the terms are ambiguous, however,
courts must resolve all ambiguities against the insurer and in favor of the
insured. 39' A policy is ambiguous if it lends itself to two or more reasonable
interpretations. 3 92
Without doubt, the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Biloxi Casino is an
excellent illustration of the types of opinions we should expect from that
esteemed tribunal. After carefully and intelligently applying Mississippi's
law, the Fifth Circuit declared that the relevant language in the title insurance
policy was unambiguous. 393 Therefore, American Title had no duty to
reimburse the indenture trustee for any of the funds that the trustee paid to
settle the underlying lawsuit.""
More specifically, the appellate court found that Schedule A in the
insurance contract only covered real estate or real property, along with
attached improvements to real estate. 1395 Put simply, the riverboat was
"beyond the bounds of the area described in Schedule A."'396 Consequently,
the title insurance contract did not cover First Trust's security interest in the
Biloxi Belle H while White Construction was building it in Gulfport. 1397

1389. See id. at 496-500.
1390. Id. at 496 (citing Lewis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 730 So. 2d 65, 68 (Miss. 1998) (reaffirming that
"when the words of an insurance policy are plain and unambiguous, the court will afford them their plain,
ordinary meaning and will apply them as written")).
1391.
Id. (citing J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550,552 (Miss.
1998) (reaffirming "the general rule that provisions of an insurance contract [must] be construed strongly
against the drafter")).
1392. Id. at 496-97; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Scitzs, 394 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Miss.
1981) (reaffirming that courts must allow an insured to recover on a claim when the language in an
insurance contract permits more than one reasonable interpretation).
1393. In re Biloxi Casino, 368 F.3d at 497.
1394. Id. at 498.
1395. Id. at 498-99.
1396. Id. at 497.
1397. Id. at 498-99.
First Trust's security interest in the boat ... cannot be the "insured mortgage" that the title
insurance policy protects.... Item 4 on Schedule A... [refers to the] "instruments creating
the estate or the interest in real estate which is hereby insured." This language poses two
serious problems for First Trust's attempt to... bring the boat within the policy.
First, the language refers to "the estate or the interest in real estate." The BILOXI BELLE
II,
under construction on a barge in Gulfport, was not real estate.... [Tihe more natural reading
is that "in real estate" modifies both "estate" and "interest." The language thus embraces fee
estates, leasehold estates, security interests, and so on, as long as those property interests are in
real estate.... From the insuring clauses to the exclusions to Schedule A, the policy is replete
with references to "land" and "real property." But those same provisions contain no references
to "chattels," "goods," "movables," "personalty," or "personal property." The only impression
an objective reader of the policy can come away with is that the document is firmly tied to terra
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VI. A BRIEF STATISTICAL REVIEW OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S
DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE-CONTRACT CONTROVERSIES
DURING 2003-2004
Elsewhere, the author and other commentators have written extensively
about the intrinsic worth of using statistics to help jurists gain an intelligible
understanding of questionable and conflicting rulings that a traditional legal
analysis cannot explain. 398 To illustrate, after taking a random sample of
reported cases, employing powerful statistical procedures, and analyzing the
findings, legal empiricists have learned that federal judges often deliberately
or inadvertently permit their biases to influence the disposition of cases.""
Statistically, courts are exceedingly more likely to decide in favor of
defendants than plaintiffs, even when one eliminates or controls for the
influence of other legal and extralegal variables.'4° Furthermore, research has
revealed that judicial bias often explains an ever increasing number of highly
contradictory, unduly intricate, and arguably unjust rulings.'W'
Certainly, this Part will not present an extensive statistical analysis of the
Fifth Circuit's 2003-2004 insurance decisions for one very important reason:
2
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided just twenty-four cases.'4°
That number is simply too small to perform an elaborate statistical analysis
that would measure and more conclusively reveal the "causal" connection
between the insureds and insurers' win-loss ratio and various legal and
extralegal variables.
On the other hand, gathering and closely examining simple statistics, in
conjunction with a case-by-case legal analysis of judicial rulings, can help
jurists obtain a better understanding of questionable summary and declaratory
judgments." 3 Additionally, a careful inspection of frequencies and
percentages can often reveal significant or unexpected patterns in judicial

firma.
Id. at 498 (citations omitted).
1398. See Willy E. Rice, InsuranceDecisions-ASurvey and An EmpiricalAnalysis, 35 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 947, 1026 (2004).

1399.

See, e.g., Rice, supra note 1232, at 1169-94, 1202-18 (chronicling intrajurisdictional conflicts

and arguably biased rulings and reporting that defendants are more likely to prevail in federal and state
declaratory-judgment actions).
1400. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-PlaintiffBias in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128, 133-34 (2000) (finding that when controlling for the possibility
of other influences or predictor variables, federal courts are still significantly more likely to decide in favor
of defendants).
1401. See generally Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions Over Whether
InsurersMust DefendInsureds That Violate Constitutionaland Civil Rights: An Historicaland Empirical
Review of Federaland State Court DeclaratoryJudgments 1900-2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1040-72,
1074-95 (2000) (chronicling inconsistent and biased rulings and reporting that defendants are more likely
to prevail in federal and state declaratory-judgment actions).
1402. See cases cited supra note 1.
1403. See Rice, supra note 1398, at 1027-35.
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opinions. In light of these positive benefits of empirical research, the author
decided to perform a content analysis of the twenty-four cases and report a
series of simple, descriptive statistics in four tables.1 4
First, Table A presents frequencies and percentages for some selected
demographic characteristics of insurers and insureds that petitioned the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals for relief in 2003-2004.145 Nearly 46% of the cases
originated in Texas; litigants filed the remaining suits in Mississippi and
Louisiana- 16.6% and 37.5%, respectively. 11 6 Almost 75% of the various
actions, however, began in just four federal district courts-the Eastern
District Court of Louisiana (29.1 %), the Southern District Court of
Mississippi (12.5%), the Northern District Court of Texas (12.5%), and the
Southern District Court of Texas (20.8%).1407

1404.
1405.
1406.
1407.

See infra Tables A-D, infra notes 1408, 1416, 1437, 1463.
See Table A, infra note 1408.
Id.
Id.
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Table A. Some Selected Demographic Characteristics of Insurance
Law Litigants Who Petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for
Review - 2003-200414(g

Demographic
Characteristics

Frequencies
(N = 24)

States Where Cases Originated:
Louisiana
Mississippi
Texas
Federal Districts Where Cases Originated:
Louisiana-Eastern District
Louisiana-Middle District
Louisiana-Western District
Mississippi- Northern District
Mississippi-Southern District
Texas-Eastern District
Texas-Northern District
Texas-Southern District
Texas-Western District
Types of Plaintiffs:
Insured Individuals
Primary Insurers
Excess Insurers
Insured Corporations
Creditors
Estates
Trustees
Types of Insurance Contracts
Comprehensive General Liability
Life
Property
Automobile
Health/HMO

Percentages
(100.0)

9
4
11

37.5
16.6
45.8

7
1
1
1
3
1
3
5
2

29.1
4.2
4.2
4.2
12.5
4.2
12.5
20.8
8.3

15
4
1
1
1
1
1

62.5
16.6
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.2

8
5
4
2
2

33.3
20.8
16.6
8.3
8.3

1408. Willy E. Rice, Table A. Some Selected Demographic Characteristicsof Insurance Law
Litigants Who Petitionedthe Fifth CircuitCourt ofAppealsfor Review - 2003-2004 (2004) [hereinafter
Table A].
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Marine
Officers & Directors
Title
Types of Insurance Complaints:
First-Party Complaints
Third-Party Complaints

[Vol. 37:871

1
1
1

4.2
4.2
4.2

12
12

50.0
50.0

While a variety of persons petitioned the Fifth Circuit for appellate relief,
the overwhelming majority were insured individuals (62.5%) and primary
insurers (16.6%). 1409 Furthermore, the percentage of petitioners filing firstparty complaints versus those filing third-party complaints was evenly
divided, with 50% of the total claims falling into each respective category..410
Among cases involving first-party actions, the insureds clashed with their
insurers over whether the insurers had a duty to pay various claims or to
indemnify insureds under several types of "personal insurance"
contracts-life (20.8%), property (16.6%), health/HMO (8.3%), and marine
(4.2%) insurance contracts. 4 "' Conversely, among cases involving third-party
actions against the insureds, serious conflicts evolved over whether insurers
had a duty to defend, settle, or indemnify insureds under several types of
liability insurance contracts-comprehensive general liability (33.3%),
automobile (8.3%), officers & directors (4.2%), and title (4.2%) insurance
41 2
contracts.1
Table B presents frequencies and percentages for several attentiongrabbing and pertinent variables.14 3 First, when comparing the 2002-2003
session with the 2003-2004 session, the Fifth Circuit agreed to decide
significantly more cases during the latter session, in which the underlying
cases involved class-action suits.141 4 For the 2003-2004 session, 75% 415
of the
cases were individual actions, while 25% involved class-action suits.

1409.
1410.
1411.
1412.
1413.
1414.
with Table
1415.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Table B, infra note 1416.
Compare Rice, supra note 1398, at 1029-30 (providing statistics for the 2002-2003 session),
B, infra note 1416 (providing statistics for the 2003-2004 session).
See Table B, infra note 1416.
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Table B. Theories of Recovery, Remedies, and the Disposition of
Insurance Law Actions in United States District Courts and in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals - 2003-20041416

Theories of Recovery,
Remedies & Outcomes

Frequencies
(N = 24)

Types of Actions:
Individual Actions
Class Actions

Percentages
(100.0)

18
6

75.0
25.0

tPetitioners' Legal Theories (Causes):
11
Declaratory Judgment
5
Breach of Contract
5
Intentional Torts
4
Unfair Business Practices
3
Equitable Subrogation
3
Negligence/Bad-Faith
3
Fraud/RICO
2
Breach Implied Covenants

45.8
20.8
20.8
16.6
12.5
12.5
12.5
8.3

fRemedies Sought:
Declaratory Relief
Actual & Punitive Damages
Indemnification/Defense
Attorney Fees

11
10
8
1

45.8
41.6
33.3
4.2

Disposition of Cases in
Federal District Courts:
Plaintiffs/Insureds Won
Defendants/Insurers Won

11
13

45.8
54.2

Disposition of Cases in the
Fifth Circuit Court:
Plaintiffs/Insureds Won
Defendants/Insurers Won

9
15

37.5
62.5

1416. Willy E. Rice, Table B. Theories of Recovery, Remedies, and the Disposition of Insurance
Law Actions in FederalDistrict Courts and in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals - 2003-2004 (2004)
[hereinafter Table B1.
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Litigants' Success-Failure
Rate Before the Fifth Circuit:
Affirmed for Defendants/Insurers
29.2
Affirmed for Plaintiffs/Insureds
Reversed Against Plaintiffs/
Insureds
Reversed Against Defendants/
Insurers
Affirmed & Reversed in Part

[Vol. 37:871

7
5

20.8

5

20.8

2
5

8.3
20.8

t Multiple causes of action appeared in several cases; therefore, the reported
percentages can exceed one hundred percent.
Second, the litigants raised and sought relief under an assortment of legal
theories. 4 17 In nearly 46% of the cases, insurers and insureds commenced
declaratory-judgment actions, asking the courts for declaratory relief under a
An equal number ofplaintiffs-insureds filed
variety of insurance contracts.
breach-of-contract and intentional tort actions against the insurers-21%,
respectively. 14'9 Furthermore, an equal number of complainants filed equitable
subrogation, common-law bad-faith, and fraud actions against insurers12.5%, respectively.142' Finally, nearly 17% of the insureds filed "deceptive
trade practices," statutory actions against their insurance companies. 21
The types of remedies that litigants asked the Fifth Circuit to award
varied. 422 Again, about 46% of the plaintiffs asked the court of appeals for
declaratory relief. 1423 Approximately 33% wanted the Fifth Circuit to declare
that insurers had a duty to defend and indemnify insureds.1424 And in nearly
42% of the cases, the aggrieved425parties asked the appellate court to award both
actual and punitive damages. 1
What were plaintiffs-insureds' and defendants-insurers' win-loss ratios
in the district courts and in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals? The results
indicate that the federal courts displayed very little sympathy for the plaintiffinsureds' plights or legal arguments. 426 The federal district courts decided in

1417.
1418.
1419.
1420.
1421.
1422.
1423.
1424.
1425.
1426.

Id.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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favor of the defendants-insurers 54% of the time. 1427 But even more amazing
and revealing, on appeal the insurers' likelihood of winning was substantially
greater: The Fifth Circuit decided in favor of the defendants-insurers nearly
63% of the time. 1428 These 2003-2004
percentages and outcomes are similar
4 29
to the 2002-2003 reported findings. 1
The last displayed percentages in Table B represent the litigants' successfailure ratio before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 43 ° Those
numbers provide some additional insight into the plaintiffs-insureds' and
defendants-insurers' likelihood of prevailing on appeal. 14 1' First, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed 29% of the federal district courts' decisions in favor of the
insurers and reversed in favor of the insurers nearly 21% of the district courts'
proinsureds decisions. 432 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed nearly 21% of the district courts' proinsured decisions,
while reversing just 8% of the district courts' proinsurer decisions. 433
Unmistakably, these findings support what other judicial studies have
revealed: Federal courts of appeals are significantly more likely to decide in
favor of defendants than plaintiffs.
As previously stated, the small number of cases in this study prevent one
from employing more powerful and sophisticated statistical procedures to
analyze the data. Consequently, this brief investigation cannot answer a
highly relevant question: What explains the Fifth Circuit's and district courts'
substantially greater propensity to rule consistently in favor of defendantsinsurers? The percentages reported in Table C, however, disclose some rather
interesting "patterns" that could provide a partial explanation.""
Table C illustrates the dispositions of the insurance cases among only
federal district courts and in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 435 The
reported percentages show the relationships between a 436
few selected
1
background variables and the litigants' likelihood of success.

1427.
1428.
1429.
1430.
1431.
1432.
1433.
1434.
1435.
1436.

Id.
Id.
See Rice, supra note 1398, at 1029-30.
Table B, supra note 1416.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Table C, infra note 1437.
Id.
Id.
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First, the type of insurance complaint influenced whether the insureds or
the insurers prevailed. 438 Among the district court cases, insurers won 58%
of the time if the underlying lawsuit involved a first-party claim. 14 39 But
insurers and insureds won an equal number of cases in the district
courts-50%, respectively-if the underlying lawsuit concerned whether
insurers had a duty to settle or defend insureds against third-party claims."
The percentages changed dramatically once the Fifth Circuit reviewed
the district courts' rulings."' On appeal, insurers won 75% of the cases if the
underlying lawsuit involved a third-party claim.' " But insurers and insureds
won an equal number of cases in the court of appeals - 50%, respectively - if
the underlying lawsuit concerned whether insurers had a duty to pay or settle
a first-party claim.' 3
Second, among the disputes decided in the federal district courts,
insureds had a greater probability of winning only if they (1) resided in Texas
(63.6%), or (2) filed their complaints in either the Eastern District Court of
Louisiana (57.1%) or the Southern District Court of Texas (60.0%). 44 Under
all other circumstances, insurance companies had the greater likelihood of
prevailing in the federal district courts.' 5 Insurers most definitely
experienced this rate of success if their principle place of business was located
in either Louisiana or Mississippi; the reported percentages are 66% and 75%,
respectively. " 6
An examination of litigants' probability of winning before the Fifth
Circuit reveals some dramatic reversals. 144 7 First, as reported above, insureds
that lived in Texas won an impressive 64% of the cases in the federal district
courts. 1 8 But before the Fifth Circuit, insured Texans won only 45% of the
cases.'" 9 Viewed another way, defendants-insurers had a greater likelihood
of prevailing before the Fifth Circuit, regardless of whether their principal
places of business were located in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas; the
reported percentages are 67%, 75%, and 54%, respectively. 45
Also, the plaintiffs-insureds experienced substantially less success before
the appellate court depending on the location of the district court in which

1438.
1439.
1440.
1441.
1442.
1443.
1444.
1445.
1446.
1447.
1448.
1449.
1450.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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they initiated their actions. 4 " As discussed earlier, insureds who filed their
complaints in the Eastern District Court of Louisiana won 57% of the cases
in that court. 452 But before the Fifth Circuit, they lost 57% of the time. 45 3
Similarly, insureds who filed their complaints in the Southern District Court
of Texas won 60% of the disputes in that court.
1454 Those same insureds lost
4 55
60% of the cases before the Fifth Circuit.
Actually, there was only one instance where the plaintiffs-insureds'
success rate exceeded that of the defendants-insurers. 456 Insureds who filed
their complaints in the Northern District Court of Texas lost nearly 67% of the
cases in that court. 457 After appealing to the Fifth Circuit, however, those
same insureds prevailed 67% of the time. 458 Still, the general trend is
incontrovertible: Under all other circumstances, the defendants-insurers had
a significantly larger likelihood of prevailing in the federal district courts and
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 4 59 These findings appeared whether the
insureds filed first-party or third-party complaints against the insureds and
whether the courts applied settled legal principles under Louisiana,
Mississippi, or Texas laws."46
Finally, Table D presents a comparison of the insurers' and insureds'
relative outcomes in the federal district courts and on appellate review before
the Fifth Circuit. 46 After closely examining the percentages in Table D, one
finds several intriguing and bewildering revelations."462

1451.
1452.
1453.
1454.
1455.
1456.
1457.
1458
1459.
1460.
1461.
1462.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Table D, infra note 1463.
See id.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in their entirety the findings
and conclusions of the following federal district courts: the Eastern, Middle,
and Western District Courts of Louisiana, and the Northern and Southern
District Courts of Mississippi."' Stated another way, when comparing the
insureds' and insurers' win-loss ratio in the federal district courts of Louisiana
and Mississippi to the litigants'
win-loss ratio before the Fifth Circuit, one
1465
finds identical percentages.
On the other hand, when comparing the litigants' win-loss ratio before
the Fifth Circuit with their win-loss in the Eastern, Northern, Southern, and
Western District Courts of Texas, major divergences appear. 1466 For example,
the results show that the Northern District Court of Texas ruled 67% of the
time in favor of the insurers, but the Fifth Circuit reversed and decided 67%
of the time in favor of the insureds.' 7 Also, the Southern District Court of
Texas ruled 60% of the time in favor of the insureds, but the Fifth Circuit
46
reversed and decided 60% of the time in favor of the insurance companies.1 1
Furthermore, the Western District Court of Texas decided two cases, and
the insureds prevailed in both instances-achieving a 100% success rate in
that court. 14 6 9 On appeal before the Fifth Circuit, however, the insured
prevailed in one case and the insurer prevailed in the other- producing a 5050 split. 1470 Finally, the Eastern District Court of Texas decided only one
case, in which the insured won. 1471' But again on appeal, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's proinsured decision and decided the controversy
472
in favor of the insurer. 1
These revelations are intriguing. However, this study certainly cannot
explain why the federal district courts in Texas and the Fifth Circuit view and
resolve certain insurance disputes so differently. Without knowing more, the
author will not try to advance plausible explanations or engage in guesswork.
On the other hand, this arguable disharmony between the Fifth Circuit and the
federal district courts in Texas certainly begs for a more comprehensive study.
Debatably, determining whether the findings reported here are simply a
fluke or evidence of a systemic split between the court of appeals and the
lower federal courts in Texas would be a worthwhile activity. After all, federal
district courts and the Fifth Circuit consult the same body of Texas law to
resolve disputes between insurance consumers and the companies engaged in

1464.
1465.
1466.
1467.
1468.
1469.
1470.
1471.
1472.

Id.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the business of insurance in Texas. Therefore, such gross disparities and
inconsistencies should not appear.
VII. CONCLUSION
The quality of the Fifth Circuit's research, writing, application of legal
principles, and general analysis in the twenty-four insurance law decisions
was extremely mixed during the 2003-2004 session. On the one hand, several
of the Fifth Circuit's opinions were thoughtful, and the conclusions were fair.
Throughout this review, the author has acknowledged and celebrated those
positive points when they were warranted. Therefore, the author will not
outline and repeat those positive features here.
On the other hand, the court of appeals did not thoroughly research and
apply the pertinent rules in many instances. Additionally, in an objectionable
number of cases, the Fifth Circuit did not present clearly written or wellreasoned opinions, even after the appellate court applied Louisiana's,
Mississippi's, and Texas's law. Given that twenty justices sit on the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"" and a panel of three justices typically hear and
decide each case, it is unreasonable to expect that every opinion will be
stellar, enlightening, and thoroughly researched. Actually, aging and retired
justices sat by designation on a few panels. And those justices may or may
not have had the necessary tools to perform at a higher level.
But still, those restrictions do not or should not explain the Fifth Circuit's
(1) frequent propensity to insert nearly undecipherable writing into some
opinions, (2) increasing inclination to ignore settled insurance-law principles
to achieve obtuse proinsurers and proinsureds decisions, and (3) frequent
propensity to perform an Erie guess when a state supreme court has already
resolved or addressed a question of law. Very likely, there would be no need
for an Erie guess if the Fifth Circuit adopts the practice of thoroughly
researching state-court decisions that predate possibly the 1930s or 1940s.
Finally, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas have embraced five
recognized doctrines to interpret insurance contracts -the traditional rules of
contract construction and interpretation, 474 the doctrine of plain meaning,1475

1473. SeeFEDERALJUDICIALCENTER:FIFrHCIRCUiTLIBRARYSYSTEM, athttp://www.lb5.uscourts.
gov/judgebio/FifthCircuit/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
1474. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (La. 1996) (holding that
"[a]n insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary
contract principles"); Sessoms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 1993) (embracing the
position that "insurance policies which are clear and unambiguous are to be enforced according to their
terms as written [like all other contracts]"); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 740-41
(Tex. 1998) (reiterating that "insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as other
contracts").
1475. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 763 (La. 1994)
(holding that "[the parties' intent must] be determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain and
popular meaning of the words used in the policy"); Blackledge v. Omega Ins. Co., 740 So. 2d 295, 298
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the adhesion doctrine, 4 76 the doctrine of ambiguity, 4 77 and the doctrine of
reasonable expectations. 4 78 On a few occasions, the Fifth Circuit employed
the doctrine of ambiguity to interpret insurance contracts and resolve disputes
between insurers and their insureds. But the appellate court rarely mentioned
or applied the other four doctrines, even when the facts warranted such
applications.
Very likely, if the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit were to embrace
and consistently apply these doctrines to resolve insurance-law disputes, their
rulings would be more intelligible and predictable. But more important, the
legal community and commentators would be less inclined to question
whether the Fifth Circuit's rulings are sound and fair.

(Miss. 1999) (holding that courts must give terms used in insurance policies their ordinary and popular
definition); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 337 S.W.2d 284,288 (Tex. 1960) (reiterating that courts
must give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when there isno ambiguity).
1476. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kan. City S.Ry. Co., 747 So. 2d 656,674 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (observing
that "[ilt is well settled that ... insurance policies are generally contracts of adhesion"), rev'd on other
grounds, 773 So. 2d 670 (La. 2000); J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d
550, 552 (Miss. 1998) (concluding that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and as such
ambiguities are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer); Arnold v. Nat'l
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (concluding without deciding definitively
that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts because they "arise[ ] out of the parties' unequal bargaining
power" and they "allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes" during the
bargaining process).
1477. See, e.g., Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1134,1138 (La. 2002)
(repeating that an "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished the
contract's text and in favor of the insured"); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662
(Miss. 1994) (embracing "the general rule that [ambiguous] provisions of an insurance contract are to be
construed strongly against the [insurance company]"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co.,
811 S.w.2d 552,555 (Tex. 1991) (reaffirming that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be
construed infavor of the insured).
1478. See, e.g., Interstate Fire & Cas., 630 So. 2d at 764 (holding that a court should construe an
insurance contract "'to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties in the light of the customs and
usages of the industry') (citation omitted); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., Inc., 427 So. 2d
139, 141 n.2 (Miss. 1983) (adopting the principle that the "'objectively reasonable expectations of
applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations') (citation
omitted); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986)
(permitting an innocent victim whose property had been destroyed to collect under an insurance contract
for loss "reasonably expected" to be covered). But see Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 140
n.8 (Tex. 1994) (observing that Texas law does not recognize the doctrine of reasonable expectations as
a basis to disregard unambiguous policy provisions).

